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As federal transfer payments to state and local
governments decrease, administrative agencies that rely on
these funds face increasingly difficult decisions about
resource allocation. The current budgetary process is ill
equipped to deal fairly or efficiently with the increased
competition for funds. The primary shortcomings of the
current budgetary process are the haphazard involvement of
interest groups, lack of minority representation,
disjointed decision making, the inability to make
tradeoffs to maximize joint gain, and judicial
intervention.
This thesis examines the advantages and disadvantages of
using one model of mediated negotiation - The Negotiated
Investment Strategy (NIS) - to supplement formal
administrative procedures. Mediated negotiation can
overcome the shortcomings of the current budgetary process
if six key elements of the process are handled
effectively: representation and team building, access to
information and joint fact finding, mediation, negotiation
skills, ample time for negotiation, and implementation of
the agreement. Three applications of the model are
described and analyzed in terms of these six elements.
They are the Columbus, Ohio NIS; the Connecticut NIS; and
the Massachusetts Department of Social Services NIS.
Although there are political and institutional obstacles
to widespread use of consensus building negotiations, like
the NIS, it is my view that they can be overcome. The
first step is for professionals in the field to identify
standards and procedures to increase the credibility and
the legitimacy of the processes they advocate. The way
will then be paved for institutionalization of budgetary
negotiations to supplement formal administrative
procedures.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Lawrence E. Susskind
Title: Professor of Urban Studies and Planning
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BUDGETARY NEGOTIATION:
A SUPPLEMENT TO FORMAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES
INTRODUCTION
Some critics of the traditional rulemaking process
have advocated that negotiated approaches to rulemaking be
used to supplement the traditional review and comment
process. Their argument is that fairer and wiser rules
will be produced at lower cost. [1] Despite the zest
with which proponents of negotiated rulemaking have
advocated the use of consensual approaches in the
rulemaking process, there is surprisingly little
discussion to date of the ways in which other
administrative processes might also be improved through
face-to-face negotiation.
This thesis examines the possible advantages and
disadvantages of using mediated negotiation in the
budgetary process.
The Budget is the single most important policy
statement of any government. The expenditure side of
the budget tells us who gets what in public money and
the revenue side of the budget tells us who pays the
cost. There are few government activities or
programs that do not require an expenditure of funds,
and no public funds may be spent without legislative
authority. The budgetary process provides a
mechanism for reviewing government programs,
assessing their costs, relating them to financial
resources, and making choices among alternative
expenditures. Budgets determine what programs and
policies are to be increased, decreased, allowed to
lapse, initiated, or renewed. The budget lies at
the heart of all public policies. [2]
For the most part, transfers of money and the policy
choices they represent are decided upon and, to a limited
4
extent, negotiated out of the public eye. Given the
potential impact that budget decisions have on the
recipients of most public goods and services, it is
surprising that there is relatively little prescriptive
theory about enhancing the fairness and efficiency of
budgeting.
While most public resource allocation decisions are
made by legislative and administrative agencies,
individuals and groups affected by such decisions
continue to demand greater voice than the electoral
process allows. While referendums, initiatives,
formal participation in administrative hearings and
lobbying offer opportunities for more direct
involvement, they fall short of providing the
"stakeholding interests" with the control they seek.
Referenda oversimplify the range of alternatives,
failing to reflect the diversity of positions held by
the electorate. Public hearings rarely guarantee
full or fair consideration of minority viewpoints.
Almost all of the traditional participatory
supplements fail to reconcile the conflicting claims
of contending parties. [3]
If mediated negotiation can enhance the fairness and
efficiency of federal, state, and local agency rulemaking,
perhaps it can also do the same for the budgetary process.
To date, there have been a few successful efforts to
introduce mediated negotiation in the budgetary process.
[4] These cases suggest that there may well be advantages
to a more consensual approach to resource allocation,
particularly in times of fiscal stringency.[5] As federal
transfer payments decrease, state and local governments
face increasingly difficult decisions. A process that
encourages policy makers to listen carefully to the
concerns of all stakeholding interests, may be necessary
to ensure the legitimacy of resource allocation decisions
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in the eyes of those most directly affected. Mediated
negotiation brings all stakeholding interests together.
Information is less likely to be lost or misinterpreted
when stakeholders meet face-to-face. Indeed,
opportunities for joint gain that might otherwise be
missed are more likely to be discovered if a collaborative
problem solving atmosphere can be created. If legitimacy
can be enhanced, mediated negotiation can keep budget
disputes out of the court where much time and precious
financial resources can be consumed quickly.
In Chapter I of this thesis, I will discuss the
existing constraints on the budgetary process, including
legal, procedural and political constraints. In Chapter
II, I will discuss some of the shortcomings of the current
budgetary process, including the haphazard involvement of
interest groups, lack of minority representation,
disjointed decision-making, inability to make trade offs
to maximize joint gain, and judicial intervention in the
budgetary process. Then, in Chapter III, I will describe
one alternative process that can be used to supplement the
current budgetary process: The Negotiated Investment
Strategy (NIS). I will describe the NIS and three
applications of the process in order to show how it can be
used to overcome the shortcomings of the current budgetary
process discussed in Chapter II. Finally, in Chapter IV,
I will discuss the obstacles to more widespread use of
consensus building negotiation, like the NIS, in the
6
budgetary process. I will also discuss how, in my view
the NIS, or similar consensus building negotiation models
can overcome these obstacles.
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CHAPTER I
EXISTING CONSTRAINTS ON THE BUDGETARY PROCESS
LEGAL CONSTRAINTS
There are many theories about how government
organizations and administrative agencies ought to behave.
Some such theories have been embodied in statute. These
laws tend to be concerned with the outcome of decision
making. While there are some procedural requirements
mandated by law, federal, state, and local laws are
peculiarly silent about how budgetary trade offs or
priority setting should take place.
Budgeting is an enormously complicated endeavor.
Federal, state, and local governments all go through
annual budget cycles. Departments that compete for
government funds must prepare budgets. So must groups or
agencies competing for departmental funds. Agencies and
departments are constrained by three types of legal
budgetary controls: 1) Constraints on outcomes that,
because of constitutional guarantees, cannot be infringed
upon by budgetary decisions; 2) Constraints on procedure
that specify time frames, responsibility of actors, method
of budget presentation and the like; and 3) Constraints
on the use of federal and state grants designed to further
national interests. Many - but by no means all - of these
legal constraints are the indirect result of other
affirmative rights of citizenship, rather than regulations
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aimed at specifying the kinds of budgetary procedures that
ought to be used.
CONSTRAINTS ON OUTCOME: CONSTITUTIONAL AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
Direct Limits on the Spending Power of Government
The taxing and spending powers of the federal
government are specified in Article 1, Section 8, Clause 1
of the U.S. Constitution which provides that "the Congress
shall have power to levy and collect Taxes, Duties,
Imposts, and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the
Common Defence and General Welfare of the United States."
By including the "general welfare" as a legitimate
objective of federal finance, the Constitution
refrains from setting limits to the federal
government's expenditure function. Interpretation of
the term "general welfare" was left to the Congress
and the Courts, and it has come to be interpreted in
an extremely broad sense. The general welfare is
understood to cover not only objectives such as
national defense or the administration of justice,
but also highly selective programs aimed at
particular regions or population groups, such as aid
to Appalachia, grants-in-aid, and transfer payments.
[1]
Most direct limitations on the taxing and spending
power apply to tax policies, not spending policies. For
example, the Uniformity Rule, Article 1, Section 8, Clause
1 of the U.S. Constitution requires that "all Duties,
Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the Unites
States..." These Constitutional requirements impose no
overall limitation on the taxing power of the federal
government. Rather, they limit the types of taxes that
can be imposed and forbid any taxing policy which
9
interferes with the preservation of due process. [2]
Historically, the spending power of the federal
government has been even less constrained than the taxing
power. One of the only direct constraints on federal
spending is that it be for the general welfare which, as
mentioned previously, has been interpreted expansively.
[3] However, due to increasing discrepancies between
federal income and spending programs, there have been
recent attempts to pass legislation that, by requiring a
balanced budget, would effectively limit the spending
power of the federal government. [4]
Like the federal Constitution, all state
constitutions prescribe taxing and spending for the
general welfare. However, unlike the federal government,
these articles frequently place severe restrictions on the
taxing and/or spending power of either the state, the
local governments, or both. These constraints take many
forms. For example, many state constitutions limit the
amount of debt that can be incurred by the state or local
government. Many states must have a balanced budget.
Local governments are often forbidden to raise and spend
more than a fixed percentage of the value of the property
in the community, as is the case in California,
Massachusetts, and elsewhere. [5]
Indirect Limits on the Spending Power of Governments
In addition to direct limits on the spending powers
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of government, there are also indirect limits on this
power. These have emerged in conjunction with
Constitutional and fundamental rights granted to citizens
by federal and state laws. These rights do not forbid
expenditures in and of themselves. Rather, they forbid
spending if it interferes with federal Constitutional or
fundamental rights that take precedence. Stewart has
described these rights as mobility rights, political and
procedural rights with respect to state and local
decision-making, and substantive rights to particular
decisional outcomes. [6] These federal rights indirectly
constrain not only federal budgeting but state and local
budgetary policy as well.
Mobility Rights
An individual's right to personal mobility is legally
guaranteed. Laws or regulations which prevent an
individual from exercising the right of mobility have been
invalidated by the federal courts for over a century.
Citizens have a constitutional right to interstate travel.
Usually the laws that have been invalidated have attempted
to impose financial barriers to free movement across state
boundaries. For example, in 1868, a Nevada law that
imposed a dollar-a-head tax on travelers who passed
through the state was invalidated by the U.S. Supreme
Court in Crandall v. Nevada. [7] More recently, in
Shapiro v. Thompson, the U.S. Supreme Court held that,
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absent a compelling justification, state and federal
provisions denying welfare benefits to individuals who
resided in an administering jurisdiction for less than a
year were unconstitutional. [8] Five years later, in
Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa, the Supreme Court
invalidated a state statute that required an indigent to
reside in a county for one year before becoming eligible
to receive non-emergency care at county expense. [9] The
more recent case of Zobel v. Williams, differs from these
first two cases in that the issue was not whether
threshold waiting periods for social services were
constitutional; rather, at issue was an Alaska statutory
scheme through which the state was to distribute income
derived from its natural resources to the adult citizens
of the state in varying amounts, based on the length of
each citizen's residence. The Court found the statutory
scheme invalid, in part reasoning that:
If the states can make the amount of a cash dividend
dependent on length of residence, what would preclude
varying university tuition on a sliding scale based
on years of residence - or even limiting access to
finite public facilities, eligibility for student
loans, for civil service jobs, or for governmnet
contracts by length of domicile? Could states
impose different taxes based on length of residence?
Alaska's reasoning could open the door to state
apportionment of other rights, benefits, and
services, according to length of residency (footnote
omitted). It would permit the states to divide
citizens into expanding numbers of permanent classes
(footnote omitted). Such a result would be clearly
impermissible. [10]
These cases indicate that mobility rights should not
be infringed by any budget policy, at least absent a
compelling state interest.
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Political and Procedural Rights
Stewart points out that the federal courts have
imposed constitutional requirements of accountability,
accessability and regularity on state and local government
decision-making. [11] The concern of the courts seems to
be that government processes be fair and open to all
interested parties. One example of how these rights might
affect budgetary allocation decisions is that if a state
creates an entitlement not otherwise provided by the
federal or state constitution (such as government
employment or welfare benefits), then the state cannot
destroy the entitlement unless the recipient has been
afforded due process. For example, in Goldberg v. Kelly,
the U.S Supreme Court held that the state of New York
could not terminate a recipient's public assistance
payments without first affording him the opportunity for
an evidentiary hearing. [12] As pointed out by Tribe:
While these new "statutory entitlements" did not
grant a constitutional right to governmental non-
arbitrariness whenever benefits were being provided
(since government remained free to foster no
expectations in distributing its largesse), they did
serve to surround the "core" of liberty and property
interests with a periphery activated, unlike the
core, only by affirmative state choices, but secure,
once activated, against destruction without due
process of law. [13]
It is important to note the Supreme Court's emphasis
on the fact that there must be an entitlement created by
the state in order to activate the hearing requirement.
In Board of Regents v. Roth, the Supreme Court found no
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basis for the claim of a non-tenured professor to a
hearing when the state university declined to renew his
teaching contract. The decision in this case hinged on
the fact that the contract specified the date the
position would end and did not provide for renewal absent
"sufficient cause", or indeed for renewal at all. In
other words, the professor had no property interest
sufficient to require the University to grant him a
hearing prior to his termination. [14] As pointed out by
Stewart, "Roth and its progeny make it clear that states
possess substantial discretion whether or not to create
entitlements as an initial matter; while ensuring
procedural safeguards for the deprivation of such
entitlements as the state affords." [15]
Substantive Rights to Particular Decisional Outcomes
The third group of rights discussed by Stewart are
substantive rights to particular decisional outcomes. [16]
Such rights must be considered in the budgetary process to
the extent that they require affirmative government
support, action and resources.
The first (wave) has consisted of judicial decisions
in pursuit of the liberal ideal of securing the
liberty of individuals, alone or in association , to
pursue their vision of the good, limited only by the
similar liberty of others. The federal courts have
protected common law liberty and property interests
against unjustified deprivation, and secured rights
to free exercise of religion, free speech and
political opinion, freedom of education, privacy, and
most recently, abortion. These rights are Hohfeldian
immunities: liberties to act free from official
restraint or sanction.
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The second wave has consisted of decisions
prohibiting and seeking to remedy group-based
discrimination. Racial discrimination has been the
paradigm case, but since the 1954 Brown
decision(footnote omitted) federal courts have
overturned state discrimination against ethnic
minorities, women, illegitimate children, and aliens.
The third wave consists of judicial interventions
seeking to secure adequate minimum levels of basic
needs such as food and shelter. This wave has
focussed on state and local welfare programs, public
housing, transportation systems, mental hospitals,
schools and prisons. In contrast to most of the
decisions in the first wave and many in the second,
which have been founded on substantive provisions of
the Constitution, most of these decisions have been
based either on procedural due process or on federal
statutes and regulations imposing substantive duties
on state and local governments receiving federal
financial support. [17]
Each of these "waves" has had an impact on budgetary
processes. However, the third set of rights has had the
most significant impact by requiring government to provide
services directly. According to Stewart, one
characteristic of these "polyclaims" - affirmative rights
to social services and support - is that every decision to
commit resources to a particular use, prevents some other
competing use of the resources. [18] In the clearest
sense, they limit budgetary options.
Additional Substantive Rights Imposed by States
In addition to the substantive federal rights listed
above, some states have added their own sets of
substantive rights. These also constrain budget policy
and priority setting. The clearest example is the right to
education.
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Beginning with the California case Serrano v. Priest
[19], states were confronted with the legality of using
local taxes for educational funding; a practice which led
to wide discrepancies in educational resources for schools
and that favored affluent localities. In San Antonio
Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, the U.S. Supreme Court
declined to extend federal equal protection to state
allocation of education funds. [20] However, this holding
did not preclude state courts from extending state equal
protection to educational benefits by ordering major
restructuring of local school funding under state
constitutions. Thus, "In response to the demands of
Serrano, ... and a variety of subsequent cases, states
have poured large sums of money into aid for education in
order to mitigate fiscal diparities across school
districts." [21]
Court intervention has also increased spending in
almost every state for other types of equal opportunity
programs such as educational programs for the handicapped,
the disadvantaged or the urban poor. [22]
In sum, the budgetary process is constrained by both
direct and indirect limits on the spending power of
government. These limits are designed to protect such
rights as mobility rights, political and procedural
rights, substantive rights to particular decisional
outcomes, and any additional substantive rights imposed by
individual states.
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CONSTRAINTS ON PROCEDURE
The U.S. Constitution places few procedural
constraints on federal spending. Examples of procedural
constraints can be found in Article 1, Section 9, Clause 7
of the U.S. Constitution which states: "No money shall be
drawn from the Treasury, but in consequence of
appropriations made by the law...", and "a regular
statement and account of the receipts and expenditures of
all public money shall be published from time to time."
Thus, while granting the federal government impressive
spending powers, the Constitution does not specifically
require Congress or the President to keep an annual
budget. [23] And, historically, there was no regular
procedure that required Congress to consider total federal
expenditures and revenues in combination.
Congress had no effective mechanism for determining
the total amount of spending it wanted or for making
explicit trade-offs among competing budget
priorities. In addition, delays in passing
particular appropriations bills were often so
protracted that many bills were enacted only after
much or all of the fiscal year to which they applied
had already ended. Under these circumstances,
Congress was very poorly equipped to assess the
effects of its budgetary actions on the economy and
to make rational decisions on the allocation of total
budget resources among competing programs in light of
broad national goals and priorities. [24]
To remedy these deficiencies, Congress passed the
Congressional Budget and Impoundment Act of 1974, [25]
which initiated a series of wide-ranging reforms. The Act
established House and Senate Budget Committees to study
the president's budget and recommend changes in fiscal
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policy and spending priorities. It also created a
Congressional Budget Office to assist the Budget
Committees, setting forth a timetable for completing
various steps required by the new Act. While it is clear
that the Act has failed to eradicate all problems with
federal budgeting, it has increased considerably the
constraints upon the federal budgetary process.
States and local governments are also constrained by
state constitutions and statutes regulating their
budgetary processes. State laws set a variety of time,
sequence, hearing, auditing and reporting requirements
that must be met during the budget cycle. In The Politics
of State Expenditure in Illinois, Anton points out the way
in which state budgetary procedures in Illinois are
constrainted:
The motivation for making (decisions about
expenditures) ... is not derived from a rationalized
financial or administrative policy but from a legal
system which requires attention to specified objects
(i.e., budget requests and appropriation bills) at
specified points in time (i.e., prior to July 1 of
every odd-numbered year). Once made these
determinations can be ignored until the next decision
period, some fifteen months away, when similar
determinations will have to be made again.... there
is no centrally organized effort to link decisions to
consequences until the following decision period.
[26]
State and local budgeting may also be constrained by
the earmarking of certain funds. Certain tax revenues may
be targeted for certain agencies; for example, gasoline
taxes are typically reserved for highway departments.
Earmarking limits flexibility. [27]
Once a federal, state or local budget has been
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formulated, implementation proceeds under a whole new set
of controls. [28] For example, at the federal level,
allocated funds cannot be used until apportionment
schedules have been filed by the respective department or
agency. These, in turn, must be approved by the
appropriate budget officer. This procedure allows
department and agency heads to exercise some degree of
control over their own programs. [29] At the state and
local level, once a statute or ordinance is passed,
departments usually must file a work plan with the budget
office. This work plan becomes the basis for monitoring
expenditures as they occur. [30]
In sum, government spending decisions are constrained
by a wide variety of time, hearing, auditing, reporting
and other procedural requirements.
CONSTRAINTS ON THE USE OF FEDERAL FUNDS
The third major category of legal constraints are
regulations and guidelines accompanying federal aid to
states and local governments.
Whenever the national government contributes
financially to state or local programs, state and
local officials are left with less freedom of choice
than they would have had otherwise. Federal grants-
in-aid are invariably accompanied by federal
standards or "guidelines" which must be adhered to if
states and communities are to receive their federal
money. [31]
Approximately one-fifth of all state and local
government revenues come from federal grants. [32]
19
Federal grants are not necessarily directed towards a
state or local government's most pressing needs. They
also require a great deal of paperwork including grant
applications and post audit accounting. They sometimes
require matching funds. Federal officials often argue
that because federal grants are optional, state and local
governments need not apply for them if they find the
requirements too burdensome or the funds incorrectly
targeted. In reality,
... it is very difficult for states and communities to
resist the pressure to accept federal money. It is
sometimes said that states are "bribed and
blackmailed" into federal grant-in-aid programs.
They are "bribed" by the temptation of much needed
federal money and they are "blackmailed" by the
thought that the other states and communities will
get the federal money if they do not, money
contributed in part by their own citizens through
federal taxation. [33]
Federal grants are currently classified as general,
bloc, or categorical. General grants consist almost
entirely of general revenue sharing funds and accounted
for only 5% of total aid in the early 80's. [34] General
revenue sharing was introduced in the State and Local
Financial Assistance Act of 1972 as an alternative to
overly restricted and narrowly-directed categorical
grants. These funds are allocated to each state through a
complex formula based on population, state and local
taxes, and income level of the population. They are much
less restrictive than other types of federal aid, and may
be used for everything from garbage disposal to police
protection. State and local governments receiving general
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revenue sharing funds must adhere to federal labor
standards in construction projects, and must not
discriminate on the basis of race, religion, sex,
handicapped status, or age. Before funds are allocated,
public hearings must be held, and after the funds are
allocated reports must be filed about how the money is
ultimately used. [35]
Stewart points out that "the carrot of federal grants
(is used) to secure recipient compliance with general
federal policies, such as nondiscrimination, unrelated to
the objectives of a particular program." [36] The
constraints may apply to all activities of the grant
recipient and not just to the program funded by the grant.
[37] Stewart cites a 1980 study by the Office of
Management and Budget which identifies 59 such conditions,
including:
prohibitions of discrimination on account of race,
color, national origin, gender, age, handicap, and
alcohol or drug abuse; over a dozen environmental
policies or requirements; and various wage and hour
standards and job-preservation requirements designed
to protect workers hired under grants and other state
and local employees whom they might otherwise
displace. Other conditions seek to eliminate
patronage in state and local government employment
and partisan political activity by employees; provide
for hearings and participation in social programs;...
[38]
These crosscutting conditions typically apply to bloc and
categorical grants as well.
Most of the current bloc grants were created by the
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 which consolidated many
federal programs into nine bloc grants. In the early
21
1980's bloc grants accounted for approximately 12% of the
total federal aid to state and local governments. [39]
Because bloc grants carry many of the requirements or
characteristics of the more restrictive categorical
grants, including application and strict reporting
requirements, bloc grants are somewhat more restrictive
than general revenue sharing funds. They do, however,
offer more local discretion regarding project priorities.
The third, and still largest category of grants
(approximately 75% of total federal grant funds in 1982)
are categorical grants. Typically, categorical grants are
the most restrictive, and are allocated by federal
departments and agencies after review of applications from
state and local governments. [40] Restrictions may be
placed on organization, staffing and operation of agencies
receiving these funds.
During the Reagan Administration, changes have been
made in the administration of federal grants. There are
now fewer restrictions on use of federal grants. However,
there are also fewer total dollars available. These
cutbacks have reduced the budget flexibility of state and
local governments.
THE "GENERIC" BUDGETARY PROCESS
The budgetary process is best described as sequential
decision making by an ever-changing group of decision
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makers. In theory, the first step in any budgetary
process is the projection of available resources.
Projections tend to be made by a budget agency, based on
information from a tax department. In the meantime, the
chief administrator will send a letter to the agencies,
departments, or programs competing for funds, providing
them with broad policy directives regarding the size and
shape their spending requests should take. Competing
agencies prepare and submit to the budget agency their
"best case" for a portion of the available resources.
Budget requests are reviewed, revised and usually scaled
down by the budget agency, often after a more or less
formal hearing before the budget director. The budget
director then submits a recommended budget to the chief
administrator. It is important to note that:
A great many decisions may already have been made by
the time the budget director submits the tentative
budget to the governor or the mayor for his approval.
However, governors or mayors must decide whether
their budget is to be balanced or not; whether
particular departmental requests should be increased
or reduced in view of the programs and promises
important to their administrations; whether economies
should involve overall "belt tightening" by every
agency or merely the elimination of particular
programs;.. .These decisions may be the most important
that mayors or governors make in their terms of
office, and they generally consult both political and
financial advisers, budget and tax experts, party
officials, interest group representatives, and
legislative leaders. [41]
The chief administrator must consider political,
economic, and social forces impinging on the operation of
government. For example, budget recommendations may
reflect funding for an interest group that was overlooked
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in a previous budget cycle, or for new programs
appropriate to the changing needs of constituents. The
chief administrator's budget document is typically
"checked" with powerful interest groups.
The chief administrator's recommended budget is
presented to the legislative branch which, for the most
part, re-reviews the concerns of interest groups and
government departments. The legislature holds formal
public hearings to ensure that all interests have been
heard. The chief administrator's recommendations may be
considerably changed in the process:
How governors' budgets fare in the legislatures
generally depend upon their general political power,
public reactions to their recommendations, the degree
of support they receive from department heads, who
are often called to testify at legislative budget
hearings, their relationships with key legislative
leaders, and the effectiveness of interest groups
that favor or oppose particular expenditures. [42]
After the legislature has made what it deems to be
the appropriate changes, the final budget measure is
passed and sent back to the chief administrator for
signature. While the chief administrator may have an item
veto, at this late stage in the budget cycle, major
changes are relatively rare.
THE REAL FORCES THAT SHAPE THE BUDGETARY PROCESS
The theoretical description of the budgetary process
depicted above, suggesting an orderly sequence of events
with plenty of opportunity for citizens to participate,
24
rarely matches what happens in reality. At least, this
seems to be the opinion of political scientists who have
studied budgetary processes. A summary of the views of
four key political scientists follows. In their views,
the budgetary process is much more politicized than
public administration theorists would have us believe.
Wildavsky on the Federal Budgetary Process
Wildavsky is primarily known for his studies of the
federal budgetary process. According to his definition:
a budget.. .may be characterized as a series of goals
with price tags attached. Since funds are limited
and have to be divided in one way or another, the
budget becomes a mechanism for making choices among
alternative expenditures. When the choices are
coordinated so as to achieve desired goals, a
budget may be called a plan. [43]
But, Wildavsky would argue, reaching the goal of a
coordinated plan is a complex, and often uncoordinated
process. Not only are individual program budgets complex,
but even more complex is the task of comparing many
diverse programs that have different values for different
people. [44] This complexity has led to the situation
where budgetary decisions are made on an incremental
basis. Indeed, Wildavsky states:
The beginning of wisdom about an agency budget is
that it is almost never actively reviewed as a whole
every year in the sense of reconsidering the value of
all existing programs as compared to all possible
alternatives. Instead it is based on last year's
budget with special attention given to a narrow range
of increases or decreases. [45]
What is unique about Wildavsky's view is that while
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he admits the problems and limitations of traditional
federal budgetary practices, he would not necessarily
advocate a more comprehensive and coordinated approach.
He considers the specialized, incremental, fragmented,
non-programmatic and sequential character of the process
to be the reason why, in the end, a budget is always
produced:
The incremental, fragmented, non-programmatic, and
sequential procedures of the present budgetary
process aid in securing agreement and reducing the
burden of calculation. It is much easier to agree on
an addition or reduction of a few thousand or a
million than to agree on whether a program is good in
the abstract. It is much easier to agree on a small
addition or decrease than to compare the worth of one
program to that of all others. Conflict is reduced
by an incremental approach because the area open to
dispute is reduced. In much the same way the burden
of calculation is eased because no one has to make
all the calculations that would be involved in a
comprehensive evaluation of all
expenditures... .Finally, agreement comes much more
readily when the items in dispute can be treated as
differences in dollars instead of basic differences
in policy. Calculating budgets in monetary
increments facilitates bargaining and logrolling. It
becomes possible to swap an increase here for a
decrease there or for an increase elsewhere without
always having to consider the ultimate desirability
of programs blatantly in competition. [46]
Sharkansky on the Federal, State, and Local Budgetary Processes
Sharkansky, and indeed, most other political
theorists who study the budgetary process, are not so
willing to extol the virtues of uncoordinated and
fragmented decision-making. one of Sharkansky's principle
themes is that:
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Financial decision-makers lack objective, non-
controversial standards useful in setting levels of
taxation or expenditure or in deciding about the
types of taxes or expenditure that should be made.
Discussions about economic and political issues are
marked by citation of beliefs and desires, rather
than by any clear truths that translate easily into
policy decisions. The decision-maker is surrounded
by controversy, and the choices that he makes will
not satisfy all parties. His decisions generate even
more controversy that will visit him again the next
time he makes a decision about taxes or expenditures.
[47]
Sharkansky admits that it is difficult to portray the
budgetary process in a wide variety of jurisdictions in
terms of one or two generalizations about budgetary
behavior. Yet, he does assert that many budgetary
officials have created similar methods of coping with the
highly complex mixture of interests, desires, claims,
economic resources, political commitments and government
structures that characterize the environment of budget
decision-makers. Two of these methods are "contained
specialization" and "incremental" decision rules. [48]
The main features of contained specialization are
"elite status, intensive specialization among
participants, an ability to manage partisanship and other
sources of conflict within decision-making bodies, and the
acceptance of specialists' recommendations by other
officials in government". [49] These features, according
to Sharkansky, permit budget officials to cope with the
problems of complex issues and fractured governmental
institutions by limiting the number of participants in the
decision making process.
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Incremental decision rules also facilitate decision
making by severely limiting the number of considerations
that budget participants take into account when they make
choices. [50] "The essence of incrementalism is its small
(or partial) view of the issues at hand. Instead of
trying to make rational choices about the entirety of a
tax system or the whole of a government budget, the
incrementalist limits his concern to a manageable portion
of the whole." [51] Sharkansky seems particularly
concerned about incremental decision making because it
prevents budget officials from looking at as wide a range
of alternatives as they should before making decisions.
They generally accept established programs at the previous
year's level of expenditure and discuss only goals that
are short-term, pragmatic, and ideological. Thus, they
fail to give enough attention to the long-term
significance of budgetary choices. [52]
Dye on the State and Local Budgetary Process
Like Wildavsky and Sharkansky, Dye asserts that a
major feature of the budget-making process is
incrementalism, which means that the status quo tends to
be preserved. Dye, quoting Thomas Anton, depicts some of
the interesting informal rules of the budget game that
result from incrementalism:
1. Spend all of your appropriation. A failure to
use up an appropriation indicates that the full
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amount was unnecessary in the first place, which in
turn implies that your budget should be cut next
year.
2. Never request a sum less than your current
appropriation. It is easier to find ways to spend up
to current appropriation levels than it is to
explain why you want a reduction. Besides, a
reduction indicates your program is not growing and
this is an embarrassing admission to most government
administrators.
3. Put tgp priority programs into the basic budget,
that is, that part of the budget which is within
current appropriation levels. Budget offices,
governors and mayors, and legislative bodies will
seldom challenge programs which appear to be part of
existing operations.
4. Increases that are desired should be made to
appear small and should appear to grow out of
exisiting operations. The appearance of a
fundamental change in a budget should be avoided.
5. Give the budget office, chief executive, and the
legislature something t cut. Normally it is
desirable to submit requests for new programs, in
order to give higher political authorities something
to cut. This enables them to "save" the public
untold millions of dollars and justify their claim to
promoting "economy" in government. Giving them
something to cut also diverts attention away from the
basic budget with its vital programs. [53]
Dye also characterizes the budget process as
political, unreceptive to policy change, fragmented, and
non-programmatic. The process is political because what
really counts in gaining government funding is how well
the parties can develop a base of support for their
request among the public and among the top political
leaders and the legislature. The budgetary process is
unreceptive to policy change because the practice of
accepting past expenditure levels as a floor, leaves few
funds for new programs. Fragmentation is due to
earmarking. Finally, budgeting is nonprogrammatic because
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agencies use accounting procedures that hide expenditures
under ambiguous phrases making it impossible to identify
the real costs of various programs. [54]
Meltsner on the City Budgetary Process
Meltsner has carefully documented the politics of the
budgetary process in the City of Oakland, California. In
this fiscally poor city, he discovered two unique aspects
of the budgetary process. First, the budget is not used
primarily to allocate scarce resources. Rather, it is used
as a control device by the city manager and as a
communication device for departments:
For the most part, Oakland's resources were allocated
years ago when the present governmental structure was
established. Previous decisions determine present
allocations... .Although the participants will argue
for marginal increases, no one expects there will be
enough money to make a dramatic change in a
particular budget....
If the budgetary process should not be interpreted
strictly as an allocation device, then how should one
interpret the effort which most city officials put
into it? Certainly the budgetary process is not a
meaningless ritual but does have some use to
officials. The department heads use the budget to
communicate to the revenue subsystem, to the council,
to segments of the community, to their professional
associations, and to their employers. The revenue
subsystem will appreciate their problems and the
other groups will know that they tried.... the
subsystem uses the process to control city
operations: the manager finds out what is going on
and encourages the department's cooperation by making
marginal changes in the budget. Communication and
control are two important reasons why Oakland
officials take budgeting seriously. [55]
Second, the city bureaucracy is divided into budget
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spenders - the departments, and budget cutters - the city
manager and his financial staff, and each side ignores the
effects of their behavior on the other:
Budget spenders ignore revenue limitations in
formulating their budgets so as to communicate the
needs of their organizations. At the same time the
city manager and his budget staff ignore service and
program implications in cutting the budget. Since,
by law, the budget must be balanced-expenditures must
equal available resources-the manager and his staff
have to consider budgeting as a form of revenue
behavior. They are the same people who have to find
additional funds if they allow spending increases.
[56]
In sum, the observations of Wildavsky, Sharkansky,
Dye and Meltsner suggest that while in theory the generic
steps of the budgetary process are followed, in reality,
modifications have emerged in order to take into account
the legal, economic, social, political, and time
constraints on the budgetary process.
31
CHAPTER II
SHORTCOMINGS OF THE CURRENT BUDGETARY PROCESS
The preceeding discussion of the "real forces" that
shape the budgetary process, indicates that even though
the generic steps are followed, there are reasons that the
process is not as fair or efficient as it should be. These
reasons - or "shortcomings" - include the haphazard
involvement of interest groups, lack of minority
representation, disjointed decision-making, the inability
to make trade-offs to maximize joint gains, and judicial
intervention.
HAPHAZARD INVOLVEMENT OF INTEREST GROUPS
There is no organized system to ensure that all
groups with stakeholding interests are involved in the
budgetary process. The key decision-makers in the typical
budgetary process are the chief administrator, his
appointed budget officials, and the legislative body.
Presumably, voters are "represented" by these elected and
appointed officials. Yet, when voters elect these key
players "they are limited to choosing among candidates who
represent collections of positions on numerous complex
issues. One can rarely be certain that a vote for a
particular candidate is a vote for a specific agency
action." [1]
Interest groups can, of course, lobby their elected
officials in the hope of winning funding for their
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programs. However, lobbying is an extremely costly and
time-consuming proposition, and becomes increasingly so
the more lobbyists become involved. [2]
Established department and agency interests are
automatically considered each year when they submit budget
requests. However, new interest groups have only few and
indirect opportunities to be heard. Interest group
representatives can appear at public hearings on the
budget. But, because such hearings do not occur until the
final stages of the decision-making process, many key
decisions have already been made behind closed doors.
Perhaps it is because citizens have attended public
hearings and have seen few results for their efforts, that
attendance at hearings is typically quite low.
Public hearings on budgets have generally proven
dismal failures, if their purpose is to ascertain the
attitudes of lay citizens on the proposals of the
budget. Relatively few citizens attend these
hearings unless a group is irate over some aspect of
the budget that it thinks is detrimental to its
interests. Too often, the only nonofficials
attending budget hearings are representatives of
taxpayers organizations, vested interest groups
pushing their pet projects, and others with time on
their hands. [3]
Sharkansky asserts that budget policy-makers have
developed stategies that help isolate spending decisions
from the controversy that surrounds them. [4] Indeed,
if policy-makers can discourage consideration of new
funding requests and participation of all interest groups,
they can avoid competitive settings where controversy is
likely to develop. Thus, the current budgetary process
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may actually encourage the haphazard involvement of
interest groups.
LACK OF MINORITY REPRESENTATION
Because resource allocation decisions are shaped
primarily by the input of elected officials and their
staffs and the claims of established departments and
agencies, it is particularly difficult for minority groups
- those interest groups that typically go underfunded - to
make sure that their interests are well represented
throughout the budgetary process. While they may be able
to lobby the legislature or attend public hearings, they
have no direct access to policy-makers at the key decision
points in the process. Thus, it is difficult for minority
groups to encourage new program funding. According to
Sharkansky: "As a conservative bulwark, the budget may
permit legislators, administrators, and private interests
to tolerate competition for change because no radical
change is likely to survive the funding process." [5]
While, it is difficult for minority groups to ensure
advocacy for their funding requests throughout the
budgetary process, agencies whose programs have popular
support have advocates at all levels of the decision-
making process. Sharkansky found that at the federal
level:
Where the program has wide popular appeal, an agency
is likely to win favorable attention from important
interest groups and from agency superiors in the
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Cabinet at the White House. An agency that offers a
popular program may receive direct budget support
from the Department Secretary and the President. And
it may receive support by having dynamic innovative
persons appointed to leadership positions. Such
leaders may generate wide public visibility by their
own prominence and by the changes they make in the
agency's program. One limited study has found that
well-supported agencies have been the most bold in
making their own requests of Congress, independent of
Budget Bureau constraints. Agencies with a narrow
clientele, ... are apt to receive little
reinforcement from interest groups or Administration
superiors. Perhaps because they fear that any
assertion of their needs will put them in the
spotlight and invite budget cuts, such agencies may
accept the first decisions of their superiors and
live according to the team rules. [6]
Sharkansky also asserts that most actors - and thus
their interests - are excluded from the arenas in which
allocation decisions are made. [7] The inability of
minority interests to receive serious consideration of
their proposals is exacerbated because there is no single
actor responsible for seeing that all interest groups are
represented when funding decisions are made, and that
minority interest's programs and concerns are given
attention equal to that afforded traditionally funded
interests.
DISJOINTED DECISION-MAKING
In the current budgetary process, decision-making is
sequential. First, an agency makes an internal decision
about how much money to request. Next, a budget analyst
makes more or less random cuts. The Chief Administrator
increases or decreases these awards given what is left in
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the budget and given his priorities. Then, the legislature
does the same.
At each stage of this process there is an alarming
lack of information about the impacts of cuts - or in the
rare cases, increases - on the individual agency, other
agencies, or client groups. According to one study of
budgeting problems in American cities, over 40% of budget
officials rated lack of information about the
effectiveness and performance of programs "severe or very
severe" and an additional 35% believed it was a problem.
[7] Meltsner's research on the City of Oakland seems to
confirm this:
Balancing the budget in the Budget Office is
accomplished by a lack of information. Because of
his own lack of experience, the analyst is not aware
of the impact of his acts on service or on policy; he
is free to make cuts and to identify items for which
the city manager must make decisions. [8]
Meltsner's research indicated that there were ten
rules of thumb that inexperienced budget analysts used to
cut program funding requests.
(1) cut all increases in personnel
(2) cut all equipment items which appear to be luxuries
(3) use precedent - cut items which have been cut before
(4) recommend repair and renovation rather than
replacement of facilities
(5) recommend study as a means of deferring major
costs
(6) cut all non-item operating costs by a fixed
percentage (such as 10 percent)
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(7) do not cut when safety or health of staff or public
is obviously involved
(8) cut departments with "bad" reputations
(9) when in doubt ask another analyst what to do
(10) identify dubious items for the manager's attention
[9]
At the next step in the budgetary process, Meltsner
found a similar lack of information in the hands of City
Managers: "No doubt, the manager's review exhibits a
greater concern with program than the blind cutting of the
Budget Office. But because of the lack of information,
the time constraint, and the volume of minor cuts which
are made, it is never possible to trace out the effect of
any particular cut on a department's output." [10] To some
degree, lack of information may not be a mere by-product
of the disjointed nature of the budgetary process.
Rather, decision-makers may be positively encouraged to
withold information in order to increase their control.
According to Meltsner:
To increase his control, the manager tries increasing
his information while decreasing the information of
the other participants. Secrecy in budgeting becomes
an important means of control. He does not want the
analysts to communicate with the departments when
they review the budget. If the departments do not
know what the manager is considering, he can prevent
end runs to the council. [11]
Decision making is also disjointed in state budgetary
processes. One study has shown that policy makers share
little information about impacts of their budgetary
decisions. Rather, governors and legislators tend to act
as mere "reviewers" of agency requests. Indeed, state
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legislatures take an even more deferential attitude than
governors:
The finding that legislatures attribute greater
importance to the governor's recommendation (rather
than to the agency's request) in making
appropriations indicates the legislature's dependence
on the governor's budget cues. This may reflect the
greater staff-resources of the governor and the
typically amateurish character of state legislatures.
When they are compared to the professional analysts
in the governor's office, Legislators appear to have
little experience in public budgeting, no
professional training in a relevant discipline, an
impossibly brief time to consider agency budgets, and
inadequate staff or clerical assistance. State
legislators have a desperate need for cues that will
guide their budget performance, and the governor's
recommendation is usually the best cue available.
[12]
Not only is information not shared at each step in
the budgetary process but, according to Anton's study on
state spending in Illinois, the information upon which
budget decisions were based was confined to members of the
government budget system until too late in the legislative
session for both the legislators and the public to review
and effectively challenge. [13]
One of the greatest problems with disjointed decision-
making is that the learning that takes place at one step
in the budgetary process is either incidentally or
purposefully not carried over to the next step. In this
type of process there is an increased chance of ending up
with an outcome that is inadequate for most, if not all,
of the parties concerned.
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INABILITY TO MAKE TRADE OFFS TO MAXIMIZE JOINT GAIN
The fourth shortcoming of the current budgetary
process is that it prevents the participants in the
process from making trade-offs likely to yield joint
gains. In this sense the process is both inefficient and
inelegant.
Parties cannot make trade-offs for joint gains unless
they know their competitors' concerns and their
competitors' bottom lines. Disjointed decision-making,
haphazard involvement of interest groups, and lack of
minority representation are all factors that contribute to
a budgetary process where nobody really knows what the
other parties really want. Part of the problem, at least
at the federal level, is that nobody knows how best to get
their needs fulfilled.
Shall each bureau ask for what it wants or shall it
give priority to the total departmental situation in
making requests? (Put in a different way the
question might be phrased: Is it best for each
interest to pursue its own advantage or shall each
seek a solution it believes is in the interest of
all?) "One of my most difficult tasks," a budget
official asserted, "is finding out what these bureau
people really want so I will know how to deal and
bargain and oppose them if I have to. Many (bureaus)
won't speak up. I don't want them to tell me what's
good for the department. That's the Secretary's job
and my job and his staff's too. But it is difficult
to divide the pie if you don't know for sure how
much a piece each one really wants. [14]
Another reason why the parties are unable to maximize
joint gains is that the budgetary process is incremental
in nature. As discussed previously, the ". ..essence of
incrementalism is its small (or partial) view of the
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issues at hand. Instead of trying to make rational
choices about the ... whole of a government budget, the
incrementalist limits his concern to a manageable portion
of the whole." [15] Incrementalism is encouraged by the
paperwork, rules, and traditions of budget procedures, and
by the emphasis on the increment of increase or decrease
from the previous year in budget requests. [16] Because
of incrementalism, spending levels and the programs funded
remain virtually the same year after year. In the
budgetary process, the "holding power of previous
budgetary decisions is usually overwhelming in the face of
short-run pressures for change, and it is strong enough to
be felt over a span of several decades." [17] Dye also
asserts that, at least at the state and local level, the
attention of budget policy makers is focused on a narrow
range of increases or decreases in the budget.
Furthermore, the "budget is almost never reviewed as a
whole every year in the sense of reconsidering the value
of existing programs." [18]
A further reason why the parties are unable to
maximize joint gains is that the budgetary process begins
with an assumption about the revenues government expects
it can get through taxes, service charges, and state and
federal grants. When this assumption is coupled with
incrementalism, there is little opportunity for any policy
change that might lead to a better budget. "This may be
part of the reason why governors and mayors have a
difficult time bringing about significant policy changes,
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and it contributes to the public's view of "politics as
usual" and a feeling that nothing can be done, regardless
of who is elected." [19]
JUDICIAL INTERVENTION IN THE BUDGETARY PROCESS
The budgetary process frequently fails to produce a
budget acceptable to all stakeholding parties. This is
primarily due to the haphazard involvement of interest
groups, the lack of minority representation, disjointed
decision-making, and the inability to make trade-offs that
maximize joint gains. It is probably true that, as Dye
suggests, disgruntled competitors for limited resources
write off the results of the budgetary process as
"politics as usual" and feel that nothing can be done to
secure representation of their interests. However, with
increasing frequency, unhappy parties are turning to the
courts to challenge the outcomes of the budgetary process.
They obviously anticipate that the courts will be more
receptive to their needs than the legislative process has
been. It appears that they may be correct in their
expectations. According to Stewart:
As the number of judicially protected rights to
social services has increased over the past three
decades, the federal courts have increasingly assumed
the traditional state and local governmental function
of evaluating competing uses of community resources.
[20]
Although the alternative of litigation may give the
traditionally under-represented interest groups an avenue
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for relief, there are several problems with this model of
resource allocation.
First, litigation is only possible for those
individuals or interest groups who can afford to hire
counsel and who can afford to wait for a judicial
decision. [21] Minority interests are not likely to be
the ones who can afford this alternative. After all, if
they had ample resources to begin with, they probably
would have already attracted the attention and interest of
the budget policy makers.
Second, litigation typically involves an even fewer
number of parties than are able to participate in the
budgetary process. While scholars have claimed that in
enforcing federal rights against state and local
governments, federal judges frequently involve various
institutions and interest groups to help frame the
remedial decree, Stewart asserts that it "is doubtful
whether all the important affected interests, including
state and local taxpayers, are adequately represented in
this quasi-political process which often could not meet
the standards of openness, accountability, and regularity
imposed by federal judges on state and local political
decisions." [22]
Horowitz asserts that there are five assumptions that
the courts make, often incorrectly, about the parties in
dispute: first, "that the plaintiffs have discernable,
homogeneous interests; second, that the defendents are
officials of organizations with an identifiable and
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coherent structure; third, that the relevant organizations
are before the court; fourth, that the defendant
organizations have more or less consistant interests; and,
fifth, that plaintiffs and defendants are on opposite
sides of the case." [23] In reality, however, it is
often the case: first, that plaintiffs have interests and
preferences that are divergent; second, that government
bodies are typically composed of a variety of factions and
interests; third, that even in complex lawsuits with many
parties, major actors are likely to be left out; fourth,
that the defendants have a variety of different views
about the litigation; and fifth, that a number of
defendants are likely to want to lose the case to escape
political accountability. [24]
At least two of these misguided assumptions have
particular relevance to budgetary policy and merit further
discussion. First, with respect to the completeness of
the parties before the court, Horowitz stresses that:
Even in a complex lawsuit with many parties, it is
quite likely that some major actors in the field have
been left out of the litigation. By labeling a
controversy a legal question, the judicial process
simplifies the issues and the parties. Parties
excluded from participation in the litigation by this
definition of the issue are likely to appear again
later, at the implementation stage, at which point
their participation may thwart, deflect, or otherwise
impinge upon the implementation of the decree, often
producing unintended consequences and preventing the
attainment of intended consequences. [25]
Second, with respect to defendants who would rather
lose than win the case at hand, Horowitz points out:
There is commonly ... a desire on the part of some
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officials to use a decree entered against them as a
weapon in the political struggle to vindicate their
view of the appropriate treatment, rehabilitation, or
other policy goal for the institution. An adverse
decree that would require additional spending is also
a weapon used by officials to augment their
budget....
.... The more such strategies succeed, the more
frequently they will be employed. For, if litigation
results in augmented expenditures for the losing
agency, then programs not in litigation will suffer
as a result of their inability to bring political
pressure to bear on the legislature. [26]
The third shortcoming of litigation is that it is
usually limited to narrow legal or procedural issues and
therefore ignores the larger distributional or policy
issues at the heart of the problem of resource allocation.
[27]
Budget allocations involve constantly shifting global
tradeoffs among a universe of claims. Judges,
operating within an expanding and increasingly
uncoordinated federal judicial system, are incapable
of providing a satisfactory ranking or other ordering
of such claims. [28]
of course, even if judges could provide a satisfactory
ranking, there remains the question of whether this is the
proper role of the judiciary rather than the legislature.
Given the unpredictable financial results of judicial
decisions, the limited number of parties and issues before
the court at one time, and the costs - in terms of both
time and money - of litigation, it is far from clear that
the judiciary is a better budget policy and priority
setting institution. Furthermore, as Stewart points out:
Because judicial decisions are decentralized and ad
hoc, courts are not disciplined by the need to relate
particular spending decisions to overall levels of
revenue and expenditure. Moreover, social service
policies no longer reflect state and local choices
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but are decided through federal judicial decrees. In
areas such as education, health care, housing, and
environmental protection, state and local
administrative powers are enlisted to carry out these
decrees. Rather than simply removing some subjects
from state competence, these rulings conscript state
and local governments, short circuiting their
accountability to local electorates. (footnote
omitted). [29]
The fourth shortcoming of litigation is that it
"undermines relationships, pitting parties against one
another and inevitably eroding whatever goodwill exist(s)"
[30] Such an adversarial setting is unlikely to lead to a
free exchange of information and ideas about how to solve
the problem of allocating limited resources. Thus, there
is possibly even less opportunity in litigation than in
the current budgetary process for trade offs to occur to
maximize joint gains.
The fifth shortcoming of litigation is that it
occurs only after the fact. Litigation is initiated only
in reaction to the outcomes of completed budgetary
processes. For this reason it is obviously inappropriate
in situations where immediate funds are needed. [31]
Furthermore, because litigation does nothing to improve
the efficiency or fairness of the current budgetary
process, it attacks the symptoms of the process and not
the underlying causes of the problems.
In sum, to the extent that litigation merely
intensifies the shortcomings of the generic budgetary
process - the haphazard involvement of interest groups,
lack of minority representation, disjointed decision-
making, and the inability to make trade offs to maximize
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joint gain - it is a hopeless alternative for effecting
specific budgetary adjustments.
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CHAPTER III
NEGOTIATED INVESTMENT STRATEGIES
AN ALTERNATIVE BUDGETING AND PRIORITY SETTING PROCESS
Increasingly, decisions about the allocation of
public funds have become the focal point of discontent
among citizens affected by those choices but unable to
shape the budgetary process directly. As governments cut
back on their levels of spending, the potential for
conflict is increasing. The result is, that at the
precise time when cooperation and joint problem solving
would prove most beneficial, interested parties have a
tendency to position themselves as adversaries, seeing a
decision that favors their opponent as one which has
negative consequences for them. If disappointed parties
turn to the courts, the result may be even worse: Those
groups with the capacity to sustain legal challenges will
achieve an unfair advantage; fewer interests will
ultimately be tended to in court-imposed decrees; narrow
legal issues will be given disproportionate attention and
their impact on overall budget priorities may be ignored.
Furthermore, the courts are not likely to focus on the
full set of trade offs that budgetary decision makers
ought to be addressing, and the adversarial process is
likely to leave all parties in a worse position to deal
with their differences in the future. Indeed, adversarial
processes tend to polarize interest groups, stifling the
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search for integrative bargains.
In an effort to improve upon the traditional
budgetary process and, at the same time, avoid the
deficiencies of court intervention, a number of scholars
and practitioners have developed new consensus building
approaches to resource allocation:
Recently, experiments with mediated-negotiation (face
to face negotiations involving teams representing key
stakeholding interests and an impartial mediator)
indicate that traditional resource allocation
decision making processes may be supplemented in a
manner likely to yield informed and durable
agreements. [1]
One such model is the Negotiated Investment Strategy
(NIS) developed by The Kettering Foundation. I will
describe the generic NIS process along with three
applications.
WHAT IS A NEGOTIATED INVESTMENT STRATEGY (NIS)
A negotiated investment strategy (NIS) is a process
designed to "solve problems, resolve conflicts, develop
plans for joint action, and implement those plans by
involving all affected interests, government agencies, and
public and private organizations in mediated negotiation."
[2]
The negotiated Investment Strategy process was
developed by the Charles F. Kettering Foundation as
an approach to improve the use and allocation of
public and private resources in local communities.
The concept evolved from a series of research studies
which indicated that the untargeted and uncoordinated
use of Federal, state, local, and private resources
in urban areas was ineffective and counterproductive
to urban revitalization. Hence, the "investment
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strategy" which was in place was unlikely to result
in desired effects. A means needed to be structured
to encourage public and private entities to focus on
the same issues simultaneously and to bring
complementary resources to bear on the problems
identified. Such an investment strategy required a
coordinated investment policy which could only be
brought about through a negotiated settlement. Such
a negotiated settlement requires mediation to resolve
conflicts and help negotiate agreements. The NIS
process was born. [3]
Since the NIS process was first conceived, it has
been used with varying degrees of success in resource
allocation disputes in a variety of settings. For
example, the cities of St. Paul, Minnesota; Columbus Ohio;
and Gary, Indiana; all used NIS processes to coordinate
public and private investments in community development.
The state of Connecticut used the process to negotiate an
equitable distribution of federal bloc grant funds for
social services. And most recently, an updated version of
the NIS was used to set spending priorities for the
allocation of State Social Service funds in Massachusetts.
COMMON ASSUMPTIONS OF THE NIS
All NIS processes share the basic assumption that
public resource allocation disputes can be resolved most
equitably through a process with the following
characteristics:
1) participation of all affected parties in the
resolution of the dispute
2) this participation takes place through
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representation of the parties' interests by a clearly
identifiable negotiating team
3) resolution of the issue at hand is reached
through the help of an impartial mediator who keeps the
process moving from the outset to the implementation of
the final agreement.
Daniel E. Berry and Evan Rogers in "Negotiated
Investment Strategy: An Alternative Approach," suggest
that four major assumptions should guide the development
of an NIS:
First, that there will be fewer shares of new program
money to go around in the future and that any real
progress in dealing with social concerns will have to
come from a better use of existing programs and
appropriations. The growing movement to limit
government spending at all levels, and the pressure
for a balanced federal budget is likely to increase
conflict levels in the system as available resources
diminish. [4]
Second, that efforts to reform the intergovernmental
system have been hampered by the delusion that those
reforms can be carried out in a 'cooperative' mode.
Robert Bish, among others, has pointed out that
cooperation is only one of several relationships
which occur among independent political units.
Others include collusion, competition, and coercion.
[5] Within the intergovernmental system all these
relationships can occur simultaneously. Thus
processes which recognize the complex and varied
nature of intergovernmental relations must be
developed and applied. [6]
Third, that the intergovernmental system is already a
bargaining system, but one in which agencies
negotiate among themselves. often these negotiations
occur without a shared community of interests or
compatible objectives. [7] Thus achieving
coordination among organizations, says Robert D.
Thomas, must be preceded by consensus building:
achieving an agreement among the various participants
about what objectives should be attained and what
means to use. [8]
Fourth, that major reorganizations, both national and
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local, require substantial political strength and
frequently are followed by such bureaucratic trauma
that the initial targets are obscured and often
delayed for many years. Furthermore, reorganization
may be premature unless intergovernmental consensus
has been reached on what it should accomplish. Thus
it may be more expedient to rigorously test the
existing system. [9]
COMMON CHARACTERISTICS OF THE NIS
The NIS has been used in diverse settings. Each time
it is used, it is somewhat varied to take into account the
idiosyncracies of the particular dispute at hand. Yet,
there are five essential characteristics which appear in
varying degrees in all NISs. These are:
1. An impartial mediator.
2. Negotiating teams, representing the competing
interests.
3. Opportunity for informal exchange of information
before formal proposals are written and presented.
4. A written agreement containing mutual commitments.
5. A public review and adoption of the agreement, with
monitoring of subsequent performance by each party.
[10]
HOW AN NIS CAN OVERCOME THE SHORTCOMINGS OF THE
CURRENT BUDGETARY PROCESS
There are six key elements of negotiation which must
be used properly in an NIS if this model of mediated
negotiation is to overcome the shortcomings of the current
budgetary process previously discussed. These elements
are: representation and team-building, access to
information and joint fact-finding, mediation, ample time
for negotiation, and implementation of agreement. In
particular, in an NIS, representation and team building
can overcome the haphazard involvement of interest groups
that characterizes the current budgetary process. Access
to information and joint fact-finding can overcome the
shortcomings of disjointed decision-making and the
inability to make trade offs to maximize joint gains.
Mediation and training in negotiation skills can improve
the opportunity for minority interests to participate more
effectively in the decision-making process. Ample time
for negotiation improves the overall quality of the
outcome of the process. Finally, implementation of the
agreement ensures that the time and effort of the parties
is rewarded and that the legitimacy of the process is
enhanced. A closer look at these six elements of
negotiation is warranted.
Representation and Team-building
To ensure equity in representation in budget policy
and priority setting, it is essential that all interested
parties in the negotiation are represented at the
negotiating table. This requires that people are allowed
to participate in negotiations (either directly or through
a representative) at anytime during the negotiation
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process so that their concerns are represented when and
where relevant.
Teams need to be held accountable to the
constituencies they represent. Thus they must continually
report back to these constituencies for feedback and
approval of the decisions reached at the negotiating
table.
Equity in representation is dependent on the spread
of information. If affected parties are not aware of the
decisions which are being made with respect to their
interests, they are unable to ensure that their interests
are indeed being represented.
One method for ensuring representation is to allow
for on-going team-building during the negotiations.
By continuing to emphasize team building, new
interests can be melded into the process after it has
begun. This is especially important for parties who
initially refrain from participation because they are
skeptical of the process. As the process builds
credibility new groups can affiliate with each team.
Teams must take responsibility for bringing new
participants up-to-speed. [11]
Access to Information and Joint Fact-Finding
In adversarial processes like the current budgetary
process, it is atypical for parties to be using the same
information as a basis for their positions. Instead,
parties tend to use skewed data and information which
justifies a particular, extreme point of view in order to
influence the decision made. This behavior is counter-
53
productive to rational, integrative problem solving.
In a consensus building situation, like an NIS, where
the idea is to develop a mutually acceptable solution to
the problem at hand, joint fact-finding by all parties
helps to overcome this extreme positioning and the
problems associated with disjointed decision making. This
is a more productive process because it allows the parties
to spend less time being defensive and more time being
creative - it allows them to make trade-offs to maximize
joint gains. A shared body of knowledge, tailored to
different levels of understanding, will help ensure
decisions made in the best interest of all parties.
To ensure that all constituencies understand the
basis for, and implications of, decisions made at the
negotiating table on their behalf, the results of joint
fact-finding should be available to the public at large.
Attempts must be made to share knowledge because if all
citizens do not have access to the facts, there can be no
claim to a fair participation process.
Mediation
Typically, in public sector disputes, the parties who
come to the table not only have unequal power, but they
may not be able to effectively represent all the various,
diffuse parties with interests at stake. To counteract
this inequity in influence, a non-biased mediator can help
the parties become more representative and cohesive
54
through the intial team selection process and on-going
team building. The mediator can help educate the parties
about negotiation skills and can help them understand the
opponents positions. He/she can provide valuable
information, suggest creative and integrative solutions,
and improve the opportunity for minority interests to
participate more effectively in the decision making
process. According to Howard Raiffa, "joint gains could
be realized if only the contending parties were willing to
yield up enough sovreignty to allow the mediator to help
them devise creative alternatives and to help them analyze
their joint gains." [12]
Negotiation Skills
Because business and government actors often have
considerable negotiation experience, they tend to be
better skilled at influencing others than minority
interest and citizens groups. However, according to Roger
Fisher:
Strong evidence suggests that negotiating skills can
be both learned and taught. One way to become a more
powerful negotiator is to become a more skillfull
one. Some of these skills are those of dealing with
people, the ability to listen, to become aware of the
emotions and psychological concerns of others, to
empathize, to be sensitive to their feelings and
one's own, to speak different languages, to
communiciate clearly and effectively, to become
integrated so that one's words and non-verbal
behavior are congruent and enforce each other, and so
forth. [13]
According to Fisher, other types of knowledge that
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will increase one's ability to negotiate effectively
include knowledge of negotiating styles, the interests of
the parties involved, and the facts of the situation. [14]
Thus, assuming that one purpose of the NIS is to involve
all parties in the negotiations, whether experienced or
not, the imbalance can be improved by providing workshops,
lectures, roleplaying and simulation opportunities to help
interested citizens learn to represent themselves more
effectively. Interest groups should also be made aware of
the value of team building and coalition building in
strengthening their negotiating power. A non-biased
mediator can greatly facilitate the learning of these and
other negotiation skills.
Ample Time for Negotiations
The element of time is crucial to information sharing
and representation. Whereas government officals and
developers see public processes like budgeting as part of
their job, for citizens and private sector participants,
participation in public activities is usually in addition
to their regular employment. For this reason it is
essential that individual citizens and interest groups be
given an appropriate amount of time to fit participation
activities into evening and weekend sessions without undue
hardship. Citizen and interest group representatives may
need additional lead time to learn some basic negotiating
skills, the interests at stake, and the implications of
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their recommendations, as well as to digest the meaning of
reports and impact statements.
In order to overcome time constraints, it is
essential that the process start as soon as possible in
the budgeting cycle.
Implementation of the Agreement
obviously, any agreement is useless unless it can be
implemented to carry out the intentions of the parties to
the negotiations. Presumably the parties also seek a
stable agreement - one they will not be forced to review
or renegotiate in the near future. While it is never
possible to be certain beforehand that an agreement will,
in fact, be implemented, certain steps can be taken to
greatly improve the odds.
Mediated negotiation can produce more feasible and
stable outcomes than other administrative process if
two conditions are met: 1) all parties with the
power to block or delay implementation must be
committed to the final agreement, and 2) no party
should be left with an incentive to undermine the
agreement. The first condition can be met only if
all the parties are invited to participate in the
negotiations; in this way the agency not only secures
their support, but also learns about potential
obstacles the agreement might face. The second
condition is more difficult to satisfy, but is the
critical challenge in any negotiation--all parties to
a negotiated agreement should view the agreement as
"better" than their non-negotiation alternatives.
[16]
Because the NIS allows for on going teambuilding, as
potential challengers emerge, there is an opportunity for
them to be included in the negotiations. While there is
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no binding requirement that all parties sign the final
agreement, experience indicates that most, if not all, the
parties do sign.
To the extent that these six key aspects of the NIS
process are handled effectively, the outcome of the
process is likely to be better than if the resources at
issue were allocated through the current budgetary
process. Each NIS should be analyzed with respect to
these six key elements.
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THE COLUMBUS, OHIO NIS
DESCRIPTION [17]
Columbus, Ohio was one of three cities chosen by the
Federal Regional Council to participate in the then-
experimental NIS program, to institute a more rational and
coordinated approach to government planning and spending.
The initial focus of the NIS was on "reforming the
intergovernmental process and resolving policy differences
on a range of issues", which the City felt interfered with
its ability to achieve its priorities. [18]
Three negotiating teams, representing the City State,
and Federal government, were chosen by the mayor,
governor, and federal representatives, respectively. Team
leaders were given a wide latitude in determining the
compositions of their teams. They were constrained "only
by the requirements that they keep their teams to a
manageable size and ensure that the right people were at
the negotiating table." [19] Teams were divided into
core and support teams once the agenda became clear. The
key issues chosen for negotiation determined which team
members would be needed most often at the negotiating
table. [20]
Prior to their first meeting, each team was asked to
prepare a statement of its primary concerns regarding the
growth and development of the Columbus area and to list
the obstacles to effective intergovernmental coordination
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in addressing these concerns. The goal of this step was
to encourage team members to work together and to sort
through the issues that cut across agency lines. [21]
Each team brought its statement to the first formal
NIS meeting in October 1979. After an open discussion,
the mediators were able to draft a list of shared concerns
for future negotiating sessions. The draft was mailed to
team leaders for review with their team members. Several
proposed revisions were incorporated in the second draft
which was circulated for final approval. [22]
The range of issues which the negotiators addressed
included minority business development, human services,
fair housing, historic preservation, water quality
management, employment and training, meeting the needs of
special populations, and state and federal participation
in several development projects. [23] organizational and
policy questions and concerns about program operation and
procedures dominated the agenda. [24]
Because the approved agenda was still in need of
substantial refinement, the mediators asked each team to
develop position papers on each of the agenda items. When
these were received by the mediators in early December,
the mediators proceeded to take the three team position
papers for each agenda item and transform them into so-
called "consolidated briefing papers".
These briefing papers were the culmination of all the
preparations for negotiations. They summarized the
issues at stake, described the point of view of each
team on the issue, and most importantly, set forth
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the specific items to be negotiated at the
negotiation sessions. [25]
Negotiation of the eight items on the agenda took
place during three day-long, open sessions in December,
January and March. Also, after each full session,
"tripartite committees" - a member of each team appointed
by the team leader - spent the following day developing
implementation proposals for the general points of
agreement reached during the full session.
The next full negotiating session was held in March.
It was followed by a series of Tri-partite Committee
meetings and a flurry of phone calls which resulted in
final Tri-partite Committee reports. These reports were
forwarded to the mediators in April. The mediators
combined, edited and ditributed them to the team leaders
as a "Draft Agreement". [26]
The final full negotiating session took place on
April 30, 1980, at which time the draft was reviewed,
substantially revised and signed. [27]
The NIS Agreement covers a wide range of issues and
can be found in the Appendix. Examples of the 76 items of
agreement include: federal agreement to endorse and
support over $480 million of public improvements to spur
downtown and riverfront revitalization and neighborhood
stabilization; federal agreement to actively consider 15
new projects; federal agreement to endorse a state-local
request to waive the state-wide uniformity program so that
several demonstration programs could be inaugurated within
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Franklin County; City agreement to place more emphasis
on economic development; City agreement to institute a
minority business development program; state agreement to
seek increased matching funds for transit in the next
state budget. Thus, the agreement addressed a full range
of physical and social development activities to be
carried out cooperatively by federal, state, and local
officials. All three teams benefitted from their
participation in the process. [28] Overall, "The N.I.S.
process helped the City to define the nature and scope of
these projects more clearly, to evaluate their relative
priority better, and to bargain more productively with
federal agencies." [29] Furthermore, a great many
federal objectives were served through the project
agreements. [30]
To enhance the likelihood of implementation, the
agreement contained procedures for monitoring progress and
resolving future differences.
ANALYSIS [31]
As mentioned previously, the "success" of any NIS is
dependent upon how effectively the six key elements of
negotiation are handled in the NIS process.
Representation and Team Building
The Columbus NIS suffered from improper and
incomplete representation. The most obvious flaw was that
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all interested parties were not represented in the
process. For example, with the exception of the Chamber of
Commerce which was represented on the City Team, there was
little, if any, input from private interest groups. The
lack of private sector representation was most likely due
to the fact that the NIS, at this early stage, was
primarily seen as a vehicle for improving
"intergovernmental" relations. Nevertheless, in the
evaluation of the NIS it was recommended that further
consideration be given to how the private sector can
effectively and fairly participate in the process. [32]
Involving the private sector will remain problematic.
It is difficult to know who can speak for the variety
of private interests, or how these interests can be
kept from taking unfair advantage. Perhaps it is
best to have the private sector represented through
the local team, making the local team responsible for
obtaining the necessary commitments. [33]
In retrospect, it appears that some state parties
involved in the negotiations, were either disinterested in
the process or did not have the authority to represent
their constituency.
Generally it was the opinion of those surveyed that
the appropriate persons for the issue areas were
involved in the negotiation, at least for the Federal
and local teams. It was indicated that the state
could have had representatives with greater authority
involved in the process.... [34]
Furthermore, apparently the state was conspicuous in its
lack of visibility on most issues. [35]
Another representation problem was that the state and
federal team each had difficulty acting in a unified
manner. This led to frequent disagreements on particular
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agenda items. [36] The evaluation of the NIS attributes
this problem in attaining team cohesiveness to the lack of
support or mandate from the executive level. [37] On the
other hand, the Mediator believes that the real problem,
at least at the federal level, was that the players were
unfamiliar with the idea of coordinating the
responsibilities and concerns of the various agencies they
represented; they had never before tried to work together
in this type of process. [38]
The Columbus NIS benefitted from on-going team
building on all three teams. The Kettering Foundation and
Ford Foundation provided resources for inside technical
assistance to facilitate team building activities.
The local and federal teams failed to consistently
report back to their constituencies, although the federal
team did report back near the end of the process. The
state team consistently reported back to their
constituencies. [39]
Access to Information and Joint Fact-Finding
The public was not well-informed about the NIS and
the issues that were being addressed until well into the
process. This shortcoming reflects the continuing
difficulty of securing press coverage of negotiations in
general. The media tends not to be interested in the
process until a final agreement is reached. [40]
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To the extent that the participants shared
information with each other, the results were positive.
Many of the participants believed the process of
having all three teams at the same table was the most
valuable aspect of the N.I.S. It improved
communication between the levels of government,
broadening understanding of other issue areas, and
"was a successful teaching effort." Having to
develop a coordinated agenda also improved intra-
level communication and understanding. [41]
However, there was also some frustration over the
federal participants refusal to openly discuss the
possibility of alternatives to existing federal resource
allocation procedures. For example, the Mayor cited "the
refusal by some people to discuss issues because of
existing laws, previous decisions, or fear of making a
mistake and compromising their agency" as a cause of
frustration. [42]
Mediation
During the negotiations, the mediators played a very
active role. While trying to avoid voicing their own
views on the substantive issues under discussion, they
attempted to frame and clarify questions, identify
tradeoffs, and facilitate discussions. [43]
Most of the N.I.S. participants thought that the role
of the mediator was essential, or at least helpful.
Many mentioned that Larry Susskind was an active
mediator and guided agendas and negotiations toward
his biases. However, few thought that he was
excessive in this, or that his activism was a
negative point. It was generally perceived that he
kept negotiations on track by clarifying issues and
stimulating action. Some believed that his active
role was necessary to keep things going. After all,
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teams could always refuse to follow his suggestions.
[44]
Negotiation Skills
None of the teams received special training in
negotiation skills. However, given that all participants
were government officials, it is likely that they all had
prior negotiation experience. It is usually only citizen
participants who need extra training to allow them to
effectively participate in the negotiations.
Ample Time for Negotiations
Based on the information available, it appears that
there were no complaints about the amount of time spent on
the negotiations.
Implementation of the Agreement
Perhaps the greatest flaw in the Columbus NIS is that
the agreement has proven difficult to implement. This is
partially due to budgetary problems at both the state and
federal level and to changes in federal policies regarding
resource allocation. There has also been widespread
agreement that better follow-up procedures, including
periodic re-negotiation sessions are necessary to ensure
implementation of the agreement. [45]
There was no mechanism which bound a signatory to
perform as agreed; compliance rested on good faith.
The team leaders were to see that their organizations
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followed through on their agreement points. But, as
noted previously, the Federal Regional Council had no
authority to compel federal agencies to act on the
promises made. Lacking support from the Governor, it
is unlikely that the state would have been able to
deliver on all of its agreements. A number of
respondents felt that some participants entered into
agreements with no intention of following through to
implementation since they had no final authority. If
the agreement were to have been more binding, higher
levels of authority would have certainly been
required at both the Federal and state levels. There
was good support for including legislature
representation especially on long-term policy issues.
[46]
Nevertheless, the evaluation indicated that as of 1982,
approximately 50 percent of the actions agreed upon were
implemented. The major deterrent to completion of the
remaining items has been the elimination of federal
programs upon which points of agreement were based. [47]
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THE CONNECTICUT NIS
DESCRIPTION [48]
Whereas the Columbus NIS covered a wide range of
issues, the goal of the Connecticut NIS was much more
narrowly focused. The Connecticut NIS focused on the
allocation of the State's federal bloc grant for social
services for Fiscal Year 1984, a time when competition for
the scarce resources was at its height.
The issues that were negotiated include: general
objectives of the social services delivery system;
definitions of social services; measures of effectiveness
of service, which were deferred to an on-going
negotiations process; allocations of the SSBG to services
and agencies; definitions and priorities among vulnerable
populations; and a continuing process for resolving future
conflicts among the parties and concerns about the
execution of the agreement. [49]
In Connecticut, the Office of Policy Management
convinced the Governor that the NIS process would provide
a creative new solution for the political dilemma of how
to allocate the funds. The Governor agreed in advance to
accept and recommend the results of the NIS to the state
legislature. [50]
Team formation in the Connecticut NIS was much more
complicated than it had been in the Columbus NIS. There
were so many recipients of social service moneys with
interests at stake that inviting them all to participate
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was regarded as too unwieldly. Finally it was decided to
bring only the two largest groups of users - the private
non-profit providers and the municipalities into the
process. The state was the third team. [51] Selection of
the team members was also more complicated in Connecticut
than it had been in Columbus, again because of the number
of groups with interests at stake. The state team was
composed of five representatives from fourteen different
departments, boards and offices. The cities and towns
decided to depend on two municipal associations to
provide a team. The 800 - 1,000 non-profit service
providers formed a statewide steering group to select
their team members and to keep informed about and have
input in the negotiations. [52] An observor team,
consisting of two representatives of the United Way, two
representatives of community foundations, and two
representatives of the corporate sector, was also formed
to improve coordination between public and private
services funding. [53] However, the observors were
discouraged from participating directly in the allocation
process.
Virtually all the negotiations were conducted during
five intensive, public negotiating sessions that were held
between October and December of 1982.
Before the first full negotiating session, each team
prepared their own version of the guiding principles for
the allocation of the SSBG funds. During the session, the
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teams agreed on both the guiding principles and on the
components that should be included in the final document.
At the end of the session, the teams divided up the tasks
that needed to be completed prior to the next full
session. For example, the non-profit team agreed to draft
and circulate a preamble to the agreement; each team
agreed to develop tentative service priorities; the
mediator would draft and circulate the guiding principles;
and each team would prepare a draft and circulate a set
of criteria for evaluation and selection of service
providers. [54]
At the second full session, each team was given time
to explain the proposals and other work they had developed
since the first full session. Next the teams negotiated
service definitions and priorities. [55]
At the third full session the teams agreed to a set
of criteria for the ranking of service priorities. The
categories of priority ranking were also identified for
the purpose of discussion. And the teams reached
agreement on which services were high priority, which were
medium priority, and which were low priority. [56]
At the fourth full session, the mediator distributed
copies of a draft agreement that he had prepared based on
the definitions and service priorities agreed to by the
teams at the earlier sessions. Participants discussed the
draft and identified points of disagreement. After
lengthy discussion and lengthy team caucuses, a consensus
on a revised allocation formula emerged. The teams then
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divided into three working groups to work on issues that
had not yet been fullY resolved. [57] "Full agreement on
conditions and guiding principles were obtained relatively
quickly. Consensus on the evaluation and selection
criteria emerged slowly. Critical to final acceptance of
the criteria was some sort of shared understanding
regarding the structure, powers, and functions of a new
tripartite structure to implement the agreement." [58]
The teams were not able to reach agreement on all the
particulars of the tripartite committee. And there were
other issues that had to be resolved to ensure the
viability of the agreement. [59]
At the the fifth session, these remaining issues (the
preamble, the tripartite committee, investment of SSBG
funds by service providers, and the definition of
cost/benefit analysis and strategies for decreasing
administrative costs) were addressed. Consensus was
reached on the preamble, and the structure of the
tripartite committee. However, the three remaining
issues, investment of SSBG funds, payment of bills, and a
possible cap on administrative costs remained unsettled.
The teams agreed that these issues should be resolved by
the Tripartite Committee by October 1, 1983. [60]
The final agreement was signed at this fifth session,
and contained sections on the definitions of services,
service priorities, allocation mechanisms, criteria for
evaluation and selection of service providers, multi-year
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plans and processes, and contracts and letters of
agreement statements. [61] The Governor accepted the
final agreement on January 25, 1983. A complete version
of the final agreement can be found in the Appendix.
ANALYSIS [62]
The success of the Connecticut NIS can be reviewed by
looking at how effectively the six key elements of
negotiation were handled during the process.
Representation and Team Building
One of the most obvious differences between the
Connecticut NIS and the Columbus NIS was the role played
by federal parties. In the Columbus NIS the federal team
members were crucial to the negotiations, but were not the
best of participants. On the other hand, in the
Connecticut NIS there was no notion of federal
involvement. This was primarily because of the changed
national political scene and because bloc grants are
characterized by fewer federal restrictions. Although
federal officials did not need to attend negotiation
sessions in Connecticut, they did provide some funding for
the process. [13]
According to the evaluation prepared for The
Kettering Foundation, among the teams that were chosen to
participate in the NIS, the individual parties involved in
the negotiations felt that their team represented the
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agencies and departments it was organized to represent.
The agencies and the departments concurred that they were
well represented by the teams. However, there was concern
voiced over the representativeness of the non-profit team,
apparently because of its heterogeneity and the number of
parties it was to represent. Although most of the parties
indicated that no parties that were crucial to the
negotiations were excluded, there was concern that the
legislature was not represented in the negotiations. [64]
The evaluation also pointed out that several
negotiators complained that they were not included in the
NIS process from the beginning.
Several of these negotiators complained that they had
not been brought in earlier, perhaps while initial
discussions were held with the Kettering Foundation.
Their "ownership" of the process was developed, not
inherent from initiation, and this, too, is a
component of negotiation. They were invited to the
negotiation table, not initially as equals, but that
equality evolved. The two, private, nonprofit
provider team spokespersons feel that they were not
equals in the process unitl they "participated in
selecting the mediator. [65]
Although the negotiating sessions were open to the
public, neither citizen nor private sector actors were
given a significant role in the process. According to an
evaluation by Sylvia Watts, three distinct groups were
excluded from the NIS: the legislature, consumer
interests, and Hispanic representatives. The exclusion of
these interests caused problems in ensuring smooth
implementation of the agreement. [66]
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Access to Information and Joint Fact-Finding
Initially municipal and private providers were at a
disadvantage because they had little knowledge of existing
service delivery structures, contracts, services, etc.
compared to the knowlege of the nonprofit providers.
However, the nonprofit providers helped these other
participants learn about such matters as the need arose in
the negotiations. The participants were satisfied with
this arrangement.
The participants felt that the training in these
areas could not have been provided without
compromising the process and the results. They felt
that had this training been provided, it may have
circumscribed the agenda for the process by limiting
knowledge and issues to those discussed. Instead,
the agenda was set jointly by the three teams and the
data needed to support it was generated jointly.
While this may have forced participants to use some
negotiation time to educate themselves about facts
which were available to them even before the
negotiations began, they now knew that these facts
were important to them and, consequently, they were
more likely to pay attention to them. [67]
on the other hand, the parties voiced complaints
about the difficulty of getting data from the state. For
example, the nonprofit providers and municipal teams
exchanged data requests with the state at the first full
session, and did not receive the data until the third
session, four weeks later. As pointed out by Watts, the
mediator did not intervene to eradicate the power
imbalance in the negotiations. Rather he "relied on the
State Team to prepare the workbook, data, and other
materials. This responsibility gave the State the
advantage of controlling the data by which decisions were
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based." [68]
Despite these complaints, for the most part the
parties seemed pleased with the amount of information
sharing that took place. "The negotiations led to
better understanding of other team's positions, and
eventually moved the teams closer toward one another's
positions." [69] Yet, according to Watts, the parties
primarily engaged in positional bargaining:
This approach to bargaining tended to ignore the
underlying interests of the parties. In addition,
the parties assumed a "fixed or diminishing pie" in
deciding how to meet essential needs in the face of
cutbacks. They spent little time exploring ways in
which the overall amount of money available to
support social services might have been increased.
They did not try to invent options through which
mutual gain might have been maximized, instead each
competed for limited funds in a way that ignored the
legitimacy of the needs expressed by his/her
counterparts. [70]
Mediation
According to the evaluation, overall, the parties to
the negotiations rated the performance of the mediator
very high. [71] However, the parties pointed out several
situations where the mediator could have played a more
active role to help move the negotiations along.
First, although the mediator was quite active in
proposing rules of order and rules for conducting the
negotiations, after the rules had been set there were
still misunderstandings about who would participate in the
negotiations. [72] "Ground rules should have been recorded
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by the mediator earlier in the process, distributed to
participants immediately, and agreement reached before
proceeding." [73]
Second, although during the second full session ,the
mediator was active in forming the issues for negotiation,
he did not allow discussion or clarification of the issues
at that time. Consequently, some participants felt that
several crucial issues were overlooked in the process.
"With more exploration of issues at that point,
participants could have focused earlier and in more depth
on crucial aspects of each issue rather than relying on
their general interpretations of the issue." [74]
Third, throughout the process there was confusion
over terminology and thus some confusion and lack of
specificity in the negotiations. The problem could have
been overcome by "a more directed discussion at the
beginning of the process led by the mediator in which
terms are defined to the satisfaction of the participants.
These terms can then be printed and distributed to
participants for their use throughout the sessions." [75]
The parties to the negotiations also suggested that
the NIS process could have been more structured and better
managed. They suggested that the mediator play a stronger
and more substantive role in the negotiations and that he
pay more attention to administrative details. [76] Some
of the negotiators complained that the mediator "allowed
pointless, futile arguments to go on and on before
intervening", "permitted irrelevant issues to impinge on
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the process", "failed to record all understandings", and
"rushed the teams." [77] Watts critiqued the mediator's
performance more harshly than the parties:
There are several things that the mediator did not do
which could have made the negotiations a better
process and produced a better outcome. They are the
following: he failed to provide the necessary
training and orientation; (2) he failed to involve
all interests adequately; (3) he alligned with the
party that appeared most powerful; (4) he failed to
use the appropriate facilitative skills; (5) he
failed to utilize other intervention strategies; (6)
he failed to employ his mediation team in a more
constructive manner; and (7) he failed to develop a
final agreement which is fair, efficient, and
implementable. [78]
Negotiation Skills
Participants suggested that more orientation would
have been helpful. [79] All teams rated the state team
the most influential in the NIS. To the extent that the
state's influence was due to superior negotiations skills,
it may have been helpful to provide negotiation training
to other participants to equalize the balance of power.
On the other hand, there was also the concern that
providing training in mediation, negotiation, or the
substance of the issues to be discussed could limit the
range of issues to be discussed to those in which training
was provided. [80] However, this concern seems to relate
more to substantive training than to training in
negotiation skills. Although most participants felt
that they had intuitive or learned negotiation skills
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which sufficed, several expressed some need for additional
training. Watts, suggests that procedural training could
have focused on more efficient negotiating techniques and
alternatives to the win/lose orientation of the parties.
[81]
Ample Time for Negotiations
Participants in the NIS suggested that more time was
needed for the negotiations. The time constraints were
particularly difficult for the private, non-profit
providers. Because they were service providers, not just
administrators (as were many of the other participants),
they had to balance the NIS activities with their client
needs. [82] According to Watts, important items that were
excluded from the final agreement could have been included
under a more realistic time frame. [83]
Virtually all of the participants indicated that
the NIS process took more time than previous allocation
processes. The NIS process required about ten person days
per negotiator in joint meetings, plus two to three times
that amount of time in intra-team meetings, and other
individual meetings and conversations. Yet, almost all of
the participants felt that the time was worthwhile. [84]
Implementation of the Agreement
The State of Connecticut has demonstrated an
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effective process for taking responsibility for
allocating the SSBG. The process resulted in: (1) a
politically-acceptable one-year allocation of the
SSBG; (2) a framework for future years' decision-
making regarding the SSBG; and (3) identification of
key issues requiring resolution through the
continuing process. [85]
Despite the praise which the process has received,
the ultimate question that must be asked is whether the
agreement can be implemented. Watts pointed out three
reasons why the agreement does not seem fair, efficient,
or easily implemented: First, the language of the
agreement was vague; Second, there are no incentives for
the parties to keep their agreements; Third, the agreement
fails to include compliance mechanisms. [86]
Furthermore, other critics have pointed out that no
timetable for implementation of the agreement was
specified and the mediator did not assume any
responsibility for monitoring of the final agreement. [87]
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MASSACHUSETTS DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES NIS
Despite the fact that the Columbus NIS and
Connecticut NIS have been labeled successes, as the
previous analyses have indicated, they have not been
flawless. As with most processes, each time the NIS is
used to solve disputes over resource allocation, it is
likely that changes will be made to overcome failures in
previous applications. The Connecticut NIS attempted to
incorporate process improvements to build on the
experience from the Columbus NIS. And, even more process
improvements have been attempted in the most recent
application of the NIS at the Massachusetts Department of
Social Services (DSS). In this section, the DSS NIS
will be described and analyzed to demonstrate the process
innovations that were developed to overcome the weaknesses
of both the Columbus and Connecticut negotiations.
DESCRIPTION [88]
In July, 1984, the Massachusetts Department of Social
Services decided to use the NIS process to help set budget
priorities for the allocation of funds for one of its
social service programs -- The Public Private Partnership
Program (4P Program). Over 100 parties, representing a
full range of constituent groups including consumer and
citizen representatives, participated directly in the
negotiations. [89]
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The 4P program is jointly funded by state and private
donors (including private foundations, companies, and
municipal governments). Donor contributions are matched
by the state on a 3 to 1 basis. In other words, 75% of
the funding for 4P services is provided by the state, and
25% is provided by the donors. [90]
The 4P program and its predecessors had, over time,
become very popular among contributors because they
allowed contributors to direct their donations to their
favorite services. Indeed, the current 4P program allows
donors to explicitly earmark their donations for specific
providers. [91] Unfortunately, the favorite services of
the contributors do not always coincide with the greatest
needs of the state.
In FY 1984, total spending for 4P services reached
$13.2 million in state funds and $4.4 million in private
funds. Over half the FY 84 budget was used for counseling
services and one quarter was used for day care. Other
funded services included camping, services for abused
women, information and referral assistance to match
clients with other assistance programs, legal aid,
mediation, homemaking services, and family planning. [92]
In 1984, the DSS came under the direction of a New
Commissioner of Social Services. The Commissioner was
concerned about the rigidity of the 4P service mix and the
geographic distribution of 4P dollars. She also wanted to
ensure that 4P funds were spent in a manner consistant
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with the state's overall social service priorities. [93]
After a series of informal conversations among senior
staff in the Department of Social Services, the
Commissioner decided to initiate an NIS to review and
revise budget priorities for the 4P Program. In March,
1984, the Department issued a formal proposal for a 7-
month negotiation among the following four negotiation
teams: 1) a donors team representing the municipalities,
the United Way, and other agencies and foundations which
provided the 25% private match for the 4P services; 2) a
providers team, representing those who delivered 4P
services under contract to the state; 3) a client and
citizen advocates team representing the recipients of 4P
services as well as the general public; and 4) a DSS team
representing the Commissioner, DSS staff, and the DSS as a
whole. [94]
Twenty "organizers" were chosen by constituent groups
and the Commissioner to help select team members, a
mediator, and support staff for the teams and to negotiate
a detailed work program. Once the four teams were
defined, the organizers began to mobilize their teams.
For the DSS team, the Commissioner invited all interested
area and regional staff to attend a June organizational
meeting. Over the course of this and subsequent meetings,
a three-tiered negotiating team was set up. A 25-person
negotiating team represented the department at the
negotiating table. The negotiation team was composed of
three representatives from the six DSS regions, three
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from the Central Office, and four at-large to fill in the
gaps (to ensure racial, gender, and occupational
representation). The negotiating team reported
periodically to a 50-person Steering Committee which was
composed of one person from each area and regional office.
In addition, periodic updates were mailed to approximately
500 people on the DSS Mailing List. [95]
The provider team was more difficult to organize.
the existing state association of providers mailed a
newsletter to the provider community. After several
regional meetings, individual regions selected their own
representatives. Additional representatives were located
with the help of a strong state-wide providers network.
[96]
The Client/Citizens Team was composed of a group of
concerned and informed Massachusetts citizens who
represented diverse program interests, geographical
interests, and minority and handicapped groups. [97]
The Donors or Partners Team included 22 members
representing United Way, Municipalities, corporations and
foundations.
The Commissioner and Organizing Committee next
selected a mediator. The mediator, in turn, recruited
staff for a "mediation team". [98]
In mid-July, the mediator conducted a half-day
training session for all team members. The participants
learned about other NISs and about negotiation skills.
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They also participated in a negotiation exercise designed
to help them improve their individual negotiating skills.
[99] There were also two subsequent training workshops
for the co-leaders of each team. Assistant mediators were
assigned to each team and funds were set aside for each
team to hire an administrative staff person. [100]
The first full negotiating session took place in late
July. The teams tentatively agreed to groundrules
governing the negotiation and identified seven agenda
items. Each team designated 1 - 2 representatives to
serve on "Issue Committees" for each agenda item. These
committees were instructed to conduct initial fact-finding
and to develop and prepare preliminary recommendations
which served as negotiating texts for the full negotiation
sessions. [101]
For the next two months, most of the activity took
place in the Issue Committee meetings or private Team
Meetings. The draft recommendations of the issue
committees were reviewed and negotiated within the teams.
From October 1984 through February 1985, full negotiation
sessions, lasting either a half day or all day, took place
approximately every three weeks. In March 1985, at the
last full session, the teams reached agreement in
principle on the provisions of the extensive agreement.
As the Mediation Staff translated the team member's
commitments into a formal document, some confusion over
the final wording surfaced. To eliminate this confusion,
the teams met separately over the next few months and
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negotiated final changes in the language through the mail.
In addition, the Partners and the Providers used these
months to circulate the draft final agreement among their
constituents before the signing ceremony. [102] The
agreement was signed in February, 1986 and is included in
the Appendix.
The final agreement included more than 60
recommendations regarding proposed changes in the 4P
Program. These fall into six categories:
1) the roles and responsibilities of the key parties
involved in the 4P partnership.
For example, the parties developed recommendations
aimed at strengthening advisory boards and creating new
regional advisory boards.
2) the process for conducting needs assessments.
For example, the parties recommended that
comprehensive needs assessment be conducted once every
three years, and that annual updates be used to verify
suspected changes in the needs of selected target groups.
3) the request-for-proposal process.
For example, the parties agreed on modifications in
the timing of RFP's and dissemination of information about
RFP's, and agreed to open bid all new monies to stimulate
new initiatives.
4) contract monitoring and evaluation procedures.
For example, the parties agreed on new guidelines
regarding notice requirements and the dissemination of
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information obtained through the monitoring and evaluation
process.
5) strategies for meeting the needs of minority and
rural underserved populations.
For example, the parties agreed that funds to
underwrite yearly sensitivity training for providers that
serve minority and underserved populations will be
included in all relevant RFPs.
6) service priorities for FY 1987 and beyond.
For example, the parties agreed that improving
services to the underserved, increasing local discretion,
and working towards wage parity should be the overriding
consideration in guiding future 4P allocations.
ANALYSIS [103]
The DSS NIS was characterized by several process
innovations that were designed to explicitly respond to
the shortcomings of the Columbus and Connecticut NISs
Representation and Team Building
In both the Columbus and the Connnecticut NISs, there
were limited opportunities for citizen or private interest
groups to actively participate in the negotiations over
resource allocation, despite the fact that the outcome of
the negotiations would have a definite impact on them.
The DSS NIS was designed for maximum consumer and citizen
participation. Indeed, all parties with a stake in the
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outcome of the process were invited to either sit at or
have their interests represented at the negotiation table
by joining a negotiation team. These included partners and
providers who had an existing financial stake in the 4P
Program as well as academics and consumer organizations
interested in seeing more responsive state government.
Furthermore, every effort was made to try to eliminate any
financial barriers to participation. Staff resources, as
well as grants totalling between $10,000 and $20,000, were
provided to all teams to help them defray the costs of
organizing, meeting, and travelling. [104]
Yet, many participants didn't really feel part of the
teams organized for the purposes of the negotiations.
[105] One problem that emerged in the NIS was how to
involve citizens who weren't already clients. The best
possible solution was to combine the citizen and client
advocates into a single negotiation team even though their
concerns were somewhat different. The reasons suggested
for this grouping were that the citizen and client
advocates had few resources and that there might not be
sufficient interest among the general public to sustain an
independent citizens' negotiating team. [106]
Nevertheless, by combining these two groups in one team,
to the extent that their interests diverged, the interests
of either may have been poorly represented.
In the Columbus NIS, some of the parties involved in
the negotiations either were disinterested in the process
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or had no real authority to bind the organization they
represented to the agreement. These shortcomings were
overcome in the Connecticut and DSS NISs to a great
extent. However, in all three of the cases, the
legislature was not a participant in the negotiations.
While it is true that once an NIS is completed, it is
usually to the advantage of the legislature to support the
result, it would be best to encourage more active
participation from the legislature to ensure that the
concerns of the legislature are addressed. This would
reduce the possibility of a legislative veto of the
agreement. How to involve the legislature in the NIS
continues to be a logistical problem because it is not
clear what team they should participate on. The DSS NIS
made continuous attempts to secure legislative involvement
to the extent possible. The Secretary of Human Services
held a meeting with key legislators to inform them of the
DSS process. Legislators were also notified of all
meetings and were sent reports throughout the
negotiations. [107]
In the Connecticut NIS, several participants
complained that they were not involved in the initial
decision-making regarding the NIS process. This problem
was repeated in the DSS NIS. The Department of Social
Services decided on the composition and number of teams,
apparently without input from other participants.
One characteristic of the Columbus NIS was the lack
of communication and cohesiveness within each team. The
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DSS NIS was designed to overcome this problem by placing a
greater emphasis on team meetings and by providing more
opportunities for mediation support in the team meetings.
For example, assistant mediators were assigned to work
with each team to facilitate internal team caucusing and
to help the teams reach internal consensus before meeting
with the others at the full negotiating sessions.
Furthermore, ongoing team-building was used to create more
cohesive and representative teams.
Access to Information and Joint Fact Finding
In the Columbus NIS, the participants expressed
frustration about the federal participants' reluctance to
provide information about existing rules and regulations.
In the Connecticut NIS, the participants expressed similar
frustration about the state participants' reluctance to
make data quickly available. To avoid such problems in
the DSS NIS, the mediator hired a research assistant to
provide detailed factual information to the parties on
request. [109]
There was also much more information-sharing among
participants in the DSS NIS. For example, the DSS
initiated an in-house survey to identify those services
viewed as most important by agency staff. The results of
this survey were used to target five broad services for
special priority over the next several years.[110]
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Not only was more information shared within the DSS
NIS, but there was also more information made available to
the public at large. For example, the mediation staff and
team members made a special effort to keep all interested
non-participants informed of the progress of the
negotiations. The mediator issued periodic published
reports summarizing the results of each part of the
negotiations. These reports were mailed to several
thousand organizations at the request of the four
negotiating teams. [111]
Mediation
In the Columbus NIS, the mediator played a very
active role in the negotiations process and the
participants seemed pleased that he had. On the other
hand, in the Connecticut NIS, when the mediator played a
more passive role, several participants had complaints.
These included confusion over terminology, not enough
discussion or clarification of issues, and not enough
attention to administrative details.
In order to overcome such shortcomings in the DSS
NIS, the mediator and his staff played an active role in
the negotiations. Not only did the mediation staff
provide necessary information to participants, and provide
extra mediation for team meetings, but they also paid
close attention to administrative details. For example,
the mediator hired an administrative coordinator to manage
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the day to day activities of the negotiations such as
scheduling, mailings, responding to inquiries, recording
the minutes of full negotiation sessions. The mediator
also redirected some of the funds initially designated for
the mediator and his staff, to the teams, to pay for each
team's staff support, telephone, and in some cases in-
state travel expenses. [1121 Also, the mediation team
worked hard to protect the fairness of the process:
They offered to play an independent fact-finding
role when the parties disagreed on past trends in
allocations. They helped the teams report back to
their constituents on a regular basis. They
questioned the participants to be sure that all the
legitimate interests were represented at the
negotiations table, they recorded the minutes of the
negotiation sessions to create a "public record"
should anyone wish to know what transpired. Finally,
they assisted in the presentation of successive
drafts of the written agreement. The presence of the
mediation team helped to shape the perceptions of
both those inside and outside the process regarding
the fairness of the negotiations. [113]
Negotiation Skills
In the Connecticut NIS and the Columbus NIS, there
was little opportunity for the particpants to learn how to
be effective negotiators. Given that most participants in
these negotiations were government officials, perhaps they
were already familiar with negotiations skills. However,
in the DSS NIS because the participants ranged from
citizens to public officials there was great diversity in
the amount of prior negotiations experience of the
participants. For this reason, a negotiation training
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session was a necessary step in the ongoing attempts to
equalize bargaining power of the participants.
Prior to the negotiations, the mediator conducted a
half-day training session during which team members
learned about other NIS efforts in public sector disputes.
They also learned about the elements of "principled
negotiation", and participated in a negotiation exercise
to help them improve their individual negotiating skills.
[114] There were also two subsequent training workshops
for the co-leaders of each team. [115]
Ample Time for Negotiation
In the Connecticut NIS, participants with competing
demands on their time, found the negotiations schedule
very difficult to meet. The DSS NIS was organized to take
such time constraints into account. For example, six
months were allowed to pass between the final negotiating
session and the formal signing ceremony to allow team
members an opportunity to review the draft with their
constituents. [116] Yet, full day negotiating sessions
were difficult for citizens to attend. In order to
compensate for this shortcoming, consumer advocates were
included in the process to represent citizens who could
not attend. [117]
The DSS NIS was enormously time consuming and
participants had very different reactions to this:
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In formal post-negotiation questionnaires, about one
third of the participants complained that too little
was accomplished at too great a cost in contributed
time. About one third of the participants were
pleased with both the outcome and the process. The
remaining one-third either expressed no strong
opinion or expressed skepticism regarding the
possible implementation of the agreement. [118]
Implementation of the Agreement
In the Columbus and Connecticut NISs it was
particularly obvious that there is a need for follow-up
implementation procedures and periodic renegotiations in
order to bring about the execution of the agreement.
In the DSS NIS, it was agreed from the outset that
the final agreement would be viewed only as a set of
recommendations to DSS, not a legally binding contract.
[119] However, the process gave the Commissioner an
agreement that was not likely to be subject to hostile
lobbying in the legislature when the proposed changes in
priority were announced. This is because all parties with
interests at stake were invited to participate in the
negotiations process.
The final agreement included several provisions
designed to ensure the timely implementation of the
agreement. For example, team members agreed to meet at
least twice within a year of the date of the signing of
the agreement to review the progress on implementation.
Furthermore, the DSS agreed to distribute the published
agreement and an updated progress report annually to all
team members and to a host of other DSS, partner,
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provider, and citizen representatives. The other
participants agreed to seek administrative remedies if any
part of the agreement is ignored or violated. [112]
Unfortunately, it is still too early to judge the success
of the DSS NIS in terms of implementation to see for sure
if these innovations have overcome previous NIS
implementation shortcomings.
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CHAPTER IV
OBSTACLES TO THE WIDESPREAD USE OF CONSENSUS BUILDING
NEGOTIATIONS IN THE BUDGETARY PROCESS
The preceeding analyses of the Columbus, Connecticut,
and Massachusetts Department of Social Services NISs,
demonstrate some of the advantages and disadvantages of
using a more explicit negotiations approach as a
supplement to the formal budgetary process. After looking
chronologically at the three applications of the NIS
procedure, it is apparent that budgetary negotiation has
improved with experience. Indeed, the DSS effort
incorporated several process innovations that were
explicitly designed to overcome some of the shortcomings
in previous NISs. Furthermore, it is apparent that
consensus building can be used to supplement formal
administrative procedures in a variety of settings.
However, despite the process innovations that were
initiated in the DSS NIS, there are still several
obstacles that must be overcome if consensus building
negotiations are to be used more regularly.
Because such negotiations are a relatively recent
phenomenon, scholars and practitioners have had little
time to study the obstacles to more widespread use.
However, I believe that the obstacles to budgetary
negotiations are analogous to the obstacles identified in
more generic studies of mediated negotiation. These
obstacles fall into two categories: political obstacles,
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and obstacles to institutionalization. Indeed, included
within these broad categories are many of the same
concerns that surfaced in the analyses of the NISs:
Should citizens be represented? What should be the role
of the mediator? Will the agreement be implemented?
While it is beyond the scope of this Chapter to
detail all the obstacles to budgetary negotiations, the
following overview should suggest to the reader, the types
of problems that may be encountered in widespread use of
consensus building negotiations in the budgetary process.
It should be noted at the outset that there appear to
be few legal obstacles to budgetary negotiations. While
any budgetary process must operate within the constraints
on outcome, procedure, and use of federal funds outlined
in Chapter I, a mediated approach to budgetary policy
making does not seem to trigger any additional legal
constraints. Several reasons have been suggested to
explain why mediated agreements need not be subjected to
close scrutiny. For example, Folberg and Taylor claim
that:
There are several safeguards relating to the fairness
of mediation outcomes. The principle safeguard is
the presence of a skilled and reasonable mediator - a
knowledgeable third party to help the disputants
evaluate their relative positions so that they can
make reasoned decisions that seem fair to them after
considering all relevant factors. The mediator
serves as a check, though not necessarily a
guarantor, against intimidation and overreaching....
A second check on the fairness of a mediated
agreement is ... legal review and processing.
Independent legal review is a necessity in divorce
settlements, labor contracts, enviromental issues,
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and other legally oriented and complex disputes...
[1]
POLITICAL OBSTACLES
There are several political obstacles to more
widespread use of consensus building negotiations of the
sort described in this thesis.
One of the most difficult political obstacles to
overcome is the representation problem. First, it is
essential that all parties with interests at stake are
contacted and invited to participate in the negotiations.
Second, it is essential that all parties are represented
at the negotiations sessions by an appropriate
spokesperson. "(S)ince the effectiveness of a negotiated
agreement often depends on the ability of representatives
to reflect accurately and respond effectively to the
needs, priorities, values, and interests of the groups
involved, the selection of the spokespersons is critical."
[2] Unfortunately, it is extremely difficult to organize
teams to represent diverse interests. This was certainly
the case in the NIS examples discussed in the last
chapter. In an attempt to mitigate the problem, The DSS
NIS was designed to allow for ongoing team building
throughout the negotiations. Yet, new team members could
only participate via one of the four prexisting teams even
if none of these teams adequately represented their needs.
It is clear that representation remains one of the
most difficult obstacles to overcome in consensus
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building negotiations. Yet, it is not an obstacle that
should preclude the use of such processes. Consensus
building negotiations can still be designed to represent a
more diverse group of interests than are currently
represented in the traditional administrative processes or
in the courts. Indeed, parties are not precluded from
ultimately going to court if they feel the
representativeness of an alternative process has broken
down.
A second political obstacle to widespread use of
budgetary negotiations is the fear of cooptation. The
fear of cooptation in mediated negotiation is the fear
that unless an agency decision is subject to judicial
review, the agency may cut deals with particular interest
groups at the expense of the public at large. [3]
However, there are many safeguards built into mediated
negotiation to guard against just such an occurence. For
example, in the DSS NIS, all negotiating teams were
granted the power to veto or block any final agreement.
If negotiations appeared to be progressing poorly, or if a
team felt they were being coopted, they could simply walk
out of the process. [4]
A requirement of unanimity is necessary because an
affected interest is likely to feel inhibited from
participating in a group discussion if it feels it
can be outvoted. The interest may feel that it has
more power by forcing the use of a hybrid process or
a political process. Mandating unanimity protects
that power. [5]
Of course, an individual may have less power in this
respect than the team as a whole. While it can be argued
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that any individual has the alternative to drop out of a
mediated process and lobby or litigate in order to be
heard, in actuality, these latter choices are often not
available to the neediest because they are time consuming
and expensive.
Mediated negotiation may do little to correct the
injustices in the distribution of wealth and power in our
society, but it can improve the position of disadvantaged
groups through access to information and joint fact-
finding and other process innovations. To a large extent,
this change in relative position of the parties depends
upon how active the mediator is in the negotiations
process. For example:
Since a lack of information is often a major weakness
of less powerful groups, especially in
technologically sophisticated disputes, increased
access to information may represent a significant
gain. The extent to which information is actually
shared may depend on the ability of the mediator to
encourage cooperation. Nevertheless, mediated
negotiation at least offers an opportunity for
information sharing not available in adversarial
proceedings. Mediated negotiation is also less
costly than sustained political action or litigation.
[6]
A third political obstacle to budgetary negotiations
is the unwillingness of elected officials to relinquish
power. Because of their power in the ultimate resolution
of the dispute at hand, it is important that elected
officials remain active participants throughout the entire
mediated neogtiation. However, "(e)lected decision makers
may hesitate to participate in a mediation effort. They
may feel threatened by a process that forces them to
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surrender even a modicum of their authority." [7] They
may have the view that if they propose negotiations they
will lose the power they have over the outcome of the
process. They may fear that such a proposal would be
interpreted as a weakness - an inability to control a
particular agency or solve the agency's problems.
Mediators can be especially useful in this situation:
Mediators are frequently used to introduce the
concept of negotiation in a way that minimizes risk
to conflicting parties and their representatives. By
definition, mediators to some extent assume the
mantle of meddlers. As such, they can begin an
informal series of inquiries with persons indirectly
connected to the dispute... .As these discussions
progress, the mediator becomes the principle advocate
of negotiation. No other party or person need assume
the interest based or personal risk. [8]
Elected officials may also be unsure about the
propriety of participating in ad hoc negotiation in light
of their legislative mandates; they may fear that mediated
settlement might be challenged under the Administrative
Procedure Act. [9] However, mediated negotiations have
now taken place in a range of settings sufficiently wide
to put most elected officials at ease. By now, it should
be apparent that mediated negotiation is a supplement to
the current legislative, administrative, and judicial
processes, not a replacement. Mediated negotiation in no
way abrogates the formal decision-making authority of
elected and appointed officials:
"...mediation can be construed as an extra step in
the administrative process. In drafting regulations,
framing policy, or making administrative decisions,
agencies can encourage face to face negotiations
aided by a nonpartisan facilitator before making
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decisions. This- often helps to smoke out potential
objections, develop allies and avoid unexpected and
avoidable litigation. [10]
The final political obstacle to be addressed here is
the power of obstructionists. Obstructionists are those
parties who would benefit from the status quo or who feel
they would lose out in the negotiations process. To deal
with obstructionists, agenices must devise incentives for
good faith negotiation. For example, the mediator or the
courts could look suspiciously at challenges by parties
who acted in bad faith in the negotiations they are
subsequently challenging. or they could send the agency
the agreement that drew widest support along with the
obstructionists' reasons for opposing the outcome. The
agency could ignore bad faith dissents. [11]
In sum, none of these political obstacles should pose
a major threat to more widespread use of consensus
building negotiations in the budgetary process. Consensus
building processes like the NIS can be designed in a
manner to mitigate, if not overcome, the problems
associated with representation, cooptation, the
unwillingness of elected officials to relinguish power and
obstructionists. At the very least, consensus building
processes can produce a more rational approach to
budgetary decision making than the approach offered by the
current budgetary process and the courts.
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OBSTACLES TO INSTITUTIONALIZATION
There are several obstacles to the
institutionalization of mediated neogtiation that prevent
it from being used on a more widespread basis. These
obstacles pose the most immediate threat to the widespread
use of consensus building negotiations in the budgetary
process; if parties in dispute are not aware of these
alternative process, they will not generate the demand for
such processes that is essential for securing the support
of the lawmakers.
The first obstacle to the insitutionalization of new
consensus building processes is the lack of information
about the methods and their advantages. This obstacle is
particularly evident in the case of mediated negotiation.
"Past experiments with mediated negotiation in the public
sector have not received much attention in the press,
government publications, or in the university programs
that train administrators, planners and lawyers. The
concept of mediation remains tied, in the public's mind,
to collective bargaining, divorce proceedings, and, more
recently, community disputes...." [12] Even when the
parties to a dispute are aware of such alternative
processes, it is often difficult for them to find them
because they have not yet gained status as public
institutions. [13]
The segregation of alternatives from the judicial
process has other adverse consequences, such as the
common absence of public funding, which sometimes
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requires disputants to pay for alternative dispute
resolution services even as the judicial ones are
provided free. More subtle discouragements derive
from the distrust that often accompanies processes
that are new and unfamiliar and that appear to be
unaccompanied by the legal protections that
disputants have been taught over the years to value
so highly. A related deterrent may be the absence
of mechanisms for ensuring high standards in the
provision of alternatives. [14]
One suggested means to overcome this obstacle is to
develop ways of making mediation an adjunct to current
public sector processes:
This might mean generating laws to add mediation to
administrative processes. Judges might first rely on
mediation. Citizen participation processes might
incorporate mediation. We are not yet ready to write
specific prescriptions, but we must begin to
experiment officially rather than unofficially
or on an ad hoc basis. [15]
The second obstacle to insitutionalization is
financial. For example, one mediator has stated: "We
need a champion to push for (mediation), and a coalition
of those with problems to push for it. And there is a
problem of resources. For instance, the Governor of
Massachusetts now supports it but there is no money. It
may take some incentive, like foundation support, for it
to become a reality." [16] Most public sector mediation
experiments to date have been financed by private
foundations. However, these funds are limited. The
aternative of having one of the parties to the
negotiations pay for the mediator is not a useful
alternative: "The parties to a dispute may question the
nonpartisanship of a mediator paid by one of the parties."
[17] While there are other funding alternatives, such as
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legislative support, judicial support, or some type of
revolving fund, they have not yet been adequately tested.
The third and final obstacle to institutionalization
is also a result of the fact that mediated negotiation is
still a relatively new method of dispute resolution: The
role and responsibilities of the mediator have not been
clarified. It is not only difficult for disputants to
locate mediators but, it is also difficult for them to
know what it is they are getting once they have found one.
Should they be looking for someone with substantive
expertise in finance or budgeting? For a politically
powerful person? (Mediator with clout?) For a process
expert? What sort of skills and standing should they look
for? The current ad hoc network of professionals in the
field of alternative dipute resolution is not large enough
to meet increased needs that would result from rapid
institutionalization.
In my mind, it is these obstacles to
institutionalization that pose the greatest threat to more
widespread use of negotiations in the budgetary process.
The profession must develop clearly identifiable standards
and procedures before it will be able to encourage
lawmakers to adopt new consensus building processes to
supplement formal administrative procedures.
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CONCLUSION
As federal transfer payments decrease, state and
local governments face increasingly difficult decisions
about resource allocation. The traditional budgetary
process is ill equipped to deal with increasing
competition for decreasing funds because of the haphazard
involvement of interest groups, lack of minority
representation, disjointed decision making, the inability
to make tradeoffs to maximize joint gains and judicial
intervention.
This thesis has examined the possible advantages and
disadvantages of using mediated negotiation in the
budgetary process. One model of mediated negotiation, The
Negotiated Investment Strategy, was discussed along with
three applications to demonstrate how a consensus building
approach to resource allocation can be effectively managed
to set better budgetary policy and priorities.
Budgetary negotiation is not a panacea. It will not
in and of itself eradicate inequitable or inefficient
budgetary outcomes. Rather its success depends upon how
effectively the six key elements of negotiation are
handled in the process. These elements are representation
and team building, access to information and joint fact
finding, mediation, negotiation skills, ample time for
negotiations, and implementation of the agreement.
Furthermore, there are political and institutional
obstacles to widespread use of consensus building
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negotiations in the budgetary process. However, in my
view these obstacles can be overcome, provided that
professionals in the field identify standards and
procedures to increase the credibility and legitimacy of
the processes they advocate. Only then will the way be
paved for institutionalization of budgetary negotiations
to supplement formal administrative procedures.
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A NEGOTIATED INVESTMENT STRATEGY FOR COLUMBUS, OHIO
AGREEMENT
This document is an Agreement executed at Columbus,
Ohio on April 30, 1980 by the participants in the
Negotiated Investment Strategy process (the "NIS pro-
cess") relative to the City of Columbus, Ohio.
The participants in this process were the represen-
tatives of the Federal Regional Council, Region V
(the "Federal Team"),- the representatives of the
City of Columbus (the "City" or "Local Team"), the
representatives of the State of Ohio ("the State"
or "State Team"), and a mediation team selected by
the FRC, the State, and the City.
Nothing contained in this Agreement shall constitute
or be construed to be a waiver by any Federal, State,
or Local agency of its statutory or regulatory pro-
visions, guidelines, or procedures, except as noted
specifically in the text that follows.
The signatories to this Agreement commit themselves
and the agencies, organizations, and interests they
represent to implement all of the terms of this Agree-
ment as quickly as possible.
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I. INTENT OF THIS AGREEMNT
This Agreement summarizes the results of the negotiations
that have been ongoing since August 1979 between the City of
Columbus, the State of Ohio, and the Federal Government (rep--
resented by the team from Region V).
The goal of this negotiation effort has been the formula-
tion of an Investment Strategy for the City of Columbus, Ohio.
Federal, State, and Local representatives, with help from a
mediation team, have searched for ways of integrating their
various policy objectives and programmatic goals for Columbus.
This document presents the Points of Agreement that have
been reached. All the parties involved share the hope that the
success of the NIS process will contribute to the emergence of
a new and more effective approach to intergovernmental relations
in the United States.
The NIS process was designed to be a vehicle for the integration
of the policy objectives of federal, state, regional, and local
governments and for taking'into consideration the variations among
states and specific urban areas and the importance of carefully
targeting limited resources. The NIS process grows out of the
National Urban Policy announced by the President of the United
States in March, 1978, calling for "A New Parternship to Conserve
America's Communities." The National Urban Policy -- the first
in our nation's history -- sets forth nine objectives:
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1. Encourage and support efforts to improve local
planning and management capacity, and the effectiveness
of existing Federal programs, by coordinating these
programs, simplifying planning requirements, reorienting
resources, and reducing paperwork.
2. Encourage states to become partners in assisting
urban areas.
3. Stimulate greater involvement by neighborhood organizations
and voluntary associations.
4. Provide fiscal relief to the most hard-pressed communities.
5. Provide strong incentives to attract private investment
to distressed communities.
6. Provide employment opportunities, primarily in the
private sector, to the long-term unemployed and disadvantaged
in urban areas.
7. Increase access to opportunity for those disadvantaged
by a history of discrimination.
8. Expand and improve social and health services to
disadvantaged people in cities, counties, and other
communities.
9. Improve the urban physical environment and the cultural
and aesthetic aspects of urban life.
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II. AGENGA OF TOPICS COVERED BY THIS AGREENT
The agenda of concerns which the XIS process addressed
included:
(1) The need to improve the public transportation system
through more flexible approaches to the planning and
programming of federally funded transportation services,
facilities, and equipment and through such specific
items as the resolution of the I-670 question, ensur-
ing the viaiblity of C.O.T.A., and increasing private
investments in "joint development" projects.
(2)-The need to appropriately balance fair share housing
objectives, low and moderate income housing needs,
and displacement concerns with neighborhood develop-
ment and redevelopment priorities, historic preser-
vation goals, and other city development objectives.
(3) Maximizing the federal social service entitlements
available to the Columbus area (i.e. through more
imaginative matching strategies). Examples include
the following: rearranging how medical transportation
is paid for; use of federal matching funds for child
support enforcement; and use of federal general revenue
as match.
(4) Maximizing and coordinating the use of federal, state,
and local resources to leverage additional private
investment and minority business development in
existing activity centers in Columbus. This would
include improved mechanisms for both initial develop-
ment and utilization of minority businesses.
(5) Expediting local water quality management and facilities
planning and coordinating them with regional planning
for future growth and the control of urban sprawl.
(6) Enabling federal and state aid for housing and human
services to low and moderate income individuals and
other special needs populations to be dispersed through-
out the city and not confined to just those individuals
concentrated in particular neighborhoods.
(7) Maximizing the effective use of CETA funds through
(a) greater cooperation and coordination at the fed-
eral level between the Department of Labor and other
federal agencies in assisting in the implementation
of programs in the prime sponsor's area; and (b) im-
proving the use of public and private funds through
more effective state-local coordination and through
more flexibile application of CETA and other program
guidelines concerning pre-job training and private
sector involvement.
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(8) Ensuring that public service-providing agencies at
the federal, state, and local levels exercise sufficient
flexibility within their statutory mandates, regulations,
guidelines, and procedures,to provide adequate services
to special needs populations.
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III. POINTS OF AGREEMNT
A. TRANSPORTATION
NIS negotiations concerning transportation investments in
the Columbus area covered six separate items: (1) strategies
for increasing the level of federal aid for highway and mass
transit improvements in the Columbus area; (2) strategies for
increasing the level of state aid for highway and mass transit
improvements; (3) strategies for strengthening the transportation
planning process and making it more flexible; (4) approaches to
expediting the 1-670 decision; (5) strategies for promoting private
sector participation in energy saving efforts such as car pooling
and staggered work hours; and (6) approaches to winning public
support for increased funding to upgrade and expand the COTA
system. The following agreements were reached:
1. The State, County and Federal agencies agree to join
the city in designating a single expeditor/coordinator
to hasten the completion of the revised draft EIS
for 1-670.
2. All three teams agree to the following concerning the
1-670 issue. Continue on the present course of action
with respect to developing the draft EIS, i.e.,
complete the draft EIS by July, 1980 instead of requiring
a study of the Interstate Transfer advantages
as part of the DEIS document. When the
DEIS is filed for public comment a reading will be
taken as to whether there is a consensus
for going ahead with the project. If there is not
a consensus in favor of constructing 1-670 as proposed,
then the City will seriously examine an Interstate
Transfer. The City agrees that it has not ruled
out the possibility of a transfer -- rather, that
the DEIS should not be modified to study this immediately.
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3. The Federal and State Teams agree to support, consistent
with their legal restrictions, the Local Team's effort to
mount a public education campaign aimed at explaining
the need for an increase in the tax levy to support
the upgrading and expansion of the COTA system.
4. Upon voter approval of the COTA levy to assure adequate
local funding, the Federal Team agrees to expedite
the appropriate approvals of grant applications
submitted for the purchase of buses subject to
appropriation actions by the Congress.
5. The Federal Team is not able to promise an increase
in the federal matching share contributed for local
transit and highway construction projects. Statutory
limitations cannot be waived. However, the U.S.
Department of Transportation is willing to provide
a letter of support/"fundability" for the High Street
Transitway provided the following conditions and pre-
requisites are-met/understood:
a. The replacement and expansion of COTA's bus
fleet must be the number one priority before the
U.S. Department of Transportation will consider
the High Street Transitway;
b. There appears to be a definite "linkage" between
the Transitway project and other objectives of
the Federal Team. For example, in Columbus'
downtown development proposals (III-F below), the
total package will be structured to emphasize job
creation for the hard-core unemployed, revitalization
of the downtown area, involvement/active participa-
tion by private enterprise, and energy conservation
through increased use of public transit. In view
of this and the prospect of monies
becoming available from the
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. Windfall .rofits Tax, a possible funding source may
arise. In that event, the project may indeed be
funded by the U.S. Department of Transportation.
In addition, the FRC agrees to provide its
support to secure funding from other federal
agencies -- including the U.S. Department of
Housing and Urban Development, U.S. Economic
Development Administration and the U.S. Depart-
ment of the Interior -- to meet the above ob-
jective.
c. The U.S. Department of Transportation's letter
about "fundability" can be construed as an
indication that it will receive a higher priority
than would otherwise be given by virtue of its
linkage to the NIS objectives and on the basis
of its individual merits.
6. The State, with the help of the Local Team and with-
in the limits of available State resources, will
make an effort in the next biennial budget to in-
crease its share of matching funds to support
transit authorities in Ohio.
7. The FRC (DOT) agrees to provide a letter concern-
ing the "fundability" of the High Street Transitway
by May 15, 1980.
8. In reference to agreement 5 above, these same con-
ditions and prerequisites will apply to the East
Busway, one of three alternatives under study in the
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east corridor, and the North Transitway which
will enter the transit alternatives study process
during 1980. With this understanding, the Urban Mass
Transportation Administration will provide a letter
to the City/COTA regarding the "eligibility". of
the two transit facilities.
9. The City agrees to secure public and private sector
participation in promoting energy conservation
measures such as car and van pooling, staggered
work hours, park and, ride commuter lots, and a
downtown transit mall.
10. In conjunction with the City and the 1PO, the State
agrees to promote a ride-sharing program among
its employees.
B. HUMAN SERVICES (defined as any service provided to an individual
or family that is financed in any way by Titles
IVA, XIX, or X of the Social Security Act.)
NIS negotiations concerning human services covered strategies
for increasing the level of Federal and State human services
funding to the Columbus area. The following agreements were
reached:
1. The State, Federal, and Local Teams will undertake a
collaborative study by a tripartite committee* that
will identify the steps necessary to maximize funding
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for human services through federal entitlements,
primarily Title =II of the Social Security Act (Med-
icaid). This study will include an analysis of fed-
deral regulations governing these programs and of
the State Plan for their implementation and is in-
tended to result in the identification of those ser-
vices that can be delivered to client populations in
the least restrictive and least expensive environment, -
while still assuring quality care. This study will
also include an analysis of State and Local financial
expenditure patterns to determine how, collectively,
these resources can legitimately be used to maximize
their leveraging potential for human service entitle-
ment funds that require non-federal matching support.
Study results will be made available to the teams
and mediators at the end of the study. This date is
anticipated to be September 1, 1980. Each team
agrees, through its appropriate members, to
commit personnel to this effort commensurate to ac-
complishing the task in an expedient manner. In addi-
tion, the Local and State Teams will commit the nec-
essary fiscal resources to accomplish that work best
done through contract. Further, it is understood
that the goal of this study is the design and imple-
mentation of one or more experimental programs in
Franklin County, and that the Federal Team will support
the request for a waiver of the federal requirement of
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"statewideness" where the waiver is necessary to the
experimental effort.
*Local Team (MESC, 648 Board, 169 Board, CSB, CWD);
State Team (OBM, MMR, DPW, ODH, LBO); Federal
Team (HEW).
2. Subject to federal approval, the State Team indicates
that regulations are forthcoming regarding AFDC-Foster
Care revisions. The State Team agrees to work with
local and county human service planners to evaluate the
potential effects of a "cap" on the allocation of AFDC-
Foster Care funds.
3. The Federal Team agrees to endorse a state-local request
for a waiver of the statewideness provision so that the
State and Local Teams could formulate a human services
investment plan for Franklin County aimed at
demonstrating (on an experimental basis) new approaches
to leveraging federal Medicaid funds and programming these
funds in a manner most responsive to local needs.
4. The Local Team agrees that current levels of local human
services investment should be maintained regardless of
any increase in the leveraging of federal funds for
human services that might be achieved through agreement 3
above. The Local Team agrees to produce letters from
the Boards of all the key local and county social service
agencies endorsing this policy.
5. The State Team agrees to the principle of maximizing
federal aid and quality care at the lowest possible
cost. Strategies for putting this principle into practice
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are described in agreement 1 above.
C. FAIR HOUSING
NIS negotiations on Fair Housing covered several closely
related points: the adequacy of Title VIII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1968 as a means of ensuring open housing in
Columbus and the desirability of adding further local, county,
or state legislation; other affirmative steps the city,
county, and state might take to help implement the principles
of fair housing; and strategies for strengthening the
enforcement of existing or new fair housing laws. The
following agreements were reached:
1. The Federal, State, and Local Teams re-affirm their
shared commitment to the goal of fair housing and
to the specific intent of Title VIII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1968 and agree to seek more effective
ways of achieving this intent.
2. The City agrees to cooperate with and
assist throught staff and financial support the 'Mid-
Ohio Regional Planning Commission (MORPC) in expanding
and implementing MORPC's fair housing educational
outreach efforts throughout the City.
3. The City agrees to continue working with
Franklin County to develop a metropolitan (areawide)
fair housing strategy and implementation schedule
with the participation of the Housing Opportunities
Center, Columbus Board of Realtors, and other groups
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currently involved in fair housing.
D. HISTORIC PRESERVATION
NIS negotiations concerning historic preservation in the
Columbus area covered six items: the prospects for more
direct and extensive local involvement in the federally-defined
process of identifying and preserving historic and cultural
resources in Columbus; the prospects for more direct and
extensive local involvement in the process of identifying
and preserving historic and cultural resources in Columbus
designated by the State Historic Preservation Office; the link
between community revitalization and historic preservation;
the use of easement purchases and other techniques that the
City might use to maintain the facades or architecturally
important buildings; the appropriateness of the Department
of Interior guidelines prohibiting the use of inferior
rehabilitation techniques or the destruction of fine architectural
elements in the city; and the prospects for enhancing the level
of professional expertise in cultural resource management at
the local level. The following agreements were reached:
1. The City (Department of Development) and the State
Historic Preservation Office agree to jointly study
ways of minimizing displacement resulting from historic
preservation.
2. The State and Federal Teams agree with the Local Team's
concern that revitalization efforts should not be
unnecessarily impeded because of historic preservation
considerations. This agreement stems from the Federal
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and State Team's view that historic preservation and
rehabilitation efforts can and do enhance the prospects
for effective revitalization.
3. The City agrees to consider an easement program for
the maintenance of facades of buildings with outstanding
architectural characteristics when it is shown through
careful studies that such a program,on a case-by-case
basis,would not have a detrimental effect.
4. For properties on the National Register or eligible for
the National Register, the City agrees to endorse the
rehabilitation standards promulgated by the Secretary
of the Interior aimed at protecting fine architectural
elements and prohibiting inferior rehabilitation tech-
niques. In those few instances when these rehabilitation
standards appear to prohibit the level and type of in-
tensive reinvestment that the City deems to be in its
best interests, the City agrees to work cooperatively
with Federal and State agencies to seek ways of main-
taining the spirit of the standards.
5. All three teams agree to the creation of an Historic
Preservation Tripartite Committee charged with re-
sponsibility for devising ways of achieving greater
local participation in the Federal and State planning
processes and the indentification and preservation of
cultural resources in the City of Columbus by means
of the following:
a. The creation of a commission or council which
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shall be representative of the local community
and whose role shall be defined in terms of its
relationship to the community and to city
government.
b. The establishment of professional expertise within
the city government which will serve as technical
staff to the local commission.
c. The development of a mechanism whereby
recommendations of the local commission will be
acted upon by City Council for the purpose of
preserving vital cultural resources.
d. The establishment of a formal means of interaction
between the City, State, and Federal governments
which shall accord appropriate status and
responsibilities to the City. Such formal means
shall take into consideration short-term measures
to afford the City additional input and involvement
in the process and explore long-term measures to
delegate certain authority to the City in the
determination of the eligibility process and the
consideration of alternatives per adverse effect(s).
e. The identification of Federal, State, and Local
funding sources and other resources to meet the
greater programmatic demands -- including staffing
-- resulting from any agreements reached.
6. The Federal and State Teams agree that the revised draft
ordinance proposed by the Local Team (Appendix A) furthers
items (a) through (d) in agreement 5 above and will serve
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as the primary vehicle through which they will be
implemented.
7. The City Team agrees to pursue the creation of an Historic
Resources Commission whose role is defined and which
is representative of the community.
8. The City agrees to adequately fund, staff, and maintain
its professional expertise in the area of historic
preservation and agrees that said staff shall serve as the
technical staff for the Historic Resources Commission.
9. Contingent upon sufficient federal funding and approval
by the Ohio Historical Society Board of Trustees and
the Ohio Historic Site Preservation Advisory Board, the
State Historic Preservation Office agrees to provide
a $10,000 grant to assist in the establishment and/or
operation of the Historic Resources Commission.
10. Based on the spirit of the Heritage Conservation and
Recreation Service's process of expediting consideration
under "expanded participation," the State Historic
Preservation Office agrees to certify, when appropriate, to
the qualifications of the Historic Resources Commission's
staff, provided the pending local ordinance is approved
and implemented.
11. During the short term, the State Historic Preservation Office
agrees to expand the degree of local participation in the
process by giving the City's Department of Development adequate
opportunity to review and comment on proposals submitted
to the Office. It further agrees to share the local comments
with the Ohio Historic Site Preservation Advisory Board.
12. The Federal agencies endorsing the projects outlined in
Section III-F. of this Agreement agree to assign "lead
agency" status to the City of Columbus.. The Advisory
Council for Historic Preservation agrees to enter into
a comprehensive agreement with the City and the State
Historic Preservation Office that would encompass con-
sideration of cultural resources for all of the projects
endorsed under Section III-F.
E. DISPLACEMENT
1. The Local Team agrees that it is important to work to
maintain the availability of housing stock for low in-
come households. To do this, however, the City and the
County need additional financial support from the Federal
and State governments (requests for support of specific
projects are included in Section III-F of this Agreement. Add-
itionally, the City agrees to reinvestigate the legality
of leveraging additional funds for housing rehabilitation
loans through local private lending institutions by means
of its CDBG monies, and further agrees to pursue such
leveraging if found to be legal.
2. Where it can be documented before the fact that Federally-
sponsored activities will indirectly cause displacement
of low income households, all three teams agree that an
early warning system is needed to identify such situations
and that a forum is required in which negotiation concern-
ing Federal, State, and Local responses can be conducted.
The FRC agrees to provide such a forum. The Local Team
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agrees that it will alert the FRC when indirect displace--
ment effects of Federal activities are projected. The
State Team agrees to provide technical support to the
Local Team in preparing such projections and to partici-
pate in discussions hosted by the FRC.
3. The Local Team agrees to concern itself with the displace-
ment effects of locally-initiated (non-federally funded)
projects.
4. With respect to the Section 8 Substantial Rehabilitation
Program the Local Team is concerned about the
"overhousing problem', '.e., the prohibition on allowing the
original tenant to return to the rehabilitated unit unless
the household meets specific occupancy standards. The
Local Team asserts that each year many elderly households
in Columbus suffer permanent displacement from their rental
units due to this requirement of the program. The Federal
Team asserts that it would be imprudent to permit small
households to return to rehabilitated units that can accom-
modate larger households,as to do so would result in an
underutilization of scarce publicly-assisted housing re-
sources. Since all three teams agree that the most desir-
able situation is one in which tenants displaced by rehab-
ilitation can be rehoused in their original unit or, at
the very least, in the immediate neighborhood if they so
desire, additional meetings will be held by MUD and the
City to work out a positive means of resolving this dis-
placement issue.
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5. The City agrees to encourage housing developers to re-use
existing structures whenever and wherever possible and
the City agrees to make every effort to incorporate
reusable structures into housing projects that it initiates.
6. The Local Team agrees to prepare a report on displacement
for public distribution that analyzes the displacement
problem and possible responses to it in Columbus. The State
Team agrees to assist the Local Team in completing this
report by December 1, 1980. The Local Team agrees that
the impact of the City's zoning ordinances will be discussed
in this report relative to the displacement issue.
7. The City agrees to consider increasing the maximum grant
allowed for city-supported housing rehabilitation beyond
the current $5,000 limit and to provide for deferred
repayment of loans. The City's final position will follow
the City Council's consideration of a Community Development
Task Force report on this subject. At present, however,
the Local Team is inclined to support an increase in the
grant size limit and a provision for deferred re-payment
of loans. The City will also continue its efforts to inform
the public that energy-related improvements are eligible
items under the housing rehabilitation program.
8. The State agrees to seek the elimination of existing
constitutional obstacles to state financial participation
in the delivery of housing assistance to Columbus and other
cities. This will be done through the support of a
constitutional amendment.
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F. LEVERAGING PRIVATE INVESTENT AND MINORITY BUSINESS DEVELOPMET
NIS negotiations on reinvestment covered a variety of topics: the status
of the City's comprehensive economic development plan; specific initiatives
the City might take (with Federal and State support) to spread the
economic benefits of new development across the most distressed areas
and the neediest groups; strategies the City might promote (with Federal
and State support) to encourage minority business development; and
specific projects the City would like Federal and State help in
implementing. The following agreements were reached:
1. The Federal Team agrees that the City has made significant
progress toward completing comprehensive economic development
plans. The City described the array of planning studies that
have been completed over the past several years and discussed
efforts underway to update certain components of the planning
effort. The Federal Team agrees that the local planning
process provided adequate opportunities for citizens and
private interest groups to participate.
2. The City agrees to the State Team's suggestion that a
city-wide development corporation be created to provide a
boost to minority business development. In fact, the City
indicated that it was in the process of completing a draft
of a detailed proposal outlining the structure and operation
of such a development corporation. If present thinking
prevails, this development corporation would be in a
position to provide risk capital to minority businesses. The
Federal Team agrees to seek advice from the appropriate
Federal agencies regarding the extent to which Federal funds
might be available to help capitalize a city-wide development
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corporation designed to boost minority business development.
And the State Team agrees to provide technical assistance,
if needed, in the formation of this corporation,
3. The Federal Team (HUD) states that there are no obstacles
(in principle) to local governments using their CDBG funds
to leverage private investment in the central business
district as long as it can be shown that distressed persons
will directly benefit from the funded activities.
4. In March, 1980, HUD, EDA, and SBA, after successfully
administering the Neighborhood Business Revitalization
Program (NBRP) in a select number of pilot cities, invited 33
new cities to participate in an expansion of the Program. The
selection of those cities by the three agencies was based on
whether the cities were classified as distressed under both
UDAG and EDA criteria and their economic development capacity,
population size, and regional distribution. With the selection
of these 33 cities, no further expansion of the program was
contemplated. The City of Columbus was not selected for
invitation.
Subsequent to the announcement of the additional cities,
Columbus, through the NIS process, has requested participation
in NBRP. The Federal Team agrees that participation of
Columbus in the NBRP would provide the City with needed
assistance to focus on economic development and enhance its
capacity to revitalize neighborhood business and commercial
areas. Participation in the NBRP requires, however, strong and
visible local commitment to economic development and business
revitalization. The Federal Team will endorse the inclusion
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of Columbus in the NBRP contingent upon the City providing
the following written commitments:
a. The City must give a high priority to economic
development by having in place an organizational
structure capable of not only supporting the NBRP
effort, but overall economic development planning,
minority business participation, and planning and
implementation of the EDA, SBA, and UDAG programs.
Such an organizational structure must be effective and
integrated or coordinated with overall city planning
and development.
b. The City must seek financial commitments from the State
and the private sector to support not only the NRBP,
but also the minority business participation and the
EDA, SBA, and UDAG programs.
c. The City must designate at least two persons to serve
as loan packagers (economic development professionals)
for the NBRP.
d. The City must prepare a Program Management Plan and
continue development of an overall economic
development strategy.
e. The City must agree to pursue alternative methods of
financing economic development and business revitalization.
5. All teams agree that in the short-term, the City should focus on
comprehensive urban revitalization that emphasizes downtown
and neighborhood commercial center strategies in order to
reinforce and complement the City's neighborhoods along with
employment and minority business development. All teams agree
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to continue to negotiate and/or cooperatively develop a longer-
term process for ensuring that the projects related to this objective
receive a higher priority and degree of consideration than would
otherwise be given by virtue of their linkage to the NIS process.
6. The U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) endorses those projects which
have been identified, along with local Minority Business
Development Program (Appendix B) and the City's goal of awarding
a minimum of 10.6% of all federally-assisted contracts to minority
firms and vendors and which supports the March 6, 1980 policy
statement on employment initiatives (Section III-H below). To
the extent that is applicable, DOL will assist the local CETA
Prime Sponsor in the reallocation of funds already budgeted to
provide financial assistance to projects identified on an individual
basis by the Federal and Local Teams to initiate and implement
projects with funding capabilities.
7. The City of Columbus has developed a model employment plan
integrating a commitment that ensures 20% of all jobs created as
a result of the proposed Capital South project are filled by
CETA-eligible persons (Appendix C). The City agrees further to
work toward this 20% employment initiatives goal on all NIS projects.
8. The Federal Team (especially the U.S. Department of Housing and
Urban Development), along with the Local Team, views assisted
housing as a priority. Consistent with this view, HUD agrees
to cooperate on a continuing basis with the City toward the
formulation and implementation of an assisted housing
strategy. To the extent to which such a strategy includes and
integrally depends on specific housing projects, HUD further agrees
to cooperate with the City in seeking discretionary allocations
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of assisted housing resources in behalf of such specific projects
when they cannot otherwise be accomodated within the regular
allocations which accrue to the City.
9. In support of the objectives outlined in agreements 1 through
8 above the Federal and State Teams agree to endorse and support
the City of Columbus' request(s) for assistance on the following
projects (described in detail in the NIS Columbus Projects
Listing prepared by the Local Team in April, 1980 and submitted
to the Federal and State Teams) which are consistent with the
President's Urban Policy and the City's urban revitalization
strategy, provided that they remain economic development priorities
in the context of mutually agreeable strategies which are designed
to target and benefit distressed areas in the City. It is
understood that any grant amounts set forth in this agreement
represent the preliminary best judgments of the City as being
the amounts necessary or appropriate to implement the projects
listed.
Five categories of projects have been endorsed: (a) downtown
revitalization, (b) downtown access, (c) neighborhood commercial
center/strip revitalization, (d) riverfront development, and
(e) building preservation.
147
I
zf
(D
S
QS
0j~ CA
S 'a
a. Downtown Revitalization
HIGH STREET DEVLOPMENT CORRIDOR
The High Street Development Corridor project is composed of
five inter-related but separate elements: the High Street
Transit Mall, the High Street Shuttle bus, the High Street
Improvements Project, the Capital Square Improvements Project,
and the Broad Street Median Project. (See #10 on map)
1. The High Street Transit Mall project is a proposal to
narrow High Street from six to four lanes between Spring
and Main Streets at a total cost of $17.7 million dollars.
$14.2 million dollars of the project cost are currently
under consideration as a matching grant from the Urban
Mass Transit Administration. These improvements are
intended to give priority to mass transit and pedestrians.
2. The High Street shuttle bus proposal would provide six
buses of unique appearance to run between the Convention
Center and the County complex. COTA has not developed
detailed plans for service on the High Street Corridor but
envisions expanded versions of the existing services,
including a shuttle bus service. The total cost of this
project is estimated at $868,320 of which $600,000 will
be used to purchase new buses.
3. The High Street Improvements project, expected to begin
in 1980, will provide for a series of permanent environ-
mental improvements on the downtown portion of High
Street. The improvements would include, but not be
limited to: street tree planting, signage, lighting,
landscaping and street furnishings. This project is
expected to cost $3 million dollars and funding is being
sought from the City, UMTA, EDA, and private sector
assessment.
4. The Capitol Square Improvements project involves the
western half of Capitol Square and both sides of the four
streets bounding the square. The project calls for land-
scape and.walkway modifications to the western or front
side of the Capitol grounds and public right of way
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improvements to the adjacent streets. High Street would be
improved with new curbs and sidewalks, street trees,
planters, traffic control devices mounted on mast arm
standards. The total cost of this project is expected to be
$6.6 million dollars, of which $3.6 million is the cost
of improvements to the Capitol grounds.
5. The Broad Street Median project is a proposal to construct
a landscape median with trees and integrated left turn
lanes along the center of Broad Street between the Scioto
River and 1-71. The project is expected to cost approx-
imately $4 million dollars and would also provide street
trees along both sides of Broad Street in conjunction with
the median. Traffic and circulation control in the down-
town, and particularly at Capitol Square, would be
enhanced by this improvement.
CAPITOL SOUTH REDEVELOPMENT (UDAG)
(See #13 ou map)
The block 1 Capitol South project, constitutes the first phase
of redevelopment for this portion of the Capitol South Urban
Redevelopment project. UDAG funds are to be utilized to
build public areas. These public areas would consist of a
multi level public way (galleria), a Town Square in the center
of the project and a pedestrian shopping bridge spanning High
Street connecting the Lazarus Department Store. The UDAG
project elements would be constructed at a cost of approx-
imately $12,000,000.
The UDAG public walkways system will link the projects main
private components to one another: A S49.5 million dollar
Western International Hotel; a $22 million dollar Cadillac -
Fairview retail development, and; a new Lazarus parking
garage and connecting walkway, and the existing Lazarus
Department Store which will be remodeled at a cost of
approximately $8.75 million dollars. The UDAG funding
application will be coordinated with a $4.5 million dollar
grant request to the Economic Development Administration.
The EDA funding will be used to construct a passageway
linking the State underground parking garage with the Town
Square, and an above grade bridge linking the Town Square
with the second block of Capitol South and the improvement
of the pedestrian system in the existing State House
underground garage.
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o. Downitown Access
1-670 COMPLETION AND AREA REDEVELOP'ENT
(See #14 on map)
The 1-670 Project is a proposal to construct six miles of six
lane highway designed to serve the northeast quadrant of the
City. This project will connect the downtown business district
to the outerbelt (1-270) with a connector to Port Columbus.
The City has narrowed the six lane alternative down to the
most feasible. It is anticipated that a rough draft of the EIS
for this alternative will be published by July 31, 1980. The
anticipated cost of $160,000,0CO will be 90% federally
funded, 5% State funded and 5% City funded. The earliest
possible date for construction of this project would be in the
mid 1980's.
SPRING/SANDUSKY IN'T.RCHANGE
(See #15 on map)
The Spring/Scndusky interchange project is the reconstruction
of portions of the inner belt loop which surrounds downtown
Columbus. This particular project consists of 5 miles of 6
lane highway connecting 1-670 and SR 315 in the northwest
quadrant of the inner.belt loop. This project was essentially
redesigned beginning in late 1978 because of previously
identified environmental problems and problems with align-
ments associated with earlier designs.. Public hearings were
held in early 1979 and 1980 which resulted in reducing six
alternatives down to two. A best alternative will be
presented to the public at a hearing in the spring of 1980.
Assuming that there will be no major problems arriving at a
concensus on the best alternative and no problems with
environmental and detail design studies, construction could
begin in 1984 or 1985.
Funding breakdown for this project is based on the 90%
Federal, 5% State, and 5% City for those portions relating
to 1-670 and 75% Federal, 12.5% State and 12.5% City for
those portions relating to S.R. 315. The total cost of this
project is anticipated to be in the vicinity of $150,000,000.
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c. Neighborhood Commercial Revitalization Program (NCRP)
The NCRP is a program to begin addressing commercial
revitalization needs within the CDBG designated revitalization
and stabilization areas based upon specific private
sector business investment commitments. Of the 30 Columbus
inner city commercial areas, 22 are within the revitalization
and stabilization areas and would be considered within this
program. Six of these 22 areas have been identified for special
attention under this activity due to their unique relationships
to existing CDBG designated target areas and special improvement
areas, their commercial revitalization needs, and their perceived
level of private sector commitment ot date. These six areas
are: Project #17 High Street: 5th to Goodale; Project #18,
Cleveland Avenue: Hudson to Railroad; Project #19, West
Broad Street: 1-70 to Scioto River; Project #21, Mt. Vernon
Avenue: Hamilton to Ohio; Project #23, Parsons Avenue: Broad
to Bryden; and Project #24, South Parsons Avenue: Livingston
to Frank Road. The Neighborhood Commercial Revitalization Program
not only enhances the ability of a commercial area to continue
to serve adjacent neighborhoods, it also directly supports
the ongoing.CDBG neighborhood revitalization activities in
many of these neighborhoods. In addition, a comprehensive
Neighborhood Commercial Revitalization Program with an internal
jobs component can give unemployed neighborhood residents
opportunities for training and placement within neighborhood
commercial areas. An integral part of this program is the
identification and aggressive promotion of significant minority
business development opportunities.
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HIGH STREET: 5TH TO GOODALE
(See #17 on map)
This project is one of the 30 inner city commercial areas
identified for revitalization under the Neighborhood Commercial
Revitalization Program. The proposal is to stimulate and support
private revitalization of commercial properties by undertaking a
series of public improvements including lighting, street Furnish-
ings, landscaping and parking. The total cost is projected to be
$4.7 million. It is proposed that this project be funded by
CD(S.500 M), EDA (53.1SM), and private sector assessment
(51.050M). For additional information, contact Mr. Pat Grady
at 222-8546.
CLEVELAND AVENUE: HUDSON TO RAILROAD
(See #18 on map)
This project is one of the 30 inner city commercial areas
identified for revitalization under the Neighborhood Commer-
cial Revitalization Program. The proposal is to stimulate and
support private sector revitalization of commercial properties
by undertaking a series of public improvements including
lighting, street furnishings, landscaping and parking. The
total cost is projected to be 51.4 million. It is proposed that
this project be funded by utilization of the existing 5.615 CD
funds previously allocated and an additionak S.100 CD)allocation
with the remainder being provided from additional funding
sources to be identified in the future. For additional
information, contact Mr. Pat Grady at 222-8546.
WEST BROAD STREET: 1-70 TO SCIOTO RIVER
(See #19 on map)
This project is one of the 30 inner city commercial areas
identified for revitalization under the Neighborhood
Commercial Revitalization Program. The proposal is to
stimulate and support private revitalization of commercial
properties by undertaking a series of public improvements
including lighting, street furnishings, landscaping and parking.
The total cost is projected to be $1.5 million. It is proposed
that this project be funded by CD (S. 100M), CDA ($1.050M),
and private sector assessment (5.350M). For additional
infcrmation, contact Mr. Pat Grady at 222-8546.
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MT. VERNON AVENUE: HAMILTON TO OHIO
(See #21 on map)
This project is one of the 30 inner city commercial areas
identified for revitalization under the Neighborhood
Commercial Revitalization Program. The proposal is to
stimulate and support private revitalization of commercial
properties by undertaking a series of public improvements
including lighting, street furnishings, landscaping and
parking. The total cost is projected to be $2.8 million.
It is proposed that additional funds be provided for this
project by CD (5.326M), in addition to the funds already
provided to the project from EDA $2.0M, HUD 5.353M,
CD $.075M, NEA 5.01SM, OA C 5.00.15M, City S 1.OM,
GCA C 5.0015M, BMIF S.010M, Columbus Foundation
$.010M . This project includes the development of a
shopping complex on the south side of Mt. Vernon Avenue
at 20th Street which will be developed by NOC, the. neighbor-
hood development corporation. For additibnal information,
contact Mr. Phil Lomax at 222-8601 or Mr. Pat Grady at
222-8546.
PARSONS AVENUE: BROAD TO BRYDEN
(See #23 on map)
This project is one of the 30 inner city commercial areas
identified for revitalization under the Neighborhood
Commercial Revitalization Program. The proposal is to
stimulate and support .private revitalization of commercial
properties by undertaking a series of public improvements,
including lighting, street furnishings, landscaping and parking.
The total cost is projected to be 54.0 million. It is proposed
that this project be funded by augmenting the existing 5.127 CD
funds previously allocated to the project with EDA ($2.83M),
CD (5.100M), City (5.080M) and private sector assessment
($.943M). For additional information, contact Mr. Pat Grady
at 222-8546.
SOUTH PARSONS AVENUE: LIVINGSTON TO FRANK
(See #24 on map)
This proiect is one of the 30 inner city commercial areas
identified for revitalization under the Neighborhood
Commercial Revitalization Program. The proposal is to
stimulate and support private revitalization of commercial
properties by undertaking a series of public improvements,
154
including lighting, street furnishings, landscaping and parking.
The total cost is projected to be $1.8 million. It is proposed
that this project be funded by CD (S.500M), EDA (5.850M),
and private sector assessment (S.450M), in addition to the
funds ($.005M) OAC, and ($.005M) SBIA, already identified
for the project. For additional information contact Mr. Pat
Grady at 222-8546.
(d) Riverfront Development Program
The Riverfront Development Program will develop a continuous
open area and recreational facility consisting of several
projects along the Scioto River. These projects include:
Rickenbacker Park, Veteran's Memorial, Sunshine Park,
Westbank Scioto River Development, Bicentennial Park River
Access, Civic Center Plaza, Sandusky Interchange Bikeway,
Bikepath: Greenlawn to Sunshine, and Bicentennial Park Housing.
The Westbank Scioto River Park Development project is in ex-
underway, with 50% of the cost from HCRS and 50% from City
funds. The Civic Center Plaza Project is in the process of
securing funds; plan development was done by Godwin-
Bohm-NBBJ in 1979. The City contact for these projects is
Roger Wells, Superintendent, Division of Parks and Forestry.
RICKENBACKER PARK
(See #25 on map)
This project will include the demolition of the old Naval
Reserve Center, to mcke way for an Educational/Information/
Restaurant Complex. A boat launching facility will be built
which will include docks, parking, picnic areas and land-
scaping. This is a historic location as it is situated at the
confluence of the Scioto and Olentangy River. It is estimated
this project will cost $.125 million for demolition and excava-
tion, $1 .00 million for multi-use center, $.4 million for con-
crete work, $1.30 for electrical work, $22 for asphalt wcrk,
$.10 for docks and accessories, $.75 for landscape develop-
ment; at a total cost of $2.05 million. This is one of a series
of public and private projects to improve the Scioto Riverfront
under the Riverfront Redevelopment Program. It is proposed that
this project be funded by HCRS (5.525M), the City ($1 .025M)
and by the private sector ($.500M)
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VETERAN'S MEMORIAL RIVERBANK
(See #26 on map)
This development will include a series of paved terraces lead-
ing down to the Scioto River from the Veterans Memorial Audi-
torium site. Boat docking facilities and river overlooks will be
included. The area will be lighted and landscaped and will tie
into the west bank wclkway. It is estimated this project will
cost 5.5 million for demolition and excavction, $1 .0 million
for concrete work, 5.45 million for asphalt work, 5.15 million
for electric work, and 5.1 million for landscape development;
at a total cost of $2.2 million. This is one of a series of projects
to improve the Scioto Riverfront public and private under the
Riverfront Development Program. It is proposed that this project
be funded by EDA ($1.176 M), HCRS (5.512 M) and the City
($.512M).
SUNSHINE PARK
(See #27 on map)
This project includes installation of two parking lots to
accommodate 35 cars which will be located at Sunshine
Park and Main Street. A system of stairs and ramps will
provide access to the water and fishing deck. An asphalt
bikeway will connect Sunshine Park with the Greenlawn
Avenue bikeway. Also included is a small lock system
at the Main Street weir. This has significant historical
interest as it will be reminiscent of the old canal system.
It is estimated this project will cost $.195 million for demo-
lition and excavation, $.5 for concrete work, $.075 for
sheet pilings, 5.115 for electrical work, $.071 for asphalt
work, and $.025 million for landscape development; at a
total cost of $.976 million. This is one of a series of a
public and private projects to improve the Scioto River-
front under the Riverfront Redevelopment Program. It is
proposed that this project be funded by HCRS ($.488M),
and the City (S.488M).
WESTBANK SCIOTO RIVER DEVELOPMENT
(See .#28 on map)
This project extends from Town Street to 1-70 on the Westbank
of the Scioto River. It will include three overlooks, two of
which are multi-level, concrete and asphalt walkways, light-
ing and landscaping. It is estimated this project will cost
$.286 million for demolition and excavation, S.6514 million
for concrete work, $.026 million for asphalt work, S.1297
million for electric work and 5.1 million for landscape devel-
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opment; at a total cost of $1.1931 million. This is one of a
series of public and private projects to improve the Scioto
Riverfront under the Riverfront Redevelopment Program. It
is propoied that this project be funded by HCRS (S.597M),
the City (S.597M), and by the private sector (5.500M).
3ICNTENNIAL PARK RIVE2 ACCESS
(See #29 on map)
The site for this project is located immediately west of
Bicentennial Park and will extend from Main Street bridge
to City Hall. The development will provide access down
to water level by means of two sets of stairs and a handi-
cap ramp. The area will be lighted and a portion of the
revetment will be removed for landscaping. It is estimated
this project will cost .5 million for demolition and exca-
vation, $1 .0 million for concrete vork, 5.1 million for
electrical work, and $.35 million for landscape development;
at a total cost of $1.95 million. This is one of a series of
public and private projects to improve the Scioto Riverfront
under the Riverfront Redevelopment Program. It is proposed
that this project be funded by HCRS ($.975M), the City
(S.975M)and by the private sector (5.500M).
CIVIC CENTER PLAZA
(See #30 on map)
This project, a plaza located west of City Hall, includes a
series of grass and paved terraces with walkways, multilevel
connected pools with a major fountain, river overlook, boat
docks, and landscaping. It is estimated this project will
cost $1 .0 million for demolition and excavation, $2.4 mil-
lion for concrete work, 5.8 million for electrical work,
$.5 million for plumbing work, and $.3 million for landscape
development; at a total cost of $5.0 million. This is one of
a series of public and private projects to improve the Scioto
Riverfront under the Riverfront Redevelopment Program. It
is proposed that this project be funded by (HCRS $1 .OM),
the City (S3.OM), and by the private sector (51 .00M).
SANDUSKY INTERCHEANGE BIKEWAY
(See #31 on map)
This bikeway project will provide a passive link between
Rickenbacker Park and the Civic Center Plaza Development.
A bridge will be provided for the transition from a Ricken-
backer Park to the east side of the Scioto River Bank. It is
1 7
estimated this project will cost $.075 million for demolition
and excavation, 5.2 million for concrete work, $.3 million
for asphalt work, S.15 milflon for lighting, and $.075 for
lendscape development; at a total cost of S.8 million. This
is one of a series of public and private projects to improve
the Scioto Riverfront under the Riverfront Redevelopment
Program. It is preposed that this project be funded by
HCRS (S..6COM) and the City (S.2COM).
BIKEPATH: GREENLAWN TO SUNSHINE
(See #30 on map)
This bikeway project will provide a Scioto River westshore
link between Greenlawn Avenue and the West Bank Walk
located north of 1-70 at Sunshine Park. A passage beneath
1-70 will be included. It is estimated this project will
cost $.02 million for demolition and excavation, $.11
million for asphalt work, and $.07 million for concrete
work; at a total cost of $.2 million. This is one of a
series of public and private projects to improve the Scioto
Riverfront under the Riverfront Redevelopment Program.
It is proposed that this project be funded by HCRS (5.150M)
and the City (5.05cM).
BICENTENNIAL PARK HOUSING
(See #33 on map)
The Riverfront Housing proposal is to encourage the develop-
ment of a high density housing environment adjacent to the
Scioto River and Bicentennial Park. The next activity to be
undertaken in this process is to assist developers in preparing
viable project recommendations. This is being actively pur-
sued by DOD and private developers. For additional infor-
mation contact Mr. Ken Ferell at 222-8172.
e. Building Reuse
HARRISION HOUSE RESTORATION
(See #1 on map)
Harrison House is listed on the National Register of Historic
Places. The City of Columbus Department of Development,
Department of Recreation and Parks, and the Columbus
Landmarks Foundation, have proposed acquisition of the site,
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exterior and interior rehabilitation of the main house, and
a brick duplex located at the rear of the site, and site
development, including walkway protection, landscaping
and development of parking. The Department of Recreation
and Parks agreed in February, 1980 to take title to the
property, presently owned by the Society Buckeye Federal.
Local option CDBG funds in the amount of S35,000 are
committed For this purpose. Additional funding of $15,671
is also required by March 7, 1980 to prevent foreclosure,
for payment of accumulated interest, a private loan,
insurance, and land acquisition fees. At present, no
commitment exists for these funds. A renovation budget of
$370,000 has been developed for the Harrison House,
including $80,000 for the duplex. A total of $44,000 in
CDBG funds, 57,000 from a CLF donation, and $3,701
from a $6,000 O.H.P.O. grant are currently available for
rehabilitation. A grant application has been submitted to
E.D.A. in the amount of $750,000, and a preapplication
to HCRS, under the Innovative Grant Program established
by Title X of the Urban Parks and Recovery Act (UPRA)
in the amount of $370,000. The UPRA grant request
provides for rehabilitation, site development, and expansion
of the Golden Age Hobby Shop at this location, including
one staff person.
SUMMARY OF NIS SUPPORTED AND ENDORSED PROJECTS
(in millions)
FEDERAL STATE LOCAL PRIVATE TOTAL
Downtown Revital. 37.617 3.6 7.07 90.35 137.900
(H.S. Corridor) (20.481) (5.77) ( 2.9 ) ( 32.751)
(Cap. South) (17.136) (1.30) (87.45) (105.2 )
Downtown Access 271.809 19.438 19.438 310.685
(1-670) (144.384) ( 8.0 ) ( 8.0 ) (160.384)
(Sprg/Sandusky) (127.425) (11.438) (11.438) (150.301)
NCRP 12.825 .0015 1.1065 2.798 16.7295
(HS:5th to G) ( 3.703) ( 1.050) ( 4.753 )
(Cleve. Ave.) ( .729) ( .729)
(W. Broad.) ( 1.152) ( .350) ( 1.502 )
(Mt. Vernon) ( 2.827) ( .0015) ( 1.0215) ( 3.85 )
(Parsons: B to B) ( 3.059) ( .080 ) ( .943) ( 3.139)
(S. Parsons) ( 1.355) ( .005 ) ( .455) ( 1.815 )
Riverfront 6.335 6.847 1.5 14.682
Building Re-use .476 .006 .007 .040 .529
TOTALS $ 329.792 $ 23.0455 $ 34.4685 $ 87.988 $ 480.5
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10. In further support of the objectives outlines in agreements
1 through 8 above, the Federal, State, and Local Teams agree
to continue discussions and negotiations following the
execution of this Agreement relative to the development of
strategies in support of projects described below:
THURBER HOUSE RESTORATION
(See #2 on map)
The Thurber House renovation is a proposal that would C
rehabilitate an historic 5,000 sq. ft. residential structure
and bring it up to minimum code standards at a cost of
$125,000. The Thurber House, located in the heart of
the Jefferson Neighborhood, and at one time the residence
of James Thurber, can be found on the National Register
of Historic Places. Because of its historic value, the Ohio
Historic Preservation Office will grant $4,485 of funds
towards the renovation effort.
This project, which is expected to begin in 1980, is projected
to provide eight temporary construction jobs. However,
execution is contingent upon the identification of a funding
source for the bulk of the renovation.
For additional information contact Ken Ferell at 222-8172
STATE DEAF SCHOOL ELDERLY HOUSING REDEVELOPMENT
(See #3 on map)
The main elements of the Ohio School for the Deaf project
include an extensive revitalization and conversion of two
historic buildings into elderly housing, and the development
of approximately 12 acres of new park and recreation area.
This project would be a cooperative effort between the Ohio
Commission on Aging, the Columbus Metropolitan Housing
Authority, the Columbus Recreation and Parks Department,
and the Columbus Landmarks Foundation. Primary architectural
and financial feasibility studies have revealed that this project
is economically feasible. It has been determined that the total
project will cost approximately $10, 000,000 consisting 'of:
242 units of HUD Section 8 Housing, $1,000,000 of Heritage
Conservation & Recreation service funds for overall site and
park development; S300,000 of Department of Energy funds
for a solar hot water system; S200,000 of Health, Education
& Welfare funds for counseling and Chore services on an annual
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basis; $1,550,000 from the State of Ohio for both the
construction of a senior citizens center and social services for
that center for a two year period, and; S5,800,000 of private
funds.
SAWYER-TEVITT HEIGHTS PUBLIC HOUSING REVITALIZATION
(See #4 on map)
The Trevitt Heights proposal is to underteke interior and
exterior rehabilitation of 155 public housing units at a cost
of $700,000. This activity was originally proposed as part
of a $5.4 million HUD urban initiatives rehabilitation program
for Sawyer Tower, Sawyer Manor and Trevitt Heights public
housing projects.
Subsequent detailed cosf analysis by CMHA, the public housing
authority operating the three projects, has identified the need
for an additional $700,000 to undertake the Trevitt Heights
portion of the overall rehab project.
The effort to improve cacditions in the public housing area
complements a substantial local and federal effort in the
adjacent Mt. Vernon Plaza Urban Renewal Project and Mt.
Vernon South Amendatory area.
BARNETT PLAZA ELDERLY HOUSING DEVELOPMENT
(See #5 on map)
Barnett Plaza is a proposal to construct 125 units of Section 8
elderly housing. The total cost of the project is estimated at
54.88 million. The Section 8 rent subsidy commitment being
sought would be used to document a guaranteed income and
entice private lenders to finance the mortgage for the building.
The Columbus Metropolitan Area Community Action Organiza-
tion is the proposed developer cf this project.
It is estimated that 78 construction jobs and several permanent
positions will result from this activity. The next step in this
project is to secure the required Section 8 commitment. The
site identified for the project is identified in the City's approved
Housing Assistance Plan as an acceptable location.
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RIVERSIDE TOWERS ELDERLY HOUSING DEVELOPMENT
Riverside Towers is a proposal to construct a 150 unit, 100%
Section 8 hghrise, new construction housing for the elderly
consisting of 140 one bedroom units and 10 two bedroom units.
A bank, a pharmacy, and a full service grocery store would be
located on the main floor of the proposed high rise.
Adjacent to the proposed high rise would be a low rise full
service senior citizen center to serve the general community.
It is proposed that of the 150 units of elderly housing, 36 be
reserved for tenants from state mental institutions, geriatrics
who have been rehabilitated and who are capable of self care.
The Ohio Department of Mental Health and Retardation has
offered to participate by providing movable equipment,
support services and a supplemental per diem payment for each
of the 36 tenants.
The next step in this project is to secure the required Section
8 commitment.
GERMAN VILLAGE RESTORATION CAPITAL IMPROVEMENTS
(See #6 on map)
The proposed German Village Restoration Capital Improvements
project is designed in recognition of the unique position of
recognized historic areas such as German Village. The proposal
involves the identification of resources which can supplement
standard City capital improvements funds and thus support the
higher costs associated with the unique improvements peculiar
to these areas. Specific activities include the rebuilding and
repair of brick streets and the installation of character light
fixtures. It is estimated that 8000 linear feet of brick street
require rebuilding and 1000 linear feet are in need of repair.
The total cost of this street work is projected at $1 million.
Installation of pedestrian scaled, historically appropriate
lighting is projected to cost 52.0 million. For additional
information contact Mr. Warthen at 222-8172.
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LANDMARKS FOUNDATION REVOLVING FUND
(See #7 on map)
This program which began in 1979 is targeted to the purchase,
rehcbilittation and sale of abandoned historic properties in the
Near East Side National Historic District. The program began
in 1979 with a $40,000 grant from the Ohio Historic Preserve-
tion Office and a match of over 550,000 from the American
Home Foundation, a subsidiary of State Savings. An additional
$100,000 was received from CDBG funds and letters of commit-
ment were obtained from both State Savings and Bank Ohio which
which allow 75-80% leveraging of these funds. So far three
properties have been completed and are on the market for sale
under the FHA 265 program which is targeted to low and mod-
erate income residents. The current request to HUD is for an
additional $200,000 to continue this effort. As with the pre-
vious CDBG grant, these additional funds will be leveraged at-
similar ratios through commitments from Bank Ohio and State
Savings. CLF feels that time is of the essence in this effort
due to current market price escalation in the area. Further
information can be obtained by contacting Nancy Recchie at
the Columbus Landmarks Foundation, 22 N. Front Street,
221-0227.
SCATTERED-SITE LOW/MODERATE INCOME SOLAR HOUSING
(See #8 on map)
This proposal is to build an affordable, passive solar , low
income, resident/owner dwelling on a vacant lot using low
income trainees for the construction work. After construction
and sale of this first unit (price will be based on actual
construction cost, primcrily materials) funds generated will be
used to construct an additional dwelling, etc. to crecte~a
revolving materials fund for this project. The project would
benefit Columbus by providing jobs and training for low income
persons, providing energy efficient low cost housing, and help
revitalize blighted arecs. The estimated cost of this project
is $74,030 with donation of all costs for site including sewer
and water taps by the City of Columbus, Ohio. The majority
of construction labor will be provided as in kind. Advance
funds of at least 539,000 would be required to start this
project. For additional information contact Joe Ventreska
at 222-8679.
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THIRD'STRET SCHOOL RENOVATION
(See J 9 on map)
This proposal is to rehab the Third Street School, 630 S. Third St.
as a part of the German Village Historic District to be used by
the Greater Columbus Arts Council. The building has advan-
tages of location, setting and size, but has experienced some
physical deterioration. With a long term lease crangement
between the Columbus Board of Education and GCAC, this
project could represent excellent community level adaptive
re-use, and could add to the German Village historic atmosphere.
A request has been submitted for a Historic Preservation Matching
Grant from the Ohio Historical Society under the Department of,
the Interior Historic Preservation Grants Program. ~The Third
Street School Preservation Study was prepared for~GCAC by
by Schooley Cornelius Associates, Architects - Engineers -
Planners. The proposed project cost is $196,918. For
additional information. contact Mr. Carl Proto at 222-7520.
PERFORMING ARTS CENTER
(See #11 on map)
The construction of the Performing Arts Center, within the
project boundaries of the Capitol South Urban Redevelopment
Project area could commence within a short period of time
after the identification of a source of funding. Architectural
work has already been contracted for through the firm of Hardy,
Holliman, Pfeiffer, Architects. Construction of the Performing
Arts Center will involve both the acquisition of land and a
new theatre and visual arts gallery space at an approximate
cost of $15,000,000. Facilities are being planned for: a
1,000 seat proscenium theatre, a 400 seat experimental theatre,
two 100 sect studio theatres, rehearsal space and administrative-
office space for the arts. It is presumed that the entire
funding of this project will occur through grants and contribu-
tions.
OHIO THEATRE EXPANS ION
(See #12 on map)
The Ohio Theatre Expansion is in two parts. The first is to
deepen and widen the stage in the Ohio Theatre which was
funded in 1977 with a National Endowment of Arts Grant.
This project will proceed as soon as the City of Columbus
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relocates the utilities behind the stage. The second part of
this project is to expand the lobby areas to the east which
would include creating administrative space on the top two
floors for local arts organizations. This area would create
needed rehearsal space for the community. The next step
in this project is to identify funding and local business
support. The estimated cost of this project is $4.5 million,
which could be reduced if funding is identified and the two
parts of the project combined. For additional information
contact Mr. Ken Ferell at 222-8172.
15TH/16TH BLOCK RENOVATION
(See #16 on map)
This project consists of an effort to revitalize the east side of
High Street between 15th and 16th Avenues in the University
area. The existing retail merchants who are tenants in 3/4 of
the block have formed a corporation and are negotiating the
purchase of the buildings they now occupy in order to renovate
the exteriors and interiors in a manner consistent with commu-
nity objectives. Future acquisition of the remaining J of the
block is also under consideration. Renovation of the block
could also involve future development of public parking along
the Pearl Alley side of the property.
The estimated cost of the total project, including acquisition
and renovation stands at $1 .8 million; the tenant businesses
are seeking Federal assistance for interest subsidies, with the
neighborhood Urban Development Action Grant (UDAG) pro-
gram being considered as a possibility. A feasibility study
marketing analysis for 3/4 of the block is underway; this study
has been financed by the affected businesses (2/3 share) and the
City of Columbus (1/3 share) at a total cost of $9,000.00.
LINCOLN THEATRE RENOVATION
(See #20 on map)
The proposed Lincoln Theatre Project involves the renovation
of an abandoned theatre facility in an inner city neighborhood.
The renovated facility would function as a cultural arts
center for Columbus' Black Community. A feasibility study
conducted through a grant from a local foundation, estimated
the total cost of the project at $2.6 million. The project as
planned would create 40-50 construction jobs and several
permanent positions.
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Project needs and activities have been defined, the major
stumbling block to execution is the identification of funding
sources. Several sources appear applicable, including some
related to the possible historic significance of the structure.
The next step is to investigate these potential sources and
identify a fundirg program for the project.
GOVERNOR'S MANSION RENOVATION
(See #22 on map)
The proposed Governor's Mansion project involves the reno-
vation of a former residence of Ohio's Governors, a designated -
historic landmcrk, for privately operated restaurant and com-
mercicl use. The total estimated cost of the renovation is
$1.4 million. A significant portion of the total project has
already been completed, however rising interest rates and
construction costs cause completion of the project to be not
financially viable.
The project developer is seeking a partial lan guarantee,
$400,000 for a proposed $1,000,000 first mortgage. The
proposed loan guarantee is designed to reduce the interest
costs for the project. It is estimated that the project would
create 40 construction jobs and 40 permament jobs.
Identification of funding sources is the next step in the project.
Execution of the project could begin upon receipt of funding.
The Barnett, Deaf School and Riverside Towers elderly housing
projects may require the use of the HUD Secretary's Discretionary
Funds. HUD has indicated that the City would improve its
ability to secure this special supplemental funding if, through
the formulation and implementation of an assisted housing strategy,
it can demonstrate that these specific elderly housing proposals
are both necessary and appropriate relative to the demonstrated
needs of the Columbus community. See agreement 7 above relative to the
formulation and implementation of an assisted housing strategy.
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Resolution of the problems associated with the revitalization/ mod-
ernization of the Sawyer and Trevitt Heights Public Housing projects
shall be linked to the City of Columbus' financial participation in
the rehabilitation of certain scattered site public housing units
owned by the Columbus Metropolitan Housing Authority. The City
agrees to consider such financial participation, the details
of which are the subject of continuing discussion among HUD,
the City, and the Housing Authority.
G. WATER QUALITY MANAGEMENT AND THE CONTROL OF URBAN SPRAWL
The water quality program for Columbus involves the rehabilitation of
the Jackson Pike and Southerly Wastewater Treatment Plants, the con-
struction of intercepting sewers, and other related projects that will
cost approximately $400 million. This agreement will allow these
projects to continue, preventing additional cost increases that would
occur from inflation by delaying the construction. Also, the progress
of these projects will be a key factor in the ability of the State of Ohio
to obligate construction grant program dollar allocations. The
Federal Team's interest is in solving existing water/sewage problems
in Columbus and outlying areas in an environmentally sound and cost
effective manner, but also in a manner in accord with the President's
urban initiatives. Other interrelated items are: strategies for
coping with water quality problems in areas outside the City without
encouraging suburban sprawl; strategies for uncoupling City annex-
ation decisions from requests for hook-ups to City services in outlying
areas; and approaches to tightening State regulation of package
treatment facilities and on site treatment systems in outlying areas.
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The following agreements were reached:
1. The Federal, State, and Local Teams agree that it would not
be helpful to re-open discussions about the final EIS on the
Columbus wastewater treatment facilities and service areas.
2. The Federal Tea, accepts the Local Team's contention that
Columbus' growth policy, though it may appear to promote
sprawl at times, is not actually intended to do so.
3. The City agrees to make explicit in its public policy pro-
nouncements that it is committed to a pattern of concentrated
development rather than to a policy of sprawl. The City
agrees to publish a declaration to this effect in its next
annual growth policy document.
4. The State and Local Teams agree to work toward developing
stricter local land use and development controls coupled with
stricter enforcement procedures for package treatment plants
in the metropolitan area. The teams also agree to examine
the need for stricter package plant standards and where
necessary seek legislative changes in existing laws and
regulations.
5. The Federal, State, and Local Teams agree to examine the need
for changes in procedures, laws, and regulations concerning
certification, construction, and monitoring of on-site systems.
Where changes are found to be needed, all parties agree to seek
the necessary changes. One problem is that current laws allow
County Boards of Health to unilaterally permit installation of
on-site systems.
6. The Federal and Local Teams agree that the City of Columbus will pro-
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vide services to outlying areas with water quality or sewage
disposal problems under several types of situations:
a. The City will accept into its sewer system, publicly
owned and operated package wastewater treatment plants
existing April 30, 1980, where such a plant is accessible
to an existing City line.
b. In the case of on-lot treatment systems, the City will
permit hook-up of a subdivision that is developed prior
to April 30, 1980 if a City line goes by the overall
subdivision and if a collection system is constructed
within the subdivision by another public entity.
c. Neither of the above collection systems would be permitted
to expand in keeping with the City's non-sprawl policy.
d. If a subdivision is proposed outside the existing
sewer system and annexation to the City is not desired,
the City will not accept Federal grant dollars to serve
this area and will not serve this area because this would
promote sprawl. The Federal team will not become involved
in the annexation decision between the City and the outlying
area.
e. In general, the City will not annex an area unless other
basic municipal services such as police, fire, and sanita-
tion can be feasibly provided in addition to water and
sewer services.
f. The City now encourages suburban municipalities to develop
in a non-sprawl fashion by executing contracts for a growth
area within which such suburban municipality can provide
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Columbus sewer and water services upon annexation of
same growth area to the suburban municipality rather
than to Columbus. The growth area of the suburban muni-
cipality provides for the reasonable growth of the sub-
urban municipality over the life of the contract. In
most cases this is twenty years. The suburban munici-
pality must also provide basic municipal services such
as fire, police, and sanitation.
g. The City has refused to accept private sewer systems
into its utility system because the City then becomes
a party to the rate-making process under the Public
Utilities Commission of Ohio. If the private system
agrees to transfer ownership to a public entity, the
City will permit hook-up of such a system provided it
is accessible to an existing line.
h. The Federal, State, and Local Teams agree that additional
areas of water pollution problems need to be studied and
included in the areawide plan.
H. EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING
NIS negotiations concerning employment and training in the Columbus area
covered three items: approaches to enhancing the accuracy and the
timeliness of unemployment data used for federal and state planning and
policy-making purposes; approaches to achieving parity between CETA
clients and WIN clients relative to the support services they receive;
and strategies for linking CETA's objective of securing permanent
non-subsidized employment for its clients to other federal and state
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programs. The following agreements were reached:
1. The Federal Team agrees to have the Columbus SMSA considered
as a priority in current or future expansion of the Current
Population Survey (CPS),which will be effective as of January
1, 1981. This would increase the reliability of CPS data for
the substate area and improve the overall quality of labor
force information.
2. The Federal Team endorses the expansion of CPS data for use
in all fifty states rather than just the current ten stat-es.
This would provide a more equitable basis for the distribution
of funds as compared to the hybrid approach which has 10
states using CPS data and the other forty using Local Area
Unemployment Statistics (LAUS). Inequities in these statistics
lead to inequities in the distribution of funds. The cost of
developing CPS system for the remaining forty states should
be considered against 'the cost of misappropriating billions
of federal dollars over the next ten years prior to the 1990
Census.
3. The Federal Team agrees that income and education information
should be included in the CPS sample. The type of information
which should be included is the type used in the Survey of
Income and Education (SIE). The Federal and Local Teams
agree that it would be desirable to use Columbus as a pilot
project city to test the feasiblity of including this type
of information in the CPS base.
4. The State and Local Teams agree to pursue the implementation
of two Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) programs in
the State of Ohio. With respect to the
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Coding of City Residency- for Unemployment Insurance Claimants
and the National Claims Data Exchange System, the State Team
agrees to explore ways of implementing these programs including
the presentation of Federal and Local Team concerns about these
programs to the appropriate legislative and administrative
bodies.
5. The Federal eam agrees to seek a waiver and, if necessary, a
rule change eliminating the regulation (676.25-5) that limits
the continuation of child care support services to 30 days
after moving from CETA to non-subsidized employment so that
these services are available for 90 days as in the WIN program.
6. The Federal Team agrees to investigate the possiblity of making
the support services available to CETA workers comparable to
those of WIN clients and to seek the necessary administrative
changes needed to ensure the comparability of services.
7. The Local Team (Local Prime Sponsor) agrees to
develop a model program for private sector leadership through
the Private Industry Council in linking CETA clients to perma-
nent unsubsidized jobs. The State Team agrees to assist in
establishing this program and to contribute special grant
funds to support this effort if such funds are available.
8. The Federal Team agrees to solicit input from prime sponsors
to ensure that technical assistance and training needs are
adequately met through management and training offices (both
national and regional) in all program areas.
9. The Local Team agrees that of the new jobs created or main-
tained (construction jobs and new permanent private sector
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jobs) through federally-assisted projects, a minimum of 20%
of these jobs will be made available to CETA (eligible) clients
referred by the Local Prime Sponsor. The Local Team also agrees
to develop employment goals on a project-by-project basis
consistent with this commitment. Given this commitment, the
Local Team anticipates a comparable funding commitment for
those federally-assisted projects where employment goals can
be identified and assured.
I. SERVING SPECIAL NEEDS POPULATIONS
NIS negotiations concerning the provision of services to special needs
populations covered a range of issues including: strategies for
meeting the needs of low income and special needs groups living outside
federally-targetted neighborhoods; approaches to providing housing
for low and moderate income families living outside o'f areas in which
the federal government prefers to target housing assistance funds;
approaches to developing a unified (integrated) human services
delivery system that can overcome a lack of agency coordination and
meet the multiple needs of clients; and approaches to coping with
technical and financial obstacles to developing a unified service
access system. The following agreements were reached:
1. The Federal Team (HUD) agrees to consider a request to
waive CDBG regulatory restrictions in order to allow at least
a percentage of each year's CDBG allocation to Columbus to be
used to support code enforcement services in expanded areas
of the inner city without reference to any other targetting
objectives HUD and/or the City might have. Such requests must
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be consistent with the provisions outlined in the letter
dated April 24, 1980 to the City from HUD (Appendix D).
2. The Local Team agrees to exercise its existing powers and
abilities to provide housing assistance to lower income house-
holds outside of areas in the City in which these households
have traditionally been concentrated. The City states
that this is currently ity policy and it will be maintained.
3. The Federal and State Teams agree to support the.transportation c.nsCJ-
idation initiative proposed by the Local Team in the following manner:
a. The State Team agrees to initiate a request to the
appropriate Federal agencies and the FRC agrees to
facilitate this request for whatever waivers might
be necessary under the terms of the Older Americans
Act. The Local Team is seeking support for a waiver
of any and all administrative requirements that would
restrict the use of Title III-B project income (that
comes by way of donations) as matching for other
programs that would increase nutrition-related transportation.
b. The Federal and State Teams support the
Local Team's request that the local consolidated
social services transportation project , Transportation
Resources Incorporated, be designated as a technology
transfer site by HEW. This transfer involves sub-
sidized technical assistance to TRI drawing from the
experiences of previous social service consolidated
transportation projects funded by the Federal govern-
ment. It also involves proposing to the Federal level
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a request to support an independent evaluation of
is understood that the financial amount of this re-
quest shall not exceed $25,000.
c. The Federal Team agrees to support, to the extent
that existing regulations permit, the Local Team's
request that the transfer of vehicle ownership or
long term leases to a single administrative authority
be permitted.
d. The Federal Team agrees to the Local Team's request
that the consolidated transportation project in
Columbus be designated, on a priority basis, as a
site for the application of any breakthroughs relative
to the management of billing and nvoicing for transpor-
tation services that result from the HEW-sponsored
pilot projects through their Michigan and Pennsylvania
consortia.
4. The Federal, State and Local Teams agree to the formation of
a Tripartite Task Force that will pursue the development of a
pilot unified service access system in Franklin County.
Central to the concept
of the unified access system will be: (a) the creation of a
decentralized intake model where eligibility for multiple
services can be determined simultaneously; (b) the existence of
a centralized information system with remote terminals at intake
points and service provider locations; and (c) the establishment
of an independent case management system with sufficient authority
175
to assure accountability of the human service system to the
consumer. Initially, the focus of this effort will be on the
reporting and accoutability requirements of the Title M pro-
gram. Members of the Task Force will include, at a minimum,
HEW, State departments of Public Welfare and Mental Health and
Mantal Betardation, Metropolitan Human Services Commission,
Franklin County Welfare Department, Children's Services Board,
648 Board, Columbus Community Services Department, CMACAO, and
United Way. The Metropolitan Human Services Commission will
be responsible for convening the Task Force and it will
commence subsequent to completion of the Human Services re-
financing strategies, as agreed to in Section III-B above. The first
meeting will occur during the last quarter of the 1980 calendar
year with a project plan finalized by June 30, 1981
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IV. PROCEDURES FOR IPLENTING AND 1M.ONITORING THE TRMS OF'THIS AGREEMENT
A. IMDLEMNTATION
The Points of Agreement outlined in Section III indicate the
responsibilities that the signatories have accepted by co-signin2 this
Agreement. All parties, by signing, accept responsibility for overseeing
the attempts of their member agencies to follow through on the responsi-
bilities outlined in Section III. All parties, by signing, accept
responsibility for overseeing the efforts of their agencies and organi-
zations to follow through on the responsibilities indicated. Where
dates are specified by which certain tasks are supposed to be completed,
it is the responsiblity of the Team Members to ensure that these dead-
lines are met. When deadlines cannot be met, it is the responsiblity
of the Team Leader whose team has failed to meet the deadline to contact
the other Team Leaders to explain why -the deadline has not been met and
what the new dates are for task completion. The other Team Leaders
should notify all of their Team Members whenever such deadline changes
occur.
If a Team Member responsible for implementation of a particular
Point of Agreement finds that unexpected obstacles to implementation
have emerged, it is the responsibility of that Team Member to communi-
cate this to his or her Team Leader, regardless of whether or not a
deadline for task completion is specified in the Points of Agreement.
The Team Leader involved should communicate whatever is learned about
these obstacles to the other Team Leaders as quickly as possible. They,
in turn, should communicate to their Team Members. The Tripartite
Committees that helped to draw up many of the Points of Agreement can
be used, at the discretion of the Team Leaders, to help work out alter-
native arrangements.
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Team Leaders are responsible for working out alternative arrangements
for the implementation of Points of Agreement should unexpected obstacles
to implementation arise. These alternative arrangements should, in all
cases, be developed through close cooperation with the relevant Team
Members.
If the Team Leaders can not work out mutually satisfactory alternative
arrangements, they may, if they wish, call on a member of the Mediation
Team to meet with them in an effort to effect a compromise alternative
arrangement, satisfactory to all parties. Should the Mediation Team be
unable to effect a mutually acceptable compromise agreement, a full
reconvening of all the parties to the NIS process would be possible,
assuming all parties and the Mediator can work out satisfactory
arrangements as to time, place,,and date.
The failure of one or more parties to follow through on the implemen-
tation of one or more Points of Agreement should not be construed as a
rejection of the terms of the overall NIS Agreement. All Team Members
are responsible for working toward implementation of the Points of
Agreement for which they are responsible or in which they are involved,
regardless of any difficulties that others may have implementing partic-
ular points. If any Team Member feels that it has become impossible
for him or her to adhere to this Agreement, this concern should be
communicated immediately to the appropriate Team Leader.
Individuals in the NIS process representing certain agencies,
organizations, or interests may be replaced by other appointed or elected
individuals. It is the assumption of all the participants in the NIS
process that this Agreement commits their agencies and organizations (and
not just the individuals involved) to the terms enumerated in this
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document. It is further understood by all the participants in the
NIS process that the terms of this Agreement shall be binding, to the
extent legally possible, on any and all individuals who may subsequently
hold the positions of the individuals who participated in the Columbus
NIS process.
Should any member of any Team feel that the individuals who re-
place current NIS participants are not abiding by the terms of this
Agreement, they should contact their Team Leader.
The Mediation Team will take responsiblity, if asked
by a Team Leader, for contacting the new party and explaining the terms
of the NIS Agreement. Should subsequent negotiation fail, the Mediation
Team will contact all the other parties to the NIS process (especially
Team Leaders and their successors) and discuss possible courses of
action. Should further negotiation fail, the Team Leaders, in conjun-
ction with the Mediators if they so choose, shall determine whether all
parties are still bound by their commitments.
B. MONITORING
It is the responsibility of each Team Member to monitor progress
toward the implementation of the Points of Agreement for which he or
she is directly or even indirectly responsible. Concerns about the
implementation of this Agreement should be directed to the appropriate
Team Leaders and/or to the Mediation Team. Team Leaders should be
in touch with each other on a regular monthly basis between May 1980
and October 1980 to discuss progress toward implementation of the terms
of this Agreement. Team Leaders should prepare a jointly written
Monitoring Report by October 30, 1980 to send to all Team Members and
the Mediation Team, documenting the progress that has been made toward
implementing the terms of this Agreement and indicating any steps;
that they deem appropriate to accelerate the pace of implementation
if, for any reason, it is moving too slowly.
The NIS Negotiating Teams for the City, the State, and the FRC
shall reconvene in mid-November 1980 at a time and place to be set
by the Team Leaders. The purpose of this meeting will be to review
the progress made in implementing each of the specific Points of
Agreement and to make such additions and modifications to this
Agreement as may be deemed desirable or appropriate by the parties.
At the mid-November 1980 meeting, the Teams shall set the time for
additional meetings deemed desirable or advisable.
If, at any time, Team Leaders feel it would be helpful to appoint
NIS Coordinators, they are empowered by the terms of this Agreement to
do so.
C. RESOLVING CONFLICTING INTERPRETATIONS
Should conflicting interpretations of the terms of this Agreement
cause disagreements among or between Team Members, the relevant Team
Leader(s) should be contacted directly for clarification. Should the
Team Leader(s) feel that the involvement of the Mediation Team would
be helpful in clarifying the terms of the Agreement, Team Leaders should
feel free to contact the Mediation Team. If a speedy clarification is
not possible through mail or phone contact, the Mediators and the Team
Leaders may decide to meet to discuss whatever conflicting interpretat-
tions have emerged. Failure to resolve conflicting interpretations
at such a meeting may lead to a call for a full reconvening of all the
parties to the NIS process, assuming mutually acceptable date, time,
and location can be arranged. Reports of clarifications reached by
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Team Leaders (with or without the involvement of the Mediation Team)
should be put in writing and distributed to all parties to the
Agreement. Should the Team Leaders find that the members of the
Mediation Team have not been responsive or have been unable to
help resolve conflicting interpretations, the Team Leaders, together,
should seek conciliation or mediation assistance from other quarters.
This holds true for any aspect of implementation or monitoring.
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V. SIGNATORIES
Team Leaders
Fran Ryan, Regicnal Representative, C f4ce of the Secretary of
the Department of Labor
Federal Team Leader
David M. Gehr, S:ta -Jrice of I' enent and Budget
State Team Leaor
Local Team Leader
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V. SIGNATORIES
To--Hody, Mayor o:
Local Team Leader
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STATE OF CONNECTICUT
A NEGOTIATED INVESTMENT STRATEGY
A Joint Agreement on Principles
Priorities, Allocations, and Plans for the
Social Services Block Grant
October 1, 1983 to September 30, 1984
Prepared by Teams Representing the Executive Branch
of the State of Connecticut, Connecticut Muncipal Governments
and Connecticut Non-Profit Social Service Providers
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I
PREAMBLE
The Social Services Block Grant (SSBG), which amends Title XX of the Social Security
Act, is an important source of money for the provision of human services for
Connecticut's citizens. For federal fiscal year 1984 (beginning October 1, 1983), it is
likely that Connecticut will receive approximately 33 million dollars. This amount
represents a significant decrease from the 47 million dollars received in federal fiscal year
1981.
Connecticut, through the Negotiated Investment Strategy (NIS) process, has accepted the
challenge and opportunity to re-examine its past and current policies and programs
supported by Title XX and to design a rational course for the future.
Historically, state policies and procedures have evolved through a wide array of
mechanisms and influences, including multi-level planning efforts, guidance from
legislative intent, tradition, needs assessments, federal requirements and fiscal
constraints. The flexibility of the SSBG and of the NIS process has offered a unique and
valuable opportunity to review, revise and improve upon past practices.
The NIS process has allowed the three sectors which provide direct services - the state,
municipalities and non-profit orgarizations - to take part in an open and participatory
dialogue regarding service priorities, the allocation of block grant monies, reduction of
service duplication and increases in inter- and intra-sector communication. The process
has also facilitated the integration of state and federal funding and improvements in
monitoring and evaluation mechanisms.
The healthy balance among state, municipal and non-profit service providers which the NIS
has provided will help ensure that we do not return to a narrow categorical perspective
when allocating funds for social service programs and when actually providing services.
This cooperative interaction should be the norm in the future for the Social Services Block
Grant.
The agreement which follows represents the joint conclusions of the State, Connecticut's
municipalities and the non-profit sector regarding which services should be funded by the
SSBG, how those services should be defined, what criteria should be used in setting
priorities among services, how much funding should be allocated to each and what
procedures and criteria should be used in judging applications from individual service
providers. It also reflects the conclusion and determination of the three sectors that the
type of cooperation established in the NIS process should be maintained through the period
of the agreement's implementation and beyond. The establishment of the Tripartite Social
Services Block Grant Committee will assist the implementation of this agreement and will
help assure that flexibility can be maintained so that effective responses to decreasing
fiscal resources and increased human services needs can occur.
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Section I
DEFINITIONS
STATEMENT OF GUIDING PRINCIPLES
Conditions of vulnerability, uniform service definitions and budget categories shall
apply to all activities funded by SSBG dollars.
RESOLUTION I-1
The following definitions for services and pertinent budget categories shall govern all
activities supported in whole or in part by SSBG allocations:
A. Services
I. Adoption Services: To enable chiloren and youth' with special needs (e.g.,
physically, oevelopmentally, neurologically or mentally disabled, minority,
and abused/neglected) who cannot remain with their families to be
adopted by individuals or families through a formal legal process.
2. Child Day Care Services: To protect and meet the developmental needs of
infants, children, and youth, or to assist families by providing direct care
to children in licensed family or group day care programs.
3. Client-Oriented Coordination of Services: Assessment of an individual's
neecs, ceveiopment of a plan to ensure that the needs are met, connection
of the individual to the providers that can meet the identified needs,
support of the client in his or her receipt of services, follow up to ensure
the service plan is fulfilled, and avoidance of duplication in the provision
of services.
4. Community-Based Non-Residential Services: Community-based non-
residential services consist of:
(a) Adult Day Care Services: Provides for direct care and protection of
adults ouring a portion of a 24-hour day inside or outside the
individual's own home. The direct care and protection activities are
designed to meet the physical, social, emotional and intellectual
needs of the individual, including physically, developmentally,
neurologically or mentally disabled individuals. Services are geared
to provide caring for an individual's needs for food, activity, rest and
other necessities of physical care, including minor medical care, for
a portion of the 24-ho.r day in a setting approved by the
administering agency; and
"Youth" is defined throughout as those persons under 18 years of age.
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(b) Community Care for the Elderly and Disabled: Includes services
that provide eloerly and/or disabled persons in danger of
inappropriate institutionalization with a service system to
strengthen their ability for independent living, enable them to live
safely in their own homes or to return to their homes or communities
after deinstitutionaliza- tion. Services may be provided to the aged
and/or disabled person, relatives or other interested community
members in order to avoid inappropriate institutionalization of the
service client.
5. Community-Based Residential Services: To avoid, forestall or shorten the
length of institutionalization for individuals who are unable to function
fully in the community without some level of intermediate care or
alternative living arrangements (e.g., halfway houses, group houses, etc.).
This service focuses on treatment, habilitative or rehabilitative care
through the provision of supportive living experiences to enable individuals
to return home, if possible, as soon as personal, social adjustment and
development permit.
6. Counseling Services: To assess, modify, or resolve problems (e.g.,
psycnological, emotional, or behavioral) through individual, group or
family counseling or guidance. (Although most human services include
some type of counseling activities, counseling as here defined is limited to
those situations in which counseling is the major service provided.)
7. Day Treatment Services: To habilitate or rehabilitate seriously impaired
individuals in order that they can remain in their families and
communities. Day treatment services are available in a planned program
with individuals returning home in the evening.
8. Emergency Shelter Services: To arrange or provide the minimum
necessities of life on a limited and short-term basis for individuals or
families during periods of dislocation, crisis or emergency, pending
formulation of longer-term plans.
9. Employability Services: To develop employability and training
opportunities for vulnerable populations.
10. Family Planning Services: Social, educational and medical services to
enable individuals of child-bearing age (including minors) to limit their
family size, space their children, or resolve fertility problems.
11. Foster Family Care Services: To protect or support abused and/or
physically, developmentally, neurologically or mentally disabled children,
youth and adults and meet their developmental needs in a licensed foster
family home when the individual's own family cannot provide necessary
care.
12. Home Management-Maintenance Services: To enable individuals and
families to function adequately in their own homes by providing, when
necessary, services for and on behalf of children, youth
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and adults by professionals and para-professionals, aimed at supplementing
the clients' efforts to maintain an independent living arrangement when
unable to perform such tasks themselves, or to prevent fam[ly disruption
through helping to maintain or improve family functioning.
13. Information and Referral Services: A broad range of services to impart
information to clients and potential clients regarding the availability and
relevance of social service resources in the State and referral and
follow-up when appropriate.
14. Legal Services: The provision of legal services to individuals and families
in civil and administrative pcoceedings.
15. Recreation, Social Development, and Enrichment Services: To provide
access to recreational and cultural opportunities and encourage the
acquisition of recreation and leisure-time skills to prevent or minimize
psychological, social or economic isolation.
16. Residential Treatment Services: Provide 24-hour supervised care and
treatment in an appropriate residential setting under the direction of
professional staff to impact significant levels of dysfunction. Placement
for these services may be up to 24 months.
17. Safeguarding or Protective Services: To protect individuals from physical
or sexual abuse, neglect, aoandonment or harm. Safeguarding services
consist of assessment, counseling, referral for treatment, placement (when
necessary) and reunification.
18. Transportation Services: Assisting individuals and families in obtaining
adequate means of transportation to access needed community services
and activities and, when required by a case plan, to actually provide
transportation and escort.
B. Pertinent Definitions Related to Delivery of Services
I. Administrative Costs: Those costs associated with managing a direct
service program such as supervisory personnel costs and the indirect costs
of organizational operations such as supplies, rent, utilities, maintenance,
insurance, telephone, and travel. 2
2. Direct Services: Those services rendered to individuals eligible under the
vulneraDle population categories as established by SSBG eligibility criteria.
3. Service Provider: Service Provider shall include State of Connecticut,
Municipal and Non-Profit service providers.
4. Training: Educational programs, conferences, workshops and training
materials to enhance the competence and assure an appropriate supply of
service staff to deliver direct, humane and effective services.
2 These costs do not incluoe those expenditures for direct program staff, contractual
services, or capital outlay.
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RESOLUTION 1-2
The Social Services Block Grant will be used to provide needed social services to
vulnerable persons or families in Connecticut, with special emphasis on those groups
which are less able than others to care for themselves (e.g., special needs children,
youth and elderly). Vulnerable persons or families are those which exhibit one or
more of the following conditions (not presented in any ranked order):
- Economically disadvantaged (unemployed, under-employed, or low income).
- Physically, mentally, neurologically, or oevelopmentally disabled.
- In need of language and cultural awareness assistance and/or technical
immigration assistance.
- Abused/neglected (e.g., sexual assault victims, abused and/or exploited children
and elderly).
- In need of drug or alcohol services.
- In need of family planning services.
- In need of mental health support services (e.g., distressed families or persons
who may be at risk of institutionalization).
- In need of supportive services in order to remain in the community.
- In need of shelter assistance.
RESOLUTION 1-3
In addition to the criteria of conditions of vulneraoility, the provision of social
services from the resources of the Social Services Block Grant will be subject to the
following eligibility criteria:
- Recipients of services shall have incomes no higher than 150 percent of federal
poverty income guidelines, except that certain services (safeguarding, family
planning, information and referral and emergency shelter) will be provided
without regard to income.
- Criminal offenders or ex-offenders may be eligible for SSBG services, but SSBG
funds cannot be used to support services provided directly by staff of a
correctional facility (per federal law and regulations).
- The Connecticut General Statutes, Section 8-210(b) requires the State to
provide day care centers for children disadvantaged by economic, social or
environmental conditions. Potential recipients of service from State child day
care centers shall have incomes no higher than 80 percent of State median
income.
- Recipients of purchased child day care services (e.g., employed AFDC and low
income) shall have incomes no higher than 45 percent of State median income.
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- Recipients of legal services shall have incomes no higher than 125 percent of
the federal poverty income guidelines.
- Recipients of home management-maintenance services and the DHR Essential
Services Program shall have incomes no higher than 45 percent of State median
income.
- Fee schedules are being, or will be, used for day care centers, purchased day
care, family planning, and home management-maintenance services, which will
be based on family size and income 3.
Currently, a fee schedule is used for day care centers and has begun to be used for
purchased day care services. This fee schedule is based on the concept of free service for
low income people up to a certain level, roughly equivalent to the maximum welfare flat
grant. Beyond that point, service recipients pay fees on a sliding scale, which gradually
increases to the point of the full cost of providing the service. The same principles will be
followed in the implementation of a fee schedule for home management- maintenance
services and rnay be followed for other services as determined by the Tripartite Social
Services Block Grant Committee (see Section V). Projected fees, based on fee schedules,
are budgeted as income to the programs financed by the SSBG, thus reducing the net State
cost, or can be applied to an expansion of the service if need has been substantiated.
Determinations of fees and the accounting of fee revenues shall be part of the contractual
relationship between the State and appropriate service providers. Finally, the Planned
Parenthood League of Connecticut applies a fee schedule to recipients of family planning
services, which is based on income dnd family size, the proceeds of which are used to
defray the cost of providing the service.
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Section 11
SERVICE PRIORITIES FOR S58G FUNDS
STATEMENT OF GUIDING PRINCIPLES
I. Service priorities shall be based on social service needs.
2. Criteria utilized for identifying and ranking social service needs shall be explicit.
3. Adverse impacts on service recipients should be minimized.
RESOLUTION 11-1
In order to establish the priorities among the SSBG-supported services, the following
criteria are adopted as indicators of service importance. The specific question or
questions accompanying the statement of each criterion identifies the way in which
each criterion is used to measure or evaluate service importance. The criteria are:
Abuse curtailment
Does the service provide intervention and/or shelter from physical or
sexual abuse?
Emergency intervention
Does the service provide intervention in acute, emergency and potentially
life-threatening situations requiring immediate action?
Avoids/prevents greater expenditures for service
Does the provision of this service prevent or delay the provision of more
expensive services? If this service were riot available, woula the needs of
the recipient require State expenditures for higher, (i.e., more expensive)
levels of service, such as hospitalization, nursing home care and/or other
types of institutionalization?
Human Services Annual Agenda
Does the service address one or more of the categories delineated in the
1983-84 Human Services Annual Agenda (Connecticut General Statutes
Sections 4-85b and 4-85c)?
Prevent inappropriate institutionaliz~ation
Does the service provide a humane, appropriate and cost-effective
alternative to institutionalization?
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Reduce dependency
Does the provision of this service reduce the dependency on institutional
support services,-thereby increasing one's self-sufficiency?
RESOLUTION 11-2
Social services, as defined in Section I of this Agreement, are divided into three
priority groupings. In addition to identifying service priorities based upon social
service needs, these three priority groupings also outline the general principles on
which allocation formulas are predicated. Those principles are defined as follows:
High Priority Services
Services within this category shall be eligible for a cost-of-living
adjustment or a cost-of-living adjustment plus additional financial
allocations. Those high priority services for which funding is not being
currently provided shall be financially supported at a level commensurate
with their status as high priority services.
Medium Priority Services
Services within this category shall remain at their present level of funaing
or remain at their present level and receive a cost-of-living adjustment.
Low Priority Services
Services within this category shall remain at their present level of funding
or receive a aecrease in funaing.
RESOLUTION 11-3
Utilizing the service definitions contained in Resolution I-1 of this Agreement and
the principles containea in Resolution 11-1 and Resolution 11-2, the service priorities
are:
High Priority Services (listed in alphabetical order)
Adoption services
Child day care services
Client-oriented coordination of services
Community-based non-residential services
Community-based residential services
Day treatment services
Emergency shelter services
Safeguarding or protective services -
Meaium Priority Services (listed in alphabetical order)
Employability services
Family planning services
Foster family care services
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Medium Priority Services (continued)
Home management - maintenance services 4
Legal services4
Low Priority Services (listed in alphabetical order)
Counseling4
Information and referral 5
Recreation
Residential treatment services
Transportation services
4 To the extent these services are part of a service with a higher priority ranking, they
would retain the priority of that other higher-ranking service.
5 It was agreed to study this service category to see if a unitary statewide system can be
established.
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Section III
ALLOCATION MECHANISMS
STATEMENT OF GUIDING PRINCIPLES
. Mechanisms shall be developed for allocating to social service needs and
providers the full amount of SSBG funds availiable each federal fiscal year.
Specific allocations shall be identified by budget category (service categories,
set-asides, etc.)
2. Innovative programming efforts shall be encouraged. Whenever appropriate,
funding snail be availaible on a competitive basis for service delivery or
management innovations.
3. SSG funds shall be used to support those services as agreed to in the NIS
process and in accordance with federal and state law. SSBG dollars shall
directly support human services and shall not supplant general funds within any
agency except in accordance with the agreement reached in the NIS process.
SS36 funds sihill be acrounted for under generally accepted accounting
principles.
RESOLUTION 111-1
There shall be no transfer of SSBG dollars to other block grants.
RESOLUTION 111-2
A specific set-aside of money shall be available on 4 competitive basis for service
delivery o. management innovations. The Tripartite Social Services Block Grant
Committee established pursuant to this process shall review such innovative
applications and programs.
RESOLUTION 111-3
Funding shall be based on (a) priority needs for social services, (b) service providers'
performance in meeting such needs and (c) cost-efficiency in service delivery.
RESOLUTION 111-4
Allocations of SSBG funds in federal fiscal year 1984 shall be made in accordance
with the attached allocation schedule and its accompanying explanation, with the
provision that "medium priority services" identified in Resolution 11-2 shall be eligible
to receive, on a competitive basis, a cost-of-living increase not to exceed 5.8 percent.
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SOCIAL SERVICES BLOCK GRANT ALLOCATIONS FOR FEDERAL FISCAL YEAR 1984
A
SERVICE/AGECY (F
PRLAM COGN1ZANCE
FEDERAL CHANGES TO ALLOCATION
FY 1983 ACCMPLISH AFTER
ALL(CATION SWAP SWAP
CHAIES TO ALLOCATION
RLORDER PER AFTER SWAP
DEFINITIONS & REORDERING
G H
REALLOCATIONS PROPOSED
FFY 1984
ALLOCATIONS
1
2
3
A
5
6
7
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
A1
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ ------------------------
0 0 0 0 0 +20,000 20,000
0 0 0 0 0 +20,000 20,000
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
9,815,115 +801,852 10,616,967 0 10,616,967 0 10,616,967
9,815,115 +801,852 10,616,967
----------------------
0 0
0 10,616,967 0 16,616,967
0 +500,0m 6 500,00
HIGH PRIORITY SRVICES
Adoption
Dept. of Children & Youth Services
Child Day Care
Dept. of Human Resources
Client-Oriented Coordination
Agency to be determined
Comunity Based Non-Residential
Dept. of Human Resources
Dept. on Aging
Ord. of Ed. & Services for Blind
Coffmunity Based Residential
Alcohol & Drug Abuse Comsission
Dept. of Correction
Day Treatment
Dept. of Humn Resources
Dept. of Mental Retardation
Dept. of Children & Youth Services
Emergency Shelters
Dept. of Human Resources
Dept. of Children & Youth Services
Alcohol & Drug Abuse Comission
Agency to be Determined
Safeguarding
Dept. of Children A Youth Services
Human Rights & Opportunities
Dept. of qeman Resources
Protection & Advocacy - Handicapped
Comission on the Deaf
Agency to be Determined
SWTOTAL - HIGH PRIORITIES
445,302
170,508
578,422
50,795
0
0
0 445,302
-170,508 0
0 578,422
0 50,795
0 0
0 0
0
+108,000
+13,300
+244,936
0 445,302
0
686,422
63,995
244,936
0
0
0
0
0
+100,000
0 445,302
0
686,422
63,995
244,936
100,000
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
16,192,329 +2,879,909 19,072,238 +2,019,596 21,091,834 +1,531,066 22,622,900
49-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
6 See note on line 132.
* *,* . .,.. . . .
C~ il ; -"
-, 
- Me
0 0 0 0 0 .500,000 6 500,000
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1,502,401 +187,436 1,689,837 +989,639 2,679,476 +400,000 3,079,476
142,349 0 142,349 +972,000 1,114,349 0 1,114,349
1,360,052 +187,436 1,547,488 0 1,547,488 +360,000 1,907,488
0 0 0 +17,639 17,639 +40,000 57,639
-------- --------------------------------------------- -----------------------------------------------------
319,065 +663,371 982,436 +612,021 1,594,457 0 1,594,457
162,590 +819,846 982,436 .612,021 1,594,457 0 1,594,457
156,475 -156,457 0 0 0 0 0
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- --------------------------------------
2,416,721 +1,330,281 3,747,002 0 3,747,002 +260,000 4,007,002
6,094 0 6,094 0 6,094 0 6,094
2,410,627 +1,330,281 3,740,908 0 3,740,908 +200,000 3,940,908
0 0 0 0 0 +60,000 60,000
--------------------------------------------------------------------------.--------.-----.------- ----------------
894,000 +67,477 961,477 +51,800 1,013,277 +251,066 1,264,343
210,000 +67,477 277,477 0 277,477 0 277,477
684,000 0 684,000 0 684,WO 0 684,000
0 0 0 +51,800 51,800 0 51,800
0 0 0 0 0 +251,066 251,066
------------------------------------------------------------- -----------------------------------------------
1,245,027 -170,508 1,074,519 +366,136 1,440,655 +100,000 1,540,655
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
A 8 C 0 E F C H
SRVICE/AGECY OF FEN*RAL CHANQS TO ALLOCATION CHANGES TO ALLOCATION REALLOCATIONS PROPOSO
PROGRAM COGNIZANCE FY 1983 ACCOMPLISH AFTER REORDER PER AFTER SWAP FrY 1984
ALLOCATION SWAP SWAP DEFINITIONS & REORDERlNG ALLOCATIONS
50 MEDIUM PRIORITIES
51
52 Employability
53
54 Dept. of Human Resourc
55
56 Family Planning
57
58 Dept. of Human Resourc
59
60 Foster Care
61
62 Dept. of Children & Yo
63
64 me Mnagement 7
65
66 Dept. of Human Resourc
67
68 Legal Services7
69
70 Dept. of Human Resourc
71 Protection & Advocacy
72 Public Defender
73
74 Cost of Living Reserve
75
76 MEDIUM PRIOITY SUTOTAL
77 -----------------------
78 LON PRIORITIES
79
80 Counseling
7
81
82 Alcohol & Drug Abuse
83 Dept. of Consumer Prot
84 Dept. of Correction
85 Judicial Dept.
86 Dept. of Human Resourc
87
88 Info and Referral
89
90 Dept. of "man Resour
91 Alcohol & Drug Abuse
92 Brd. of Ed. & Service
93 Commission on the Dea
94 Protection & Advocacy
95 rman Rights A Opport
96
97 Recreation
98
99 Dept. of Human Resour
1o0
es
es
uth Services
es
es
- Handicapped
'5.8 X)8
Commisslon
tection
ces
ces
Commission
s for Blind
f
- Handicapped
unities
ces
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1,081,198 0 1,081,198 0 1,081,198 0 1,081,198
1,081,196 0 1,081,198 0 1,081,198 0 1,081,198
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1,132,701 0 1,132,701 0 1,132,701 0 1,132,701
1,132,701 0 1,132,701 0 1,132,701 0 1,132,701
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
~------
0 0 0 0 0 +120,000 120,000
011, 0 18320 +120,000 120,000
1,183,322 0 1,183,322 -1,080,000 103,322 0 103,322
1,183,322 0 1,183,122 -1,080,000 103,322 0 103,322
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -----------------------------
2,031,895 -1,023,047 1,006,848 0 1,008,848 0 1,008,848
980,276 0 980,276 0 980,276 0 980,276
28,572 * 0 28,572 0 28,572 0 28,572
1,023,047 -1,023,047 0 0 0 0 0
+192,912 192,912
5,829,11 ---------------------------------------------- ----- --
5,429,116 -1,023,047 4,406,069 -1,080,000 3,326,069 +312,912 3,638,981
------------------------------------------------------------------- - -------
,887,434 -2,338,427 2,509,007 -586,795 1,922,212 -100,000 1,822,212
640,795 0 640,795 -586,795 54,000 0 54,000
86,234 -86,234 0 0 0 0 0
821,495 -821,495 0 0 0 0 0
1,430,698 -1,430,698 0 0 0 0 0
1,868,212 0 1,868,212 0 1,868,212 -100,000 1,768,212
----------------------------------------------------------- ---------- ----------
2,157,912 -113,672 2,044,240 -352,801 1,691,439 -800,000 891,439
1,602,183 0 1,602,183 0 1,602,183 -800,000 802,183
153,026 0 153,026 -77,026 76,000 0 76,000
17,639 0 17,639 -17,639 0 0 0
244,936 0 244,936 -244,936 0 0 0
26,456 0 26,456 -13,200 13,256 0 13,256
113,672 -113,672 0 0 0 0 0
660,0750-------------------------------- 3-3
660,075 0 660,075 0 660,075 -330,000 330,075
660,075 a 660,075 0 660,075 -330,000 330,075-
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- --------
7 Counseling, home management-maintenance and legal services which are part of another service rather than freestanding are ranked with the
services of which they are a part.8 A cost of living Increase will be considered upon an individual review of each service provider.
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----------------------------------------------------------------------------- ------- -- ---- 
--
A 8 C 0 E F G H
SERVICE/AGENCY OF FEDERAL CHANGES TO ALLOCATION CHANGES TO ALLOCATION REALLOCATIONS PROPOSED
PRIX0RAN COGNIZANCE FY 1983 ACCOWALISH AFTER REORDER PER AFTER SWAP FFY 1984
ALLOCATION SWAP SWAP DEFINITIONS & REORDERING ALLOCATIONS
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ -------------------------------------
101 LOW PRIORITIES (continued)
102 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -
103 Residential Treatment 2.302,730 0 2,302,730 0 2,302,730 0 2,302,730
104
105 Dept. of Children & Youth Services 2,302,730 0 2,302,730 0 2,302,730 0 2,302,730
106 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
107 Transportation 196,764 0 196,764 0 196,764 -196,764 0
108
109 Dept. of Haan Resources 196,764 0 196,764 0 196,764 -196,764 0
110 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
111 LOW PRIORITY SUBTOTAL 10,164,915 -2,452,099 7,712,816 -939,596 6,773,220 -1,426,764 5,346,456
112 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
113 SET-ASIDES
114 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
115 Training 858,069 0 858,069 0 858,069 -258,069 600,000
116 Innovative Projects 0 0 0 0 0 +250,000 250,000
117 Data Base, Strategic Planning,
118 Evaluation & Technical Assist. 0 0 0 0 0 +380,000 380,000
119 Contingencies 0 0 0 0 0 +138,488 138,488
120 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
121 SET-ASIDES SUBTOTAL 858,069 0 858,069 0 858,069 +510,419 1,368,488
122 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
123 CENTRAL ADMINISTRATION 496,456 -332,396 164,060 0 164,060 0 164,060
124
125 Dept. of Human Resources 164,060 0 164,060 0 164,060 0 164,060
126 Office of Policy A management 332,396 -332,396 0 0 0 e 0 0
127 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
128 BALAE FOR REALLOCATION 0 927,633 927,633 0 927,633 -927,633 0
129 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
130 TOTAL 33,140,885 0 33,140,885 9 0 33,140,885 9 0 33,140,885 9
131
132 9 There is potentially another $836,998 as listed in the 11/26/82 Federal Register. This, plus any carryover funding, will be apportioned as follows:
133 First, the contingency fund will be restored to I percent of the present block grant total ($331,400L. Second, an additional $250,000 will be
134 reserved for Client-Oriented Coordination of Services and will be released for that purpose after six months experience with the service In the
135 fiscal year and a Tripartite evaluation. Third, $125,000 will be reserved for Transportation. Any additional funding will be allocated through a
136 Tripartite agreement.
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EXPLANATION OF ALLOCATION SCHEDULE
I. DESCRIPTION OF COLUMNS ON THE ALLOCATION SCHEDULE
A. Column A lists the service categories and the State agencies of program cognizance
under each. The services are grouped according to the agreed-upon priority rankings.
B. Column B shows the SSBG allocation for the current fiscal year based upon the
service definitions in effect prior to the negotiations.
C. Column C reflects all of the pluses and minuses in SSBG funding necessary to
accomplish the swap of SSBG ana General Fund money. The swap was negotiated in
order to permit agencies and important services not directly related to the statutory
block Grant goals to withdraw from the Block Grant. Those services affected as a
result of the agencies' withdrawal are: Community based Residential (Depart neut of
Correction - line 24), Safeguarding (Human Rights and Opportunities - line 42), Legal
Services (Puoulc Defenaer - line 85), Counseling (Consumer Protection, Correction,
Judicial - lines 83 to 85), Information and Refe rral (Human Righits and Opportunities -
line 95), Administration (OPM - line 126).
The services and agencies which contributed General Fund dollars and are to receive
SSBG dollars in their place are: Child Day Care (Department of Human Resuirces -
line 9), Community Based Non-Residential (Department on Aging - line 18),
Community Based Residential (Alcohol and Drug Abuse Commission - line 23), 0ay
Treatment (Department of %lental Retardatiort - lie 29) and Emergency Shelter
(Depart nent of Human Resources - line 34).
D. CoI-nn D is tie total of column B plus column C. It is an intermediate step which
snows the allocation after the swap. All other allocations remain the same. In each
instance, swap dollars were placed in high priority services.
E. Column E reflects changes in classification of existing services to reflect the newly
negotiated service definitions. For example, it is agreed that counseling, home
manage:nent-maintenance services and legal services which are part of another
service rather than free standing will be classified with the service of which they are
a part. Each plus indicates an ac'tivity moved from somewhere else in the column.
Each minus indicates an activity moved to another classification. There is no net
change in funding in tie column; each pTas is balanced by a minus. The changes
include:
1. Movement of $972,000 fron DHR - Home Management (line 66) to Community
Based Non-Residential (in 17).
2. Movement of $17,639 from the Board of Education and Services for the Blind -
Information & Referral (line 92) to Community Based Non-Residential (line 19).
3. Movement of $534,995 CADAC - Counseling (line 82) and $77,026 CADAC -
Information & Referral (line 91) to CADAC - Community Based Residential (line
23).
4. Movement of $51,800 from CADAC Counseling (line 82) to CADAC -
Emergency Shelter (line 36).
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5. Movement of $108,000 from DHR - Home Management (line 66) to DHR -
Safeguarding (line 43).
6. Movement of $13,200 from Protection and Advocacy - Information & Referral
(line 94) to Protection and Advocicy - Safeguarding (line 44).
7. Movement of $244,036 from Deaf and Hearing Impaired - Information and
Referral (line 93) to Deaf and Hearing Impaired - Safeguarding (line 45).
F. Column F summarizes the net effect of the swap changes ano the definitional changes.
G. Column G presents all of the negotiated reallo:ations of funding. The minuses are
program reductions and the pluses are program increases. The reductions ire cs
I. The $927,613 balance available for reallocation in Column F (line 123)
2. Transportation - Department of Human Resources (line 109) - $196,764
3. Counseling - Department of Human Resources (line 36) - $100,000
4. lnformation and Referral - Department of Human Resources (line 90) - $800,000
5. Recreation - Department of Human Resources (line 99) - $330,000
6. Training (line 115) - $258,069
The increases are:
I. Adoption - $20,000 - Department of Children and Youth Services (line 5)
2. Client-Oriented Coordi.Htion of Services - $500,000 - agency to be determined
(line 13)
3. Community Based Non-Residential - $409,000, including $360,000 through the
Department 3n Aging (line IS) and $40,000 for trie board of Education and
Services for the Blind (line 19)
4. Day Treatment - $200,000 - Department of Mental Retar,1ation (line 29);
$60,000 - Department of Children and Youth Services (line 30)
5. Emergency Shelter - $251,066 - agency to be determined (line 37)
6. Safeguarding - $100,000 - agency to be determined (line 46)
7. Foster Care - $120,000 - Department of Children and Youth Services (line 62)
It is also agreed that funds will be set aside for the following purposes:
1. Innovative Projects - $250,000 (line 116)
2. Data Base, Strategic Planning and Evilua tion - $380,000 (line I17)
3. Contingencies - $138,488 (line 119)
IT
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A reserve is set aside (line 74) for cost of living increases in medium priority
programs. Eligibility for increases will be determined basea upon a review of each
provider. Any leftover money will revert to the Contingency Fund (line 119)
The total amount allocated is $33,140,885, the same amount available in the current
year. Data published in the Federal Register on November 26, 1982 indicated that an
additional $836,998 may be available in FY 1984, if appropriated by Congress. It is
agreed that this sum, plus any carryover funding, will be allocated as follows: First,
the Contingency Fund would be restored to $331,400 (1 percent of the present block
gr3t total). Second, an additional $250,000 will be reserved for Client-Oriented
Coordination of Services and will be released for that purpose after six months'
experience with that service and a review by the Tripartite SSBG Committee. Third,$125,000 will be reserved for Transportation. Any additional funding would be
allocated by the Tripartite Committee.
11. DESCRIPTION OF SET ASIDES
A. Training (line I 15)
The teams agree to set aside $600,000 in training dollars. This money would be
administered by the Department of Human Resources, with planning by a committee
of involved agencies in order to preserve the integrity and provision of generic
training of staff and service providers.
B. Innovative Projects (line 116)
There shall be a set aside of $250,000 for the purpose of encouraging and entertaining
new anC innovative requests for proposals (RFP's) which fall unier the purview of
priorities established under the Social Services Block Grant. RFP's will De reviewed
pursuant to the procedures estdblished in Section V of this Agreement.
C. Data Base, Strategic Planning, Evaluation and Technical Assistance (line I17)
The teams agree to set aside $380,000 for the tripartite development of an automated
human service data base/management information system, for strategic planning
related to the SSBG, for evaluation, and for technical assistance to SSBG service
providers.
The maintenance of this data base and the coordination of the programmatic and
fiscal data will rest with OPM and DHR. The State will develop the planning and
evaluation of data into an overall management information system which will strive
for computer compatibility throughout the State, initially among grantor and service
provider agencies with automated capacity. It will develop these systems and the
necessary tools for implementation of the system (manuals, forms, etc.). The initial
objective will be an expanded capacity to develop and maintain common service
definitions, fiscal allocations, client characteristics, and related types of data. The
goal will be to provide a common source of reliable data and to assist the Tripartite
Social Services Block Grant Committee in timely policy, management and fiscal
allocation decisions.
In the area of evaluation, the teams agree to hire a consultant to review current State
grant administration requirements, including audit, reporting
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and evaluating requirements and to offer recommendations to simplify and reduce
administrative burdens on all service providers.
D. Contingency Fund (line 119)
The teams agree to set aside $138,488 (plus other funding which may become
available as described in the final paragraph of Part I, above) The fund will be
available for activities that are liable to occur during the year but cannot be fully
anticipated in advance of the start of the program year.
Contingency uses would be limited to:
1. Funding new, unanticipated priority programs
2. Meeting unanticipated emergency program situations and needs (e.g., flood,
etc.)
3. Funding unanticipated time-limited activities: studies, consultants, etc., which
will enhance SSBG management and/or service delivery.
Ill. STATE AGENCY RESPONSIBILITIES
A. SSBG Lead Agency: Department of Human Resources
Working with OPM, the Lead Agency has central responsibility for:
1. Liaison with the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
2. Executing letters of agreement with the State agencies of cognizance for the
funas allocated oy SSBG service definitions
3. Coordinating ongoing data base, grant administration reform, neeas
assessments and other ongoing planning and administrative functions
4. Maintaining appropriate audit records (State/federal)
5. Liaison with the General Assembly
6. Providing technical assistance to State agencies of cognizance and other
service providers.
B. State Agencies of Program Cognizance
Identified State agencies of cognizance10, in coordination with OPM and the lead
agency, shall have responsibility for:
1. Reviewing current and potential service providers, utilizing the accepted
Criteria For Evaluation and Selection of Service Providers as agreed in Section
IV of this Agreement.
2. Executing contracts or letters of agreement with service providers
U0 State Agencies of Cognizance include: DHR, DMR, DCYS, DMH, CADAC, SDA,
Board of Education and Services for the Blird, Commission on the Deaf and Hearing
Impaired, and Office of Protection and Advocacy.
I)
I
3. Monitoring programs
4. Maintaining appropriate audit records for provider contracts
5. Performing impact assessments
6. Participating in ongoing data base, grant administration reform, needs
assessments and other planning and administrative functions
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Section IV
CRITERIA FOR EVALUATION AND SELECTION
OF SERVICE PROVIDERS
STATEMENT OF GUIDING PRINCIPLES
. Perforiace criteria shall be established for the selection -a :valuation of
service providers.
2. Service providers must be accounittble for the services they provide.
3. Reporting ano evaluation instruments shall be minimized to the extent
compatible with service provider accountability.
4. A consistent, comprehensive data base snail be developed. The three parties
agree to develop an automated SSBG data base and shall set aside funds for its
development.
5. SSBG funds shall be distributed in accordance with the allocation criteria on
the basis of the service provider's ability to neet social service needs, rather
than on the level of government, public or private sector, or previous funding.
6. Selection and evaltiation processes shall be implemented in a manner
compatible with principles of procedural due process.
RESOLUTION IV-1
The process for selecting a service provider for the delivery of SSBG-supported
services shall be as follows:
Step 1. Thie three negotiating teams agree on general criteria to judge
program and management performance, service delivery potential
and the management systems of specific service providers.
Step 2. The State team identifies specific State agencies with cognizance
responsibilities for each of the services as cefined by the Tripartite
Socfial Services Block Grant Committee.
Step 3. For each service category, a notice of availability of funding shall be
developed and disseminated. Said notice snail identify goals and
objectives for the service and those criteria used to assess ano
evaluate pertinent service providers, if any, and shall iaentify, f.ar
information purposes only, present recipients of SSBG funding.
Step 4. The State agencies of cognizance apply criteria to service providers
and make selections. Applications from service providers not under
contract/letter of agreement will be considered along with
evaluations of those service providers which are currently under
contract/letter if agree-nent. Wherever appr,,riate, :nulti-year
(indefinite) funding contracts/letter of agreement, subject to a
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30-day notice of cancellation provision, will be provided, subject to
the continued availability of funding.
Step 5. Tripartite Committee reviews selection decisions.
RESOLUTION IV-2
In order that the criteria below may be fairly applied, it is important that each
application submitted by a service provider be complete enough to permit an
accurate rating for each criterion. Further, for an accurate rating 'of any
application and determination of the financial soundness of the applicant, it is
important that the provider submit a budget for that service which includes and
identifies for the service all sources of revenue and support. Such identification is a
basic requirement which must be met before the criteria listed below are applied.1 I
A. Program and Management Performance (60 points1 2)
- Demonstrated capacity or evidence of capacity for delivering
client-effective services in a cost-effective manner to one or more of
the vulnerable populations.
- Ability to meet the goals and objectives of the agency's work plan.
Demonstrated capacity or evidence of capacity to serve the maximum
possible number of targeted clients within budgetary limitations.
- Demonstrated capacity or evidence of capacity to live within budget.
- Demonstrated capacity or evidence of capacity for coordinating with or
utilizing other available resources for tne particular targeted clients and
networking with other agencies.
- Demonstrated capacity or evidence of capacity for adequate client
follow-up.
- Documented client/staff ratio that permits an adequate standard of care.
- Demonstrated capacity or evidence of capacity that staff has appropriate
training, education and experience necessary to perform in their
respective positions as well as evidence of performance competency on
an ongoing basis.
- Demonstrated capacity or evidence of capacity to provide an integrated
approach to serving the needs of individual clients.
- Demonstrated capacity or evidence of capacity for complying with all
federal, state and municipal regulations, statutes and auditing
requirements.
Assuming all the listed criteria are met, preference will be given to existing
providers in order to maintain continuity of services.
12 The maximum point total for each category reflects the relative weight
attached to each category of criteria.
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rCost eftectiveness.13
B. Service Delivery Potential (40 points14 )
- Presentation of a comprehensive work plan to achieve stated goals and
objectives.
- Evidence that program design meets the needs of the targeted population.
- Evidence of service accessibility (e.g., in terms of geographic and
transportation constraints; cultural and linguistic needs; requirements to
meet the needs of the physically disabled; service availability within
minimal waiting time and beyond normal working hours, geared to clients'
developmental needs and time frames).
- Evidence of explicit client entry systems which include referral and intake
procedures and client eligibility requirements.
- Clear definition of the services offered.
- Demonstrated knowledge and unaerstanding of clientele.
C. Management Systems
Management systems criteria are essential to any provider; thus, no points are
attached to this section. The items noted below constitute minimum
requirements for the selection of any service provider.
- Evidence of a plan for multi-year operation.
- Presentation of a workable, service-oriented, cost-effective budget
indicating all sources of revenue.
- Evidence of fiscal and general management capacity, including timely and
accurate fiscal and program reporting.
- Evidence of quality control.
- Independent audits or financial reports.
- Evidence that the organization is duly constituted under the laws of the
State of Connecticut.
- Evidence of potential for accessing additional resources by service
providers.
13 The Tripartite Committee shall oevelop, by April 25, 1983, standards and
principles for the application of this criterion. In so doing, the Committee shall
pay due attention to the complexity of the services being provided and to the
various types of measurement appropriate to the respective services.
14. The maximum point total for each category reflects the relative weight
attached to each category of criteria.
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RESOLUTION IV-3
The negotiating teams agree to develop a comprehensive, automated human services
data base/management information system and snall set aside funds for its
development.
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Section V
MULTI-YEAR PLANS AND PROCESSES
STATEMENT OF GUIDING PRINCIPLES
A continuing process for the negotiation, implementation and evaluation of the SSBG
shall be the responsibility of a Tripartite Committee which will be constituted in the
same manner as the original process.
RESOLUTION V-1
A Tripartite Social Services Block Grant Committee shall be established. The
Committee, reflecting the three sectors represented in the Negotidted Investment
Strategy process, shall be made up of three members designated by each of the three
negotiating teams plus a chairperson appointed by the Governor. The Committee
shall convene at the call of the chairperson or at the request of the representatives
from two or more sectors. Subject to thosc exceptions noted in this Resolution, the
Committee shall establish its own rules of procedure. All actions of the Committee
shall te by consensus save for the exceptions iaentifiec herein. The chairperson shall
not have voting power. The Committee may, if it deems appropriate, enlist the
services of a mediator, with expenses for said services to be charged to the
contingency fund. In addition to such other functions as the Governor may charge the
Committee with performing, the Committee snaii have the following responsibilities
and powers:
1. Oversight. The Tripartite Committee will have responsimility for overseeing and
evaluating the implementation of this Agreement, for monitoring the impact of
this Agreement and for assuring tne continuance of the positive working
relations established among the representatives of the three sectors. Its
oversight responsibilities will include, but nut be limited to, training, strategic
planning and the development of the SSBG data base, fees aria eligibility
standards, and paperwork reduction.
2. Interpretation. Should there be elements of the final Agreement that are
unclear, tne Committee will be responsible for providing clarification.
3. Duties.
a. In the event that the actual funding level of SSBG dollars available in
federal fiscal year 1984 is different from the amount allocated unaer this
Agreement, the Committee will be the forum for the negotiation of any
necessary adjustments to the Agreement.
b. The Tripartite Committee will evaluate and advise on the selection of
projects to be funded through the set-asioes for Innovative Projects and
Training and on all activities undertaken using the Data Base, Strategic
Planning, Evaluation, and Technical Asssitance Set-aside.
c. In those cases where this Agreement allocates additional funding to
certain high priority services but does not indicate the specific State
agency of program cognizance, the Committee will review the designation
of the agency or agencies of cognizance.
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d. Each State agency of program cognizance, following its selection of
specific provioers, will inform DHR and OPM regarding its decisions.
DHR and OPM will then prepare a draft detailed aggregate allocation plan
indicating for each service category the specific allocations to providers
(State agencies, municipalities, and non-profit agencies). There shall be a
public review and comment period with opportunity for a public hearing
after ample notice. After the review and comment period, agencies of
cognizance will be responsible for informing DHR and OPM of any
revisions to the draft allocation plan. The final draft will then be
submitted to the Tripartite Committee for its review. Any
recommendations or proposed modifications to the plan shall be specified
in writing and sent to the Commissioner of DHR and/or the Secretary of
OPM for final determination. 1 5 The Commissioner and/or Secretary will
respond in writing to the Committee's recominendations or proposed
modifications and shall state his or her rationale for accepting or rejecting
each of the Tripartite Committee's recommendations or proposed
modifications. 16
e. The Committee will be the forum for the negotiation of any amendments
deemed necessary in order to implement the terms of this Agreement.
f. The Committee, upon the initiation of the chairperson or representatives
from any two sectors, shall reconvene to consider any amendments to the
Agreo~nermt. Tne adoption of any proposed amendments shall require the
negotiated consensus of all sectors.
4. Fiture NIS. The Committee will begin preparation for future negotiations on
the SSBG and will advise the Governor regarding the application of the NIS
process for federal fiscal year 1986 ana for future years.
The Tripartite Social Services Block Grant Committee shall carry out its functions in the
spirit of cooperation engendered by the NIS process and in a manner consistent with all
State and federal laws and regulations.
i:> Tne Tripartite Committee, in discharging its responsibilities, is authorized by the
agreement to make written or oral requests of appropriate State agencies, municipalities
or ion-profit agencies. Said agencies or subdivisions shall respond to said requests in a
timely manner.
16 Any modifications will be sent to the Commissioner of DHR and the Secretary of OPM1
except in those cases in which DHR is the agency of cognizance. For those cases,
proposed modifications will be sent directly to the Secretary of OPM for final
determination.
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Section VI
CONTRACTS OR LETTERS OF AGREEMENT
STATEMENT OF GUIDING PRINCIPLES
1. Contracts/letters of agreement appropriate to the service shall be the basis for
the distribution of all SBG funds.
2. A funding instrument pursuant to a contract/letter of agreement shall be signed
with each provider. Every effort will be made, subject to Congressional 3r
State legislative funoing decisions, to provide funds to providers by the start of
eacn fiscal period.
3. Contraictual agreements/letters of agreement shall ensure that all service
provi ers are paid for services on a timely basis.
RESOLUTION VI- .
Service providers shall be paid on a timely basis.
RESOLUTION VI-2
The Tripartite Committee shall examine practices and performance regarding the
aliccation of 55BG funds among administrative and direct service categories. The
Committee shall prepare, adopt and publish a report no later than October 1, 1983
which reflects its findings an. contains recomnmenaations, if any, for appropriate
guidelines and practices to govern these fiscal allocations so as to ensure the most
effective program performance possible oy a service provider.
RESOLUTION VI-3
The Tripartite Committee shall examine practices and performance regarding the
payment of SSBG funds to SSBG service providers and the manner of investing said
SSBG funds by various State agencies and SSBG service providers. The Committee
* shall prepare, adopt and publish a report no later than October 1, 1983 which reflects
its findings and contains recommendations, if any, for appropriate guidelines and
practices to govern the financial investment options that both maximize the use of
5SBG funds and are consistent with all State and federal laws and regulations.
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We hereby accept and affirm the foregoing statements, data, and obligations as
constituting the terms and conditions of our agreement.
Dated December 23, 1982
For the State:
Barbara Brasel
Executive Director
m. on the I af & Hearing Impaired
Donald MPConnell
Executivtr Director
Ct. Alcohol and Drug Abuse Commission
Ho . Stephen B. Heintz
Under Secretary
0 flce of Policy an anagement
Hon. Hector A. R vera
Deputy Commissioner
Department of Human Resources
Hon. Amy Wneaton
Deputy Commissioner
Dept. of Children and Youth Services
For he Non-Profit Sector:
Rooert burgest
President
Ct. Association for Community Action
usan Halperin
Attorney-at-Law
Raymon Norko
Executiv Director
Legal Aid Society of Hartford County
J6an Quinn
Executive Director
Connecticut Community Care, Inc.iZF
Jo n R. Quinn
acutive Director
h..ster Seal Society of Connecticut
For the Municipalities:
Hon. Rudolph Arnold
Deputy Mayor
C of Hartford
Joqi C' en(
Executi e Director
S c onference of unicipalities
Albert Ilg
Town Manager
Town of Windso
Hon. Anthon/ aiorano
First Selectfn n
Town of Marlborough
David Russell
Executive Director
Council of Small Towns
r the M on T m:
eph b. Stulberg
ediator
Ernest L. Osborne
Associate Mediator
J. Michael Keating
Secretariat
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INTRODUCTION
The Partnership Forum for Social Service Priorities was
organized in April 1984 at the request of Marie Matava,
Massachusetts Commissioner of Social Services. In order to
negotiate an agreement regarding the future of the Massachusetts
Public-Private Partnership Program--4P (a special social service
program involving both public and private funds)--the Forum
brought together representatives of the following: (1) the six
regional, forty area, and one central office of The Department of
Social Services (The DSS Team); (2) the 230 proprietary and non-
profit providers of social services (The Providers Team); (3) the
20 United Ways, sixteen municipal and county human service
offices, and 80 corporations and independent foundations that
provide matching funds to help support particular social services
(The Partners Team); and (4) representatives of recipients of
social services (The Citizens Team).
The four teams organized themselves independently of each
other. They received funds from DSS to hire administrative
staff. All four teams were assisted by a professional Mediation
Staff that they helped to select. The four teams met on their
own and together for ten months to consider possible changes in
the administration of the 4P Program as well as possible shifts
in funding and service priorities. The agreements reached by the
Partnership Forum are contained in this report. The teams did
not vote; rather, they worked until a consensus emerged. The
individuals and organizations whose names appear on the signature
page at the end of this report are committed to working together
to implement the agreements spelled out in this document.
Copies of the minutes of all the meetings of the teams and
of the Forum as a whole are available through the Massachusetts
Department of Social Services.
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I. THE NATURE OF THE 4P PARTNERSHIP: THE ROLES AND
RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE FOUR PARTIES
Preamble
The 4P Program is a general social service program that
belongs to the people of the Commonwealth. It is managed by the
Department of Social Services with input from Providers,
Partners, and Citizens. The hallmarks of the 4P Partnership are
flexibility and sensitivity to local needs. Although 4P is
jointly managed, DSS is accountable for the expenditure of funds.
Due to the special shared funding feature of the 4P Program, the
joint-management approach is applicable only to 4P and not
necessarily to other activities of DSS.
Composition and Strengthening of Area and Regional Advisory Boards
1. Advisory Boards shall be used to involve community
representatives--Citizens, Partners, and Providers--in the
development of the 4P service structure. DSS Central Office will
regularly update the membership handbook and job descriptions of
Advisory Board Members. DSS shall organize training for new
Board members that highlights the responsibilities of Board
membership.
2. Area Boards and Area Office staff must make a special effort
to encourage membership of Partners, Citizens and client
representatives. Area Boards should include Partner
participation.
3. Special efforts must be made to recruit adequate minority
and rural underserved representation on Area Boards.
4. Regional Advisory Committees shall be created in those areas
where local cooperation would be especially helpful or where Area
Board members desire to form such committees. They will take
responsibility for making recommendations relecant to multi-area
needs assessment, priority setting, and RFPs. Participants will
be drawn from Area Boards within each region and be
representative of Citizens, Partners, clients and minority groups
in the region.
5. The 4P Advisory Committee, formerly the Donated Funds Task
Force, will be reconstituted and convened. The Commissioner
shall take steps to ensure that the Committee includes
representatives of the Partner, Provider, and Citizen interests
and ensure adequate representation of minorities and the poor.
The responsibilities of this committee are detailed in Sections
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IV and VIII of this agreement. The Committee should (1) develop
an outreach program to locate and involve new Partners, new
Providers, and new communities in the 4P Program; (2) advise on
priority setting; (3) take responsibility for developing a
statewide flexible matching policy; and (4) monitor the
implementation of this agreement.
The Assignment of Responsibility for Needs Assessment
1. The Regional and Central Offices of DSS shall manage the
process of needs assessment. This entails (1) formulating a
framework to guide the analysis of needs assessment data; (2)
providing technical assistance to the area level staff
responsible for needs assessment; (3) providing relevant state or
regional data (e.g. census statistics or labor force trends); (4)
promoting information-sharing among different areas and regions,
including information on both technicall issues and the results
of needs assessments; (5) monitoring local data collectiona dn
ensuring reasonable consistency with statewide needs assessment
standards; and (6) developing a readily accessible data base.
DSS shall maintain needs assessment data in publicized accessible
locations and at Area, Regional, and Central offices.
2. Area Boards, DSS Area Office staff, and other appropriate
Citizen, Client, Partner, and Provider representatives will work
together to collect local needs assessment data on a regular
basis and to review and comment on the overall framework for
needs assessment (i.e. tools and techniques) proposed by the DSS
Central Office.
3. Regional Advisory Committees will make recommendations to
ensure that multi-area or regional service needs are given
adequate attention in the process of needs assessment.
The Assignment of Responsibility for Establishing Service
Priorities
1. The establishment of area, regional, and statewide services
priorities requires a partnership amon DSS, Citizens, Partners,
Providers, and Clients. 4P service priorities should reflect the
results of a bottom-up process. DSS rea boards and area staff,
in concert with Citizens, Clients, Partner, and Provider
representatives shall develop local service priorities that
reflect current needs assessments and that take account of
statewide and regional service priorities.
The Assignment of Responsibility for the RFP Process
1. The area staff director, with support and advice from the
area board, shall assume responsibility for developing an area-
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specific purchase plan and evaluating RFP responses from the
provider community.
2. The regional director, with support and advice from the
regional advisory committee, shall assume responsibility for
developing a region-wide purchase plan, evaluating RFP responses
for multi-area services, and ensuring that all proposals from
within the region are evaluated.
3. DSS Regional and Central Offices are recognized as the units
with ultimate responsibility for the selection, monitoring, and
evaluation of Providers chosen to fulfill particular contracts.
If there are services or programs for which needs assessments
indicate the desirability of statewide administration, the
relevant RFPs shall be issued by the DSS Central Office.
4. Issues involving the identification of local service need and
the prioritization of services shall not be grounds for a
Regional Office rejecting an Area's recommendation for other
reasons, the basis of the rejection shall be given in writing to
the Area Boards.
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II. NEEDS ASSESSMENT
of Needs Assessment
Needs assessment is the process of determining the level of
need for social services of different types, both services
currently provided and services not currently provided.
Background
The Massachusetts Department of Social Services is mandated
by law to conduct a needs assessment each year. Section 7D of
the Massachusetts General Laws states,
The Commissioner shall conduct an annual needs
assessment for all social services under the control
of the department.
DSS conducts needs assessments at the area level. The role
of the DSS Area Boards in this process is defined in Section 15
of the law:
1) To act as representatives of the citizens of the
area;
2) To advise regarding local needs and resources in
the development of a comprehensive analysis of
social needs;
3) To review and approve the annual area plan and to
make recommendations concerning the annual budget
for the comprehensive social services of the area.
Relationship of Needs Assessment to the Setting of Priorities and
the Purchase of Services
There is a strong relationship among needs assessment, the
setting of service priorities, and the development of purchase
plans. All three must be viewed independently; yet the results
of a needs assessment guide the setting of service priorities.
These, in turn, shape the composition of the purchase plan. The
design of a needs assessment includes the previous definition of
service priorities and past purchase plans. In short, it is
inappropriate to consider needs assessment as completely
independent of either service priorities or purchase plans.
n2o
Collection of Needs Assessment Data
1. The assessment of social service needs should involve
systematic efforts to obtain information from consumers.
Assessments should yield measurements of the needs of population
groups, particularly underserved groups such as minorities and
the rural poor. Data collection should produce quantitative
assessments of the needs of various target populations. Some
populations, it should be noted, cannot be surveyed directly.
Information regarding their needs must be sought from providers,
partners, consumer advocates, the Office for Children (OFC), and
key informants in the social service network.
2. DSS will either designate or hire an appropriately trained
staff member whose primary objective is to design a state-of-the-
art needs assessment instrument to ensure the most objective
assessment possible. If this is not possible, DSS will engage an
outside professional consultant to review and help to improve
existing needs assessment instruments. DSS staff (Area,
Regional, and Central), along with Area Board members and
partners,.will also be given regular access to training in needs
assessment techniques.
3. A comprehensive needs assessment will be conducted once every
three years beginning in FY 1986. Such a comprehensive
assessment will encompass all populations and all service
categories in order to provide a baseline against which to
measure future needs as well as progress. The results of the
comprehensive assessment will be available to the public with
sufficient notice to allow all parties time to evaluate any
changes in needs prior to the issuance of new RFPs.
4. Annual updates will be used to verify suspected changes in
levels of need in consultation with the 4P Advisory Board. While
every effort should also be made to minimize the cost of annual
updates, review of consumer needs shall be conducted annually.
Off-year updates shall also make use of data and analyses
developed through regular RFP monitoring and evaluation.
5. Needs assessments conducted as part of the $P Program shall
be integrated and consistent with other needs assessments carried
out by DSS. The results of all needs assessments shall be
readily accessible to the public. The public shall also have
easyu access to the overall needs assessment data base maintained
and updated by the DSS Central Office.
6. Needs assessment data will be collected at the most
disaggregate level feasible. For most populations and services
this will be the area level. In order to reinforce the
community-oriented bias of the 4P Program, howecer, needs
assessment data should be analyzed and presented on a community-
by-community basis. For some highly populated areas, data may
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have to be presented at a neighborhood or sub-community level to
be useful to citizens, partners, and providers. The needs of
some minority populations can only be assessed efficiently on a
regional or statewide basis. The needs assessment guidelines
adopted by DSS should be flexible enough to assure that the needs
of minorities are evaluated at the level most likely to ensure
accuracy.
7. The needs assesment process requires the cooperation of DSS
Central, Regional and Area offices. It is the responsibility of
DSS Central, Regional, and Area offices to promote standards for
statewide comprehensice needs assessment including initial
direction and traing in the development of needs assessment tools
and techniques. Regional and Area offices will supplement the
standardized tools and techniques to take account of local
concerns.
8. Area Boards must take responsibility for ensuring that
citizens, providers, and partners review all needs assement tools
(e.g. surveys) and techniques (e.g. sampling protocols) in
sufficient time for their imput to be effective. Area Boards
will ensure that Partners are involved in any public review of
needs assessment tools and techniques.
9. To conduct comprehensive needs assessments every three years,
DSS will augment existing PDS staff with citizen volunteers and
will solicit participation of Partners in collecting and
analyzing needs assessment data. The goal is to prodcue needs
assessment data that all parties in the state will use in
planning for changes in the plans for purchasing 4P servicesc
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III. REQUESTS FOR PROPOSALS
Objectives of the RFP Process
Requests for Proposals (RFPs) are used to move from
needs assessment to realistic plans for the provision of
services. The RFP process must be designed to preserve openess
and competitive bidding in the purchase of services.
The Timing of Open RFPs
1. RFPs are to be issued once every three years corresponding to
the service cycle. This presumes that annual contracts are
rolled over (after careful monitoring).
2. RFPs will be distributed with enough lead time to allow both
partners and providers sufficient time to respons. The timetable
and schedule will be standardized and publicized in advance. If
RFPs are sent out in January (of the preceding budget year),
awards should be granted in April, with contracts commencing in
July. Partners for whom this schedule presents problems (because
of imcompatible internal budget timetables) will alert DSS.
There shall be at least a 30-day period available to review
proposals.
3. DSS shall open bid new monies to stimulate new initiatives.
Information Required to Respond to RFP
1. The complexity of the financial information required by RFPs
may discourage small or less knowledgeable agencies from
submitting responses. DSS will streamline the financial portion
of its RFPs.
2. The amount of information Providers are required to submit in
response to RFPs can be onerous. The amount of information
requests will be reduced through DSS's use of RFQs--Requests for
Qualifications--by which qualified Providers may preregister.
Master contracts may also be used in the same way. These will be
issued to Providers doing business with DSS and will cover all
subsequent individual purchase agreements. It is important to
note that such streamlining must not reduce the informational
requirements for effective monitoring.
3. DSS and Partner agencies willl coordinate their information
requests from Providers. Where feasible, they should request the
same information in determining financial allocations for the
same services.
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Dissemination of Information About RFPs
1. It is DSS's responsibility to provide general as well as
technical information about RFPs to potential and current
Partners and Providers. In addition to maintaining readily
accessible and up-to-date lists of all RFPs issued and meeting
all public notice requirements, DSS will take several additional
steps: (1) inform as many Provider agencies as possible about
forthcoming RFPs (and make public the list of agencies it has
tried to contact in connection with each RFP); (2) inform as many
Partner agencies and Citizen Advocates as possible about
forthcoming RFPs (and these groups, in turn, should help DSS
expand its list of Providers to contact); (3) allow Providers not
initially known to DSS an opportunity to respond to any RFP; and
(4) provide all interested Providers and Partners with as much
technical information as possible to assist them in responding to
technical information as possible to assist them in responding to
RFPs. DSS will share with interested Partners any technical
information it receives from Provider agencies in response to
RFPs.
2. Provider agencies shall supply DSS and Partners with copies
of their RFP responses on request.
3. Representative(s) from DSS will be designated at the regional
level to provide assistance in responding to RFPs.
Contracting
Partners shall be notified in a timely fashion of the dates
that RFPs will be negotiated and will be invited to participate
in these contract negotiations.
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IV. MATCHING PROVISIONS
Background
The purpose and effect of any modification of the existing
25% matching provision of the 4P Program should be to generate
additioinal support for those programs of demonstrated need that
have had difficulty identifying matching funds as a result of,
but not limited to, geographic isolation, the nature of the
service provided, or the nature of the clientele served.
Obstacles to Greater Partner Participation
The Partnership Forum identifies several conditions that
seem to have inhibited overall Partner participation in the 4P
Program: (1) some potential Partners have incorrectly presumed
that they will be burdened by excessive contractual and
administrative requirements; and (2) many potential Partners have
not participated because they have not been aware of the
existence of the 4P Program.
Some services have been unable to generate matching funds
from Partners even when the two conditions described above have
not applied. There are several reasons why this has probably
been the case: (1) some services have generated little Partner
interest and (2) some areas of the state have had difficulty
identifying matching funds because of a scarcity of potential
Partners or Providers in their vicinity; (3) some programs that
serve primarily minority clients have had difficulty identifying:
matching funds; and (4) the overall level of 4P funding has not
increased rapidly enough to take full advantage of all potential
Partner contributions.
There is a Need to Reconvene the 4P Advisory Committee
In order to overcome some of the obstacles to greater
Partner participation in the 4P Program, it is agreed that the 4P
Advisory Committee will be reconvened. The Committee will seek
to overcome the lack of information and the presence of
misinformation about the 4P Program among Partners and Providers.
DSS shall work with the Committee to spearhead an educational
effort to inform potential Partners and Providers about
oportunities and recent changes in the Program. Potential
Partners and Providers will be targeted and introduced to the
Program. They will be given information that will help to dispel
popular misconceptions about the contractual liability of
Partners. The Committee will also seek to apprise past Partners
and Providers of the substantial procedural and regulatory
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reforms that have taken place in the 4P Program since 1982.
The Advisory Committee will work to expand its former
membership to ensure that groups that have been historically
under-represented are included. This applies especially to
representatives of service consumers and citizen advocates.
The Need for a Matching Pool
In order to marshall support for needed programs that
confront difficulty in identifying matching funds, Providers and
DSS staff will alert the 4P advisory Committee when such
situations arise. The Committee will advise DSS on the
identification of potential new partners that can participate in
the creation of a statewide matching pool. These funds will be
raised in a manner that will not compete with the fund raising
efforts of existing Partners.
The Advisory Committee will define appropriate guidelines
and funding criteria relative to the use of the funds in the
matching pool. The participants in the Partnership Forum urge
the Advisory Committee to focus on sliding matching arrangements
for both Partners and DSS. DSS shall determine which programs
should be supported with funds from the matching pool in order to
redress bona fide inability to identify matching funds.
The Possibility of Cdollaborative Matching Arrangements
Under current regulations, Partner contributions can be
pooled in order to produce a 25% match. Unfortunately, many
current and potential Partners are not aware of the possibility
of collaborative matching arrangements. It is also permissible
for one participating Partner to serve as a financial conduit for
the other(s). DSS shall make a special effort to publicize the
acceptablity of these arrangements.
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V. MONITORING AND EVALUATING
The Objectives of Monitoring and Evaluation
Careful monitoring and evaluation of 4P contracts are
required to ensure that public and partner funds are administered
responsibly and that the highest possible level of service
quality is maintained. More specifically, monitoring is aimed at
ensuring that contracts are administered in compliance with
statewide purchasing and service standards. Monitoring is also a
means of providing on-going technical assistance. Evaluation is
meant to ensure that 4P-funded services meet measurable program
goals and that service providers engage in a process of self-
review.
External evaluations, incorporating information gathered
through on-site visits, are crucial to effective administration
of 4P contracts. In addition, providers must be responsible for
developing such plans, providers must be sure to (1) define
specific goals and objectives for each funded activity (N.B.
these should be measurable at any point in the funding cycle),
and (2) collect and analyze client and service data in a fashion
consistent with state regulations.
Who Monitors and Evaluates
1. Monitoring and evaluation teams should be comprised of
representatives of the DSS, DSS Area Boards, the appropriate
Partner agencies, and OFC councils, where appropriate. Maximum
effort will be made to locate minority and underserved
representatives to serve on monitoring and evaluation teams.
There shall be at least one professionally qualified person on
each team (i.e. one person with the appropriate license or
accreditation and experience evaluating the service being
reviewed).
2. DSS will take the lead in organizing monitoring and
evaluation teams. This will be done in cooperation with Area
Boards and appropriate Partner agencies.
3. In an effort to avoid conflicts of interest, no individual
who has or may derive a personal or financial interest, benefit,
or gain through a program being reviewed may be involved in
monitoring or evaluating that program.
4. Every effort should be made by state, federal, and private
agencies involved in evaluations to coordinate their evaluation
efforts. 4P evaluations may usefully be supplemented with other
past or on-going evaluations.
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What To Do With Information Obtained Through The Monitoring and
Evaluation Process
1. Monitoring and evaluation reports shall be available to the
general public through the Department of Social Services. DSS is
responsible for maintaining copies of all reports. To the
greatest extent possible, monitoring and evaluation data should
be computerized and available through a central source (i.e. DSS
Central Office).
2. Monitoring and evaluation reports shall be sent, as a matter
of course, to appropriate Partners, Providers, DSS Area Offices,
and members of monitoring and evaluation teams (who have asked
that copies be sent to them). It is the responsibility of the
DSS Regional offices to be sure that reports are distributed in a
timely fashion.
3. As part of its monitoring and evaluation process, DSS should
continue to collect data which specify minority clients served.
These data should be specific with regard to racial, ethnic, and
cultural identification; typl/2es of service rendered; and number
of contacts with the service provider.
4. Evaluation reports play an important role in the RFP process:
evaluations will be considered when contracts are reviewed for
renewal.
5. Information obtained through evaluations should be used to
provide technical assistance to other agencies involved in
providing similar services.
6. Monitoring and evaluation team, when conducting their
evaluations, will have access to (1) all staff and management
personnel of the provider agency, and (2) all organizational
records, including budgetss and general data regarding the
delivery of services (i.e. how many clients served, their income,
eventual disposition of cases, etc.). Client records will be
made available only to DSS representatives, subject to
regulations and applicable law.
Training and Notice Requirements
1. Training will be provided to all those serving on monitoring
and evaluation teams by DSS and, where appropriate, in
conjunction with other agancies. Training should include, but
not be limited to: (1) review of all relevant state regulations;
(2) review of contracting practices; (3) review of provider
proposals in response to RFPs and any outside communications
regarding the RFP and the contract; (4) review of monitoring and
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evaluation policies and procedures; and (5) review of purchasing
and service standards.
2. Providers and Partners shall be notified at least 10 days in
advance of any on-site visits. Notification includes proposed
evaluation criteria and the composition of the monitoring and
evaluation team. If a provider is expected to furnish
information beyond the scope of a self-evaluation or other
routinely collected information, the Provider shall be told this
at least 30 days in advance of an on-site visit. Whenever and to
the greatest extent possible, monitoring and evaluation teams
should coordinate site visit dates and times with providers. If
a Provider agency objects to the composition of a monitoring or
evaluation team, it has the right to appeal, orally or in
writing, to DSS. DSS shall develop a standard appeals process.
3. Exit interviews shall be conducted with the Provider prior to
the preparation of a Final Report. The Provider shall have the
opportunity to make factual corrections or to furnish a formal
written response to a final monitoring or evaluation report.
4. DSS shall, within three years, standardize all monitoring
processess. Formal evaluations, including on-site visits, shall
be conducted once during each three year funding cycle for each
Provider operating one or more 4P contracts.
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VI. MINORITIES AND THE UNDERSERVED IN RURAL AREAS
Background
Many easily identifiable minorities have a great need for
more responsive and more extensive human services of the sort
provided under the 4P Program. Yet, unless special efforts are
made to overcome the barriers to meeting the social service needs
of these disadvantaged groups, their needs will continue to go
unmet.
In Massachusetts, the term Minority Populations is used to
refer to people who differ from the Commonwealth's majority in
terms of either race, ethnicity, or cultural background, or
language. The underserved in rural areas are part of a
distinguishable group of people who have readily identifiable
needs, but whoo are not receiving the human services they require
because of their geographical isolation. The primary focus
within this underserved group should be those at the lower end of
the income scale.
There exist a number of barriers that make it difficult for
the system to respond fully to the social service needs of
minorities and the rural underserved. First, cultural and
language barriers sometimes generate misunderstandings. Needs
may go unrecognized because communication is impeded. Second,
there exists, often unintentionally, institutional discrimination
that results in a propensity to respond with insufficient
sensitivity to the needs of minorities and the underserved in
rural areas. Third, there are insufficient financial resources
to respond to all those in need.
The existing human service delivery system emphasizes
response to immediate problems. Equal consideration should be
given to interventions before problems are manifest.
Service Priorities and the RFP Design
1. There is a major need for a minority role in translatiing
minority needs into service priorities and the design of programs
and services. Since service priorities and purchase plans are
defined primarily at the area level, a mechanism must be
developed to ensure that minorities in each area are adequately
represented on Area Boards.
2. Many minorities may be too few in number to be represented on
each Area Board without those Boards becoming to large to be
functional. To address this problem, DSS shall recommend to
State Advisory Committee a Minority and Rural Underserved
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Subcommittee of the DSS statewide Advisory Committee. Membership
of this subcommittee need not be limited to Area Board members.
This subcommittee should include representatives and advocates
for minorities and rural poor populations and should act to
oversee the assessment of needs, to advise DSS on which services
ought to be given priority for each minority and rural poor
client group, and to assist DSS in translating those priorities
into RFPs that address those needs.
Program Responsiveness
1. DSS will continue to focus on delivering quality services to
minorities and the rural underserved in the state. This may
require that in responding to RFPs, Providers be asked to
demonstrate knowledge of the needs of minority populations within
their geographic area and demonstrate that their staff have the
requisite language skills and cultural sensitivity to serve
minority clients in a manner that can bridge social and
geographic isolation.
2. DSS should encourage Providers that serve minority and
underserved populations to undergo appropriate training
(responsive to concerns of the particular community being served)
in sensitivity to the problems of poverty, isolation, and other
social issues that affect service delivery. DSS will continue to
provide the same training to its own staff. Resources to
underwrite annual cross-cultural training may be included in RFPs
for services to minority and underserved populations.
3. There is an important need to educate and train more minority
professionals and professional working in rural areas in human
service delivery. Partners, Providers, and DSS should make
greater efforts to allocate resources to increase the
opportunities for minorities to secure professional training in
human services through scholarships, tuition reimbursement, and
other work/study programs.
4. DSS will allow for and encourage the development of flexible
and innovative service modalities and will allow for training
required for those service modalities.
Building Statewide Capacity to Serve Minorities and the Rural
Poor
1. With the help and assistance of Partners, Providers, and
Citizen Advocates, the 4P Advisory Committee should initiate an
outreach program to identify new Partners willing to provide
additional matching funds aimed predominantly at serving the
needs of minority and underserved clients in rural areas.
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2. Every effort should be made to remove contracting and
procurement barriers in the path of minority providers. There
are a number of steps that DSS might be able to take in this
regard. DSS shall reimburse providers at a fair and equitable
rate for services rendered. Second,, DSS shall take whatever
steps are necessary to implement the Administration's wage
upgrading policy so that minority providers can hire
professional, multi-lingual minority staff at competitive
salaries. Third, DSS shall review its contracting system to be
certain that any requirements that encourage minority providers
to bid less than competitive amounts for service contracts or
that discourage minorities from bidding at all are eliminated.
DSS will, for example, remove any barriers to partnerships
between minority and non-minority providers seeking to respond
together to the special needs of minority and rural poor clients.
3. In allocating resources to regions and areas, DSS shall
recognize and provide for increased costs associated with
providing services to certain communities, such as the increased
costs of time spent in travel by DSS staff and provider staff and
the administrative costs of maintaining outreach sites so that
services will be accessible to clients.
4. DSS shall ensure that its minimum standards are flexible
enough to permit small providers with limited staff to manage
administrative and fiscal procedures. DSS and 4P Partner
agencies will be encouraged to assist minority providers in
building their capacities to handle administrative and fiscal
responsibilities.
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DISTRIBUTION OF ADDITIONAL 4P FUNDING
All services funded from the 1040 (4P) account are 75%
state-funded. Priority setting for the 1040 account will be
based on a careful analysis of needs assessment results. The
indicators that will be used are listed in Appendix II of this
report. Although this list is not complete, it will be used in
the interim until DSS develops a more complete set of tools and
techniques for undertaking comprehensive needs assessment.
Partners interested in purchasing services that are
primarily supported through 0200 account may do so to supplement
0200 funding. The participants in the Partnership Forum agree
that improving services to the underserved, increasing local
discretion, achieving wage parity and prevention are significant
considerations in guiding 4P allocations.
Assumptions
1. The 4P Program is unique for several reasons. First, it is
rare that a program exists that pairs local Providers and local
funding sources (Partners) to provide human services identified
by communities. Second, 4P is the only general social services
program in the Commonwealth. The Department of Social Services
is the administrator of this program, although theprogram belongs
to the larger community. In this light, all services funded by
4P must be open referral unless otherwise negotiated in a three-
party agreement among the specific Partner, Provider, and Area
office (this does not imply that all 0200 services will be on a
closed referral basis).
2. The base budget request for the 4P Program (prior to the
allocation of any increment) must remain at least at its 1986
level plus for inflation of 4%
Scope of This Agreement
The following paragraphs of this section of the agreement
focus exclusively on the allocation of additional funds in the 4P
budget. The task the participants in the Partnership Forum set
for themselves was to generate a consensus on how best to spend
additional money. The participants hope it will be easier to win
support for additional funds once it is understood that the uses
of the new money spelled out in this agreement will have the full
support of all the groups involved in the 4P Program.
Wage parity for social service workers supported under any
4P contract. the partiipants in the Partnership Forum feel
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strongly that current salary levels for the social service
workers supported under 4P contracts (as well as other state
contracts in Massachusetts) are low relative to prevailing wages
in the public sector. Such disparities have many different
causes and will not be resolved easily. Nevertheless, consistent
with whatever EOH agreement is reached, DSS will implement wage
parity.
New approached to meeting the needs of heretofore
underserved minorities (particularly racial and ethnic
minorities). A portion of any increment in 4P funding should be
used to broaden and deepen the social services available. The
Partnership Forum recommended that special emphasis in this
regard be placed on agancy and staff development. In the long
term, any improvement in the response to the needs of minorities
will depend on an expansion of the capacities of new or existing
agencies with the potential and ability to serve hertofore
underserved minorities. In order to achieve the goal of
strengthening minority agencies and minority services and staff
within non-minority agencies, 4P money will be set aside for:
minority contracts; to provide technical and RFP assistance; to
help determine the needs of minorities in the Commonwealth; and
other ways to stimulate further staff and agency development.
Creation of a more flexible pool of 4P money. The
participants in the Partnership Forum are convinced that the 4P
Program should emphasize the desirability of responding to
locally determined needs. This means that differences in needs
and priorities from region to region and area to area ought to be
expected. In order to enhance the responsiveness of the 4P
Program, the participants in the Forum agree that a portion of
any increment in 4P funding will be set aside to create a
flexible pool. This pool will be distributed, with the advice of
the 4P Advisory Committee for local need identification,
establishment of priorities, and demonstration projects. The
allocation of these funds must be based on a demonstrated need
for services and can be used to (1) support projects or programs
at the local level that might help to underscore the needs that
would be of benefit state-wide; )2) redress inequities in
allocation that are cause by matching requirements that may be
too hard for some areas to meet; or (3) provide greater
flexibility at the local level in terms of eligible services and
rapidly emerging service needs. This allocation method will also
be used as a pilot for local involvement which will be expanded
in FY87. A pilot will also allow for the testing and refinement
of implementation plans prior to the issuance of regulations.
4. A priority of the 4P Program should be to support families
and protect children.
Listed below are statewide priorities presented by DSS for
1040. The participants agree that these will be among the
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criteria used when local priorities are established for 4P.
Families in Need of Service
Strengthening the capacity of families and individuals to
act responsibly and independently should be given the highest
priority. Specific outreach programs for people in their homes
and through agencies with services that strengthen parenting
skills and strengthen inter-family communication is important.
Services that encourage families to stay together and treat
family members with proper respect should be emphasized. These
include respite care for families with physically and emotionally
handicapped members, parent aid programs, the full range of
family planning services (including natural family planning), and
day care services, especially for infants and toddlers, and for
children of parents in training programs. For families and
individuals already functioning independently, information and
referral programs should be considered as should advocacy for
special needs students to assure acess to existing services.
Young Parents/Parents-to-Be
The vast increase of teenagers who become pregnant and
choose to keep their babies creates a high priority for services.
Programs for young parents, particularly school and community
based programs, offer an opportunity for comprehensive prevention
vocational dollars might be directed to high risk, troubled young
parents to help them finish their education. Funds could also be
allocated to ensure that this population reveives proper medical
attention and learns decision-making, future imaging, and
parenting skills, thereby preventing unwanted pregnancy,
abuse/neglect and welfare dependency.
Adolescents in Need of Services
There are two youthful populations for whom existing
resources are inadequate: adolescents who do not live in a
family setting and youth with severe behavioral problems. The
first group continues to grow since traditional family settings
are not a viable option for large numbers of teens. Increased
emergency shelter capacity and intensive outreach tracking
services are also needed for both these groups.
Linguistic and Cultural Minorities
As the number of linguistic and cultural minorities grows,
DSS has become aware of the need to overcome barriers to service
and isolation faced by these populations. Additional funding in
this category should be devoted to strengthening DSS's capacity
to deliver existing services to cultural and linguistic
minorities. This goal will be partly realized through DSS's
commitment of 7% of all its contract dollars to minority owned
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vendors.
The Homeless
This population continues to be a high priority where
shelter and housing for homeless families are inadequate or non-
existent. Additional funds should be spend to increase housing
search and intensive advocacy to both prevent homelessness and
locate shelter for already homeless people. This service should
be targeted to those geographic areas where enormous housing
problems both create family break-up and drain the social work
system.
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VIII. MONITORING IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS AGREEMENT
The agreements spelled out in this document will be
implemented immediately. No legislative action is required. The
individuals whose signatures appear on the final page of this
document support implementation of the more than 60 specific
points of agreement. The signees have made every possible effort
to brief their respective organizations on the terms of this
agreement and are pledged to take the following steps subsequent
to signing.
1. Team members will gather at least twice within a year of the
date of the signing of this agreement (preferrably at six-month
intervals) to review progress on implementation. These meetings
will be called by team leaders or someone designated by the
current team leaders.
2. The Commissioner and the 4P Advisory Committee will meet at
least annually, on or about the anniversary of the signing of
this agreement, to review the process of implementation. The
Commissioner will take the responsibility for convening this
meeting and will make every effort to attend.
3. If any team believes that the terms of this agreement have
been ignored or violated by any of the signees (or their
organizations), administrative remedies will be sought.
4. The terms of the Partnership Forum agreements are only those
spelled out in the Final Agreement (and not in any prior draft
agreements or conversations). The participants agree not to cite
or quote any of the terms of this agreement out of context.
5. DSS will distribute this agreement annually with a progress
report to all Forum participants, the Provider and Partner
communities, Area and Regional Boards, Area and Regional
management staff, the 4P Advisory Board, and central office
staff. The first Annual Program Reports will be in the hands of
the groups listed at least two weeks prior to the scheduled
meeting of the 4P Advisory (2 above).
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